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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. New venture teams (NVTs) in technology-based entrepreneurship 
Technology-based entrepreneurship is an influential source of scalable economic growth and 
major improvements in public health, environmental sustainability, and wealth creation. The 
mechanisms through which entrepreneurs shape their ventures are often contingent on factors 
related to the institutional characteristics of the national economy, industry, and most 
importantly – the entrepreneurs themselves. In this PhD dissertation, we highlight the essential 
role of the entrepreneurs at the heart of technology-based new ventures – with a specific focus 
on their experience, disposition and actions. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach to 
entrepreneurship, we bridge insights from related disciplines, such as social psychology, 
personality research, management and organizational behavior. By doing so, this dissertation 
aims at gaining a more fine-grained insight into the role of individuals and teams in 
entrepreneurial opportunity identification. 
The importance of entrepreneurial teams has been widely recognized by research and 
the popular press. Because the majority of new ventures are started and led by teams, rather 
than by a single entrepreneur (Kamm, Shuman, Seeger, & Nurick, 1990; Klotz, Hmieleski, 
Bradley, & Busenitz, 2014), team members’ experience and qualifications are important factors 
for entrepreneurial success (Beckman, 2006; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Ensley, 
Pearson, Amason, 2002; Wasserman, 2013). Next to supplying their firm with critical human 
and social capital, founders shape the initial structures of their organization, which tend to have 
long-lasting imprinting effects, affecting new ventures’ development over time even after all 
initial founders have left the firm (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Leung, 
Foo, & Chaturvedi, 2013). The salient role of teams becomes particularly apparent in high-
technology sectors, where the complexity of the business requires an array of technological 
and commercial capabilities impossible to possess by a single person, as a result of which 
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technology commercialization becomes increasingly a team sport (Beckman, 2006; 
Chowdhury, 2005; Mustar & Wright, 2010). Given the typically small size of entrepreneurial 
teams, their high degree of interdependency and joint decision-making, the organizational and 
team levels of analysis often coincide, with the latter allowing to capture pertinent competences 
that determine new venture’s success (Beckman, Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007; Forbes, Borchert, 
Zellmer-Bruhn, & Sapienza, 2006; Penrose, 1995), and making these teams a promising and 
compelling topic to research.  
Although quality of the team is critical to investors (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Clarysse 
& Moray, 2004; Gimmon & Levie, 2010) and for the overall success of the new firm (Beckman 
& Burton, 2008; Beckman, Burton & O’Reilly, 2007), we know surprisingly little about how 
teams emerge and evolve, and how they affect firm performance over time. Extant research on 
new venture teams has produced a large number of valuable insights, focusing on the effects 
of various human and social capital characteristics on team processes and organizational 
outcomes (for recent review, see Klotz et al., 2014). However, topics related to team formation 
and evolution have been widely under-studied and many research questions remain 
unanswered. Specifically, questions related to how teams evolve and what determines their 
founding mode remain open to date. This is particularly intriguing given that a team’s 
composition of knowledge and experience is considered to be one of the main drivers of new 
venture success (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Yet new 
ventures often experience a number of constraints that may prevent them from developing a 
most optimal team. Deliberate or unconscious in their nature, these constraints may take place 
already at the very inception of a new firm and may persist during its further development. 
Therefore it is important to understand where they come from and how they can be overcome. 
Specifically, we need a more fine-grained understanding of what drives a particular founding 
mode of a team and what influences its development over time.   
 3 
Against this backdrop, the present PhD dissertation aims to gain a deeper understanding 
of the role of entrepreneurial teams, focusing specifically on their emergence and evolution. 
To do so, we first perform a systematic literature review to map existing work, to identify 
existing gaps and avenues for future research (Chapter 3). In a unique longitudinal data set of 
Flemish technology-based new ventures, we then aim to address these research gaps (Chapters 
4 and 5). In this introduction, we begin by providing definitions that we will use throughout 
this dissertation. We then introduce the overall theoretical framework and present a summary 
of the three papers included in this dissertation: one systematic review (Chapter 3) and two 
empirical studies (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
1.2. Defining NVTs in technology-based new ventures 
The present dissertation focuses on new venture teams within high-technology sectors, in 
which entrepreneurial opportunity is fostered through innovations in science and engineering.  
By doing so, we aim to address new ventures that exhibit the ambition and potential to grow 
and succeed. While technology-based new ventures are not representative of the entire 
population of start-ups, they form an important subgroup, particularly with regard to their 
contribution to the respective national economy, job creation and innovation (Almus & 
Nerlinger, 1999; Audretsch, 1995). Due to the critical challenge of linking technological 
expertise with market-related capabilities, these ventures are typically founded by teams 
(Roberts, 1999) whereby the question of retaining and updating highly skilled human capital 
plays a particularly pertinent role, making technology-based new venture teams an interesting 
context to study evolution and performance effects of new venture teams.  
In this dissertation, we distinguish between founding teams and new venture teams. In 
line with prior research, we define founding team as a group of entrepreneurs who were 
involved in new venture’s legal incorporation (De Jong, Song, & Song, 2013). The term new 
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venture team, in contrast, refers to both founding teams and teams comprising subsequently 
hired managers. Throughout this dissertation we will use the terms new venture team, 
entrepreneurial team, and start-up’s management team interchangeably to describe “the group 
of individuals that is chiefly responsible for the strategic decision making and ongoing 
operations of a new venture” (Klotz et al., 2014, p. 227).  
 
1.3. Overall framework of this dissertation 
The main objective of this PhD dissertation is to provide a deeper insight into the issues related 
to the evolution of entrepreneurial teams. Providing an in-depth account of multiple team 
characteristics, while acknowledging the dynamic nature of new venture teams, will 
substantially improve our understanding of the role of teams in entrepreneurial success and 
contribute to a number of related research fields, including entrepreneurship, management, 
organization and strategy. In addition, this dissertation is also designed to have a number of 
practical implications, as it addresses important issues of team staffing and development. It 
aims to shed light onto important questions relevant for both scholars and practitioners: “Why 
do management teams look the way they do?” and “Is it better to start up with a fully developed 
team of experts (which might be costly both financially and in terms of coordination) or is it 
better to start up with a relatively small and homogeneous team and acquire additional human 
capital as a new venture evolves?” 
 Although scholarly interest in new venture teams is relatively new, the field generated 
a large amount of work, covering numerous issues related to team experience (e.g., Colombo 
& Grilli, 2010; Gruber, 2010), diversity (e.g., Amazon, Shrader, & Tompson, 2006; Eisenhardt 
& Schoonhoven, 1990), team functioning/ processes (e.g., Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Ensley, 
Pearson, & Pierce, 2003) and emergent states (e.g., Brinckman & Hoegl, 2011; Chowdhurry, 
2005). In order to be able to navigate through this large and wide-spread body of work and to 
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identify the open research questions specifically critical to teams in high-technology ventures, 
there was a need of an overview of the extant research. To provide such an overview, which 
would allow us to identify research gaps and to formulate promising and compelling 
propositions, we conducted a systematic literature review with a specific focus on high-
technology new ventures as represented by academic spin-offs. Although, academic spin-offs 
(ASOs) do not represent the entire population of technology-based start-ups, they constitute an 
important proportion of innovative technology-based new ventures (Rasmussen, Mosey, & 
Wright, 2011). As such they face similar concerns as their independent counterparts that 
commercialize novel and often disruptive technologies. Therefore, the insights generated from 
the ASO context can be transferred and applied to the wider context of technology-based start-
ups. Furthermore, ASOs are typically founded by teams (Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2010; 
Mustar & Wright, 2010), which makes them particularly interesting to examine issues related 
to entrepreneurial teams. Chapter 3 of this PhD dissertation is the result of a large-scale 
systematic review1 of studies on teams in academic spin-offs published in peer-reviewed 
journals between 1980 and 2015. This review summarizes the current state of the art2 and 
highlights existing research gaps. The most prominent research gaps that were identified within 
this literature review included current lack of understanding of (a) team formation and (b) 
compositional dynamics within teams. The subsequent chapters of this PhD dissertation are 
two empirical studies that aim at filling these gaps. 
 First, studies on new venture teams predominantly focus on firm performance and other 
indices of entrepreneurial success, whereby little is known about the origins of teams and their 
                                                 
1 This review was conducted as part of a collaboration project with Dr. Iro Nikiforou, Prof. dr. Bart Clarysse, and 
Prof. dr. Marc Gruber. The review process was a team effort, to which I have significantly contributed. The 
resulting paper (part of this PhD as Chapter 3) was published in the Academy of Management Perspectives, 
reference: Nikiforou, I., Zabara, T., Clarysse, B., & Gruber, M. (2018) The Role of Teams in Academic Spin-
Offs. Academy of Management Perspectives, 32(1), 78-103. 
2 Existing reviews on the role of entrepreneurial teams (e.g., Klotz et al., 2014) cover a wide range of team-
related themes, yet do not focus on the specific issues related to technology-based entrepreneurship. Given the 
richness of the field, there was a need to synthesize existing research on teams in academic spin-offs.   
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configuration. Lack of these insight is surprising given that founding conditions have long-
lasting imprinting effects, which are known to influence new ventures’ development and 
performance over time (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Simsek, Fox, & Heavey, 2015). 
Understanding how entrepreneurial teams emerge and what drives heterogeneity in their initial 
design is important both for theory and practice. A deeper insight into the forces governing the 
initial structural choices may help to overcome biases and increase the change for new venture 
success. In Chapter 4, we use our rich dataset of career histories and demographics of founders 
in Flemish technology-based new ventures to examine the role of lead founder’s personality 
traits in assembling and structuring the founding team3. By delving into the micro-foundations 
of founding team structures and focusing on the entrepreneurs’ individual biases, we aim to 
contribute to the important question of why management teams look the way they do and why 
there is high degree of heterogeneity with regard to how founders start their firms. 
 Second, existing research on entrepreneurial teams, along with the general team 
research, has been criticized for treating teams as static entities, whereby their characteristics 
are linked to firm performance, disregarding compositional changes that occurs within these 
teams (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2015; Guenther et al., 2015). Because new ventures’ human capital 
constitutes their most critical asset, changes to founding teams are crucial for new firms’ 
success. Understanding the drivers of compositional change is particularly important for 
practitioners, while at the same time there is a need for theory synthesis. Following recent calls 
for a more dynamic approach to team composition (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & 
Alliger, 2014), we focus on compositional change within new venture teams. In Chapter 5, we 
use our unique longitudinal dataset of Flemish technology-based new ventures to examine the 
antecedents of new managerial hire in technology-based new venture team4.  We argue that the 
                                                 
3 This paper is co-authored with: Prof. dr. Boone, Prof. dr. van Witteloostuijn, and Prof. dr. Clarysse. It aims to 
be submitted to the Journal of Business Venturing 
4 This paper is co-authored with: Prof. dr. Boone, Prof. dr. van Witteloostuijn, and Prof. dr. Clarysse. It has been 
submitted to the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal. 
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antecedents of new member addition can be traced to the attributes of team, organization and 
environment in which new ventures operate. We further examine and discuss the relative 
importance of these attributes.  
 Figure 1.1 represents the overall research framework of this dissertation, illustrating 
how research gaps and propositions derived from the systematic review (Chapter 3) lead to the 
subsequent empirical chapters, in which we attempt to fill these gaps. The two empirical studies 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) are also interrelated, as they address different stages of the founding 
team evolution. In the following sections, we provide a short summary of each of the three 
papers, the  systematic review and the two empirical studies. 
 
Figure 1.1. Overall framework of this dissertation 
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1.4. Overview of the papers 
1.4.1. Chapter 3: The role of teams in academic spin-offs 
Academic spin-offs (ASOs) represent a small but economically significant proportion of high-
tech new ventures. Although, originating from a historically non-commercial environment, 
academic new ventures tend to be different from their independent counterpart in a number of 
aspects (Colombo & Piva, 2012), they are faced with similar challenges at the core of which is 
the need to synergize technological and business competences in order to successfully 
commercialize novel and potentially disruptive technologies (Rasmussen, Mosey, & Wright, 
2011). These challenges may involve potential lack of relevant commercial skills and industry 
experience, as well as the need to hire new managers in an attempt to overcome this 
shortcoming. New professionals may add relevant managerial know-how, yet these additions 
may also be detrimental as differences between managers and engineers with regard to their 
mindset and identities may be large.   
 The purpose of the Chapter 3 of this PhD dissertation is to provide a systematic review 
of existing wok on teams in ASOs that would enable an overview of pertinent common themes, 
as well as to identify research gaps. Although the specific focus of this literature review is on 
the academic spin-offs, we are certain that a large number of generated insights also applies to 
the independent technology-based start-ups. We carefully analyze, map and discuss this body 
of work in order to make it readily accessible to researchers and outline a number of interesting 
paths for future research at the intersection of ASO and entrepreneurial teams. We find that the 
majority of reviewed studies has focused on the human capital (HC) and social capital (SC) 
endowments of academics and surrogate entrepreneurs forming the ASO team, while much 
less attention has been directed to issues surrounding team formation and evolution, and only 
a handful of studies focused on team functioning, such as knowledge-sharing and conflict.  
Based on this critical assessment of the status quo, we identified several research gaps and 
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articulated promising avenues for future research, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. We aim at filling 
some of these gaps in the follow up chapters of this PhD dissertation. 
 
































1.4.2. Chapter 4: Micro-foundations of organizational blueprints: The role of lead 
founder’s personality 
Founding team structures have been found critical for new ventures’ development and success 
as they provide a framework for entrepreneurs to combine and channel their efforts to achieve 
organizational goals, but also because once established they tend to be long-lasting and difficult 
to change (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Leung et al., 2013). For instance, scholars reported that 
new ventures founded by teams, as opposed to lone entrepreneurs, have higher survival rates 
(Aspelund, Berg-Utby, & Skjevdal, 2005), and that founding teams with higher levels of 
structuring are more likely to grow (Sine et al., 2006), obtain venture capital (Beckman & 
Burton, 2008), and to achieve initial public offering (Beckman et al., 2007). Teams as opposed 
to a lone entrepreneur enjoy access to more human and social capital resources (Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1992), and developed structures help new firms to overcome liabilities of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). While a majority of new ventures start-up with fairly homogenous 
founding teams (Klotz et al., 2014; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003), there is a high variability 
between new ventures with regard to how they structure their founding teams. This leads to an 
interesting, yet understudied question – what influences founders’ preferences toward one or 
another (potentially more successful) design? In other words, what determines new ventures’ 
successful blueprint and, consequently, why do organizations and their management teams 
look the way they do? 
 To answer this question, prior research focused on the institutional context of a new 
venture creation – by comparing university spin-offs with independent technology-based start-
ups (Colombo & Piva, 2012; Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005) – and at the sociological mechanisms 
behind founding team formation (Ruef et al., 2003). These studies have highlighted the 
importance of the lead entrepreneur in making a core decision of whether to recruit a team and 
whom to recruit. Yet do date, this role has not been empirically examined. Chapter 4 of this 
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PhD dissertation aims to contribute to this line of research by elucidating the role of lead 
founder’s personality in forming a founding team, in a way that facilitates the long-term 
success of a nascent organization. Using our rich fine-grained data on founders’ functional 
positions and career histories, we find that personality traits affect different aspects of the 
founding team structure, each of which are known to facilitate new ventures’ long-term 
success. Extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability reflect individuals’ interpersonal 
disposition and are associated with founding with a team. Conscientiousness reflects 
individuals’ deliberation and planning and is important for the structural elaboration of the 
founding team. Figure 1.3 depicts the research model of this chapter. 
 



























































1.4.3. Chapter 5: Expanding the circle: Antecedents of a new managerial hire in 
technology-based new venture teams 
New ventures are typically founded by a group of friends or colleagues (Klotz et al., 2014; 
Ruef et al., 2003) whose knowledge, skills and charisma become the major source of new 
firms’ initial human capital (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
Over the course of time, new ventures need to professionalize their founding team by hiring 
new managers as the venture evolves and outgrows capabilities of its initial founders (Boeker 
& Karichalil, 2002; Chang & Shim, 2015; Wasserman, 2003). As the original founders may 
not possess the requisite skills to manage a firm growing beyond its founding stage, new 
managers are needed to reduce the misfit between founders’ capabilities and changing 
organizational demands. This first manager-level hire is an important milestone in a life of a 
new venture as it sets the course towards transition from a small, typically unstructured venture 
managed by a rather informal entrepreneurial group to a fully developed organization led by a 
professional management team. Despite a number of studies devoting their attention to the 
evolution of founding teams, we still know surprisingly little about when firms are likely to 
reach this milestone and what factors influence its completion.  
Extant studies have generated a wide range of interesting insights (e.g., Boeker & 
Wiltbank, 2005; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Feguson et al., 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; 
Wasserman, 2003; 2017), with, however, little integration effort made up to now. Existing 
findings are dispersed over different literature fields, using different theoretical lenses, 
different levels of analysis, and (in some cases) datasets that do not allow for fine-grained 
hypotheses testing.  The purpose of the Chapter 5 of this PhD dissertation is to integrate existing 
findings on antecedents of new managerial hires in entrepreneurial teams, to examine their 
relative importance and to provide additional insights. We do so with a specific focus on 
growth-oriented technology-based start-ups, as these ventures are typically started by teams in 
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which capability development proves particularly important (Gruber, MacMillan, & 
Thompson, 2008; Mustar & Wright, 2010). Utilizing our unique longitudinal data on 148 
Flemish technology-based new ventures, we find that new ventures’ likelihood to hire new 
managers depends on multi-level forces related to the founding teams’ human capital, board 
oversight, and commercialization environment. Figure 1.4 illustrates the research model of this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
In the spirit of the open science movement (Honig et al., 2018; van Witteloostuijn, 2016), this 
chapter provides a detailed overview of the data collection and the dataset construction 
processes. The aim is to promote transparency, but also to acquaint the reader with the dataset 
used in this dissertation, including its strengths and weaknesses. In the following sections, we 
first describe the type of data that was collected for this dissertation. We then, describe in detail 
the methods of the review study (Chapter 3) and the datasets used in the two empirical studies 
(Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
2.1. Data collection 
The purpose of this PhD dissertation is to examine the role of entrepreneurial teams in the 
development and performance of technology-based new ventures. First, this requires a 
thorough assessment of the status quo within the extant research. We therefore, performed a 
large-scale systematic literature review, including 593 papers published in peer reviewed 
journals since 1980. Based on this review, we were able to identify prominent literature gaps, 
which we addressed in the two subsequent empirical studies. Second, studying the role of teams 
in technology-based entrepreneurial process requires extensive organizational, team-based and 
individual data on innovative growth-oriented technology-based new ventures. Because this 
type of data is not readily available, a key part of this dissertation was the construction of an 
extensive longitudinal database, which encompassed yearly organizational and financial 
information on 169 Flemish technology-based innovative growth-oriented start-ups and the 
detailed demographic data on 382 founders and 98 subsequently added managers. In the 
following sections, we first describe the methods used in the review study (Chapter 3). Then, 




Table 2.1. Overview of the collected datasets  
Chapter 3 (Review) Chapter 4-5 (Empirical studies) 
Reviewed papers N=593 Firms N=169 
Final dataset N=43 Founders N= 382 
  New team members N=98 
 
2.2. Chapter 3: Methods 
We conducted a systematic literature review of studies that examined the role of teams in 
academic spin-offs for the period between 1980 and 2016. We chose 1980 as the starting point 
of our review, because the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 increased the incentives 
for academic science commercialization (Link, Siegel, & Bowman, 2007; Siegel, Waldman, & 
Link, 2003) and initiated increasing scholarly interest in this phenomenon. We searched the 
Web of Science database for studies containing the terms “team(s)”, “founders” or 
“entrepreneurs” and a variety of keywords that we generated in order to capture academic spin-
offs. The full list of keywords is provided in Table 2.2. Our initial search generated 593 studies.  
We reviewed each of the 593 papers to identify those studies that met our inclusion criterion: 
research that deals with both (1) teams and (2) academic spin-offs in a non-trivial manner. For 
instance, some papers only touched upon the notion of team and, thus, can hardly be considered 
as research that is focused on the subject of the present study. In this regard, studies that simply 
mention the words “team”, “spin-off” (or related words) and did not elaborate on these 
concepts were eliminated from our review. In addition, we eliminated studies that examined 
teams different than founding teams or top management teams, except for the studies that 
examined other types of teams (e.g., board of directors) in relation to founding or top 
management teams. This process generated 40 studies. Furthermore, we added 3 papers 
(Colombo & Piva, 2008; Franklin et al., 2001; Heirman & Clarysse, 2004) that we knew were 
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relevant to our study but did not show up in our search, giving us a total sample of 43 studies 
that formed the basis for our literature review. 
 
Table 2.2. List of keywords  
To capture teams To capture academic spin-offs 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Team / founders / entrepreneurs AND 
Academic spin-offs/ spin-outs/ start-ups/ ventures/ firms 
University spin-offs/ spin-outs/ start-ups/ ventures/ firms 
Research spin-offs/ spin-outs/ start-ups/ ventures/ firms 
Science spin-offs/ spin-outs/ start-ups/ ventures/ firms 
Science/ research/ academic/ university commercialization 
Science/ research/ academic/ university incubator 
Science/ research/ academic/ university park 
Academic technology transfer/ TTO 
University technology transfer/ TTO 
 
 
2.3. Chapter 4 and 5: Database construction 
At the basis of the empirical database construction was the initial dataset of Flemish 
technology-based innovative start-ups, which comprised very detailed information on NVs 
firm-level information including: founding year, sector, type of the business model, product-
orientation, patent, board, and investment (see Table 2.1 for the full overview of variables). 
This dataset has been constructed by Prof. dr. Bart Clarysse5 and Prof dr. Robin de Cock6 in 
collaboration with the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT)7, 
                                                 
5 We would like to thank Prof. dr. Bart Clarysse for sharing this data set 
6 We would like to acknowledge Prof dr. Robin de Cock who has initiated and was chiefly responsible for the 
collection of the initial dataset, which we complemented by a new wave of data collection that resulted in our 
final database 
7 At the time of the initial data collection (between 2009 and 2015), IWT was a governmental agency aimed at 
supporting innovation in Flanders, both within academia and industry. In 2016, it merged with The Research 
Foundation Flanders (FWO) – a Flemish public research council that aims at supporting scientific research.  
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which has helped to identify the population of innovative technology-based start-ups, provided 
their contact information and endorsed participation in the data collection process8. The overall 
initial dataset comprised 169 new ventures (1,006 annual observations) founded between 2006 
and 2013. As the list of newly founded firms were yearly added, the dataset resulted in an 
unbalanced panel dataset, with the last new firms update following in 2014 (firms founded in 
2013) and the last data collection round in 2015. While this dataset provides rich longitudinal 
information on entrepreneurial firms, it was not designed for team-demography research. It 
lacked fine-grained individual and team-level data and hence did not allow us to test our 
hypotheses. Therefore, additional data collection was performed to create a comprehensive 
dataset of demographic characteristics of all founders and subsequent managers for each 
corresponding year of observation. 
 
The additionally collected data comprises 382 founders of 169 firms and 98 new managers for 
which multiple sources were used. We began the data collection process by cross-checking the 
organizational information about each of the start-up in the initial dataset using the BELFIRST 
database and the Belgian business register (Staatsblad). This information included: status (i.e., 
active vs. closed), legal situation, founding date, contact details, and names of founders and 
officers (where applicable). We also recorded new more detailed information that helped us 
link the initial dataset with other existing data sources. This information included: enterprise 
registration number, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) numbers, starting capital, and 
whether the firm is a university spin-off. We then used founders’ career histories to construct 
a database of each founder’s demographic and career-related information using secondary data 
sources (e.g., LinkedIn, Bloomberg, firms’ websites, and press releases), which we also 
                                                 
8 We refer to Appendix 2.4.1 at the end of this chapter for more detailed information on the data collection methods 
of the initial dataset. 
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supplemented by the primary data-collection (e.g., emails and interviews with the founders), 
where secondary data could not be obtained. Based on the individual-level detailed raw data, 
we constructed team-based variables.  
Merging the two datasets resulted in a unique longitudinal database that combines 
yearly organizational data on entrepreneurial firms, complemented by fine-grained information 
about founders and subsequently hired managers – including their education, age, prior 
functional experience (with up to three former positions), company affiliation and shared work 
and education experience. The advantage of this dataset is that it follows each firm since its 
legal founding. Its longitudinal nature allows us to keep track of the changes in firm and team-
level characteristics, while accounting for the effects of founding conditions. Hence, it fits well 
with the objective of this dissertation to study the evolution of the entrepreneurial teams. Table 
2.3 provides the full overview of the data within the two merged datasets. In the following 
sections, we first describe the overall dataset, and subsequently the datasets used by each of 
the two empirical studies. 
 
Table 2.3. Dataset construction 
 Initial dataset 
(169 firms)  
 
Data collected as part of this PhD dissertation 
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Team member addition 
 
Confirm founding team size 
Confirm founders’ names 
Confirm team size 
Confirm team exit 
Confirm team member addition 
 
Education diversity 
Functional role at founding diversity 
Functional role at founding breadth 
Dominant functional experience diversity 
Functional experience breadth 
Elaborate structure 
 
Prior commercial experience (years) 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 





Commercial experience (years) 
Personality 
Past start-up experience 
 
For each team member: 
Year of birth 
Gender 
 
Level of education 
Field of education 
 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 
Serial entrepreneur 
 
Functional role at founding 
Functional role at each year 
 
Past job functional role 1 (last job) 
Past job functional role 2 (second last job) 
Past job functional role 3 (third last job) 
Dominant functional experience 
 
Prior company affiliation (company name) 







2.3.1. Sample description 
This section deals with the descriptive statistics of the sample. We begin by providing an 
overview of some basic organizational characteristics of the 169 technology-based new 
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ventures in the overall dataset, summarized in Table 2.4. About 54% of the firms in our sample 
were founded to commercialize a product, approximately 24% commercialized services, and 
around 22% to do both. A large share of new ventures developed their products and services 
to market to other businesses, in a business-to-business model (61%). A smaller share targeted 
end-consumers (32%), while a very small share targeted both (7%). With regard to the industry 
sectors, the largest share of new ventures operated within Business services (32%), ICT (20%), 
and Biotech/ medical (14.8%) sectors. Others are distributed among industries related to 
Energy, electricity and electric devices, Construction and maintenance, and the Standard 
products for people’s and animals’ needs. About 24% of our sample are university spin-offs9, 
and approximately 14.8% of the ventures in our sample have had a patent at the time of new 
ventures’ founding. Only 3% of all ventures have received venture capital at the time of 
founding, while 10% have obtained funds from business angels. Around half of the new 
ventures had a board, and about 23% had an external board at the time of founding. 
 




                                                 
9 We performed a number of tests to see whether the university spin-offs significantly differ from the rest of the 
firms in our sample. The descriptive statistics and the two-group mean comparison tests are summarized in the 
Appendix 2.4.2. 
Commercialization orientation Total % 
Product 92 54.4 
Service 40 23.7 
Hybrid  37 21.9 
Total 169 100 
Business model Total % 
Business-to-business 103 61 
Business-to-consumer 54 32 
Business-to-business-and-consumer 12 7 





Table 2.5 summarizes some basic characteristics with regard to new ventures’ founding teams. 
The founding team size ranges between 1 and 7 members, with a mean size of 2.2 (see Figure 
2.1 for the distribution of founding team size). Assessing the founding team composition, with 
regard to its functional role structure (Figure 2.2) and its functional experience (Figure 2.4), 
we observe a large homogenous group: at founding a large group of firms has only one 
functional role (typically CEO) and only one prior functional experience.  This may be caused 
by the fact that 30% of new ventures in our sample are founded by a solo founder. We therefore 
also provide team diversity distributions for a sub-sample of new ventures founded by teams. 
Although the average number of functional roles and prior functional experience is higher for 
this subset of firms, it still remains fairly low with the majority of founding teams having two 
functional roles (typically limited to a CEO and a technological function)  and with the majority 
of teams having prior experience in one functional domain. This resonates with the common 
finding that new ventures are typically founded by groups of friends, relatives and former 
colleagues who often share similar backgrounds and experiences (Klotz et al., 2014; Ruef at 
Industry sector Total % 
Business services 54 32 
ICT 34 20.1 
Biotech/ medical 25 14.8 
Energy/ electricity/ electric devices 21 12.4 
Construction/ maintenance 11 6.5 
Other* 16 9.5 
missing 8 4.8 
Total 169 100 
* Standard products for people’s & animals’ needs 
Other characteristics Total % N 
University spin-offs 41 24.6 169 
Patent at founding  25 14.8 169 
VC funds at founding  5 3.1 159 
BA funds at founding 16 10 159 
Board at founding  77 47.8 161 
External board at founding 37 23.3 159 
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al., 2003). It is also interesting to note that a very small number of teams has no prior functional 
experience (functional experience breadth is 0). 
 
Table 2.5. New ventures’ founding team characteristics 
 Measure N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FT size Count  169 2.17 1.11 1 7 
FT role breadth10 Count  161 1.66 .78 1 4 
   Team-based subsample Count  112 1.92 .78 1 4 
FT experience breadth Count  149 1.73 .97 0 4 




                                                 
10 The detailed description of how founding team role breadth and experience breadth 
variables were assessed can be found in Appendix (2.4.2) 
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Table 2.6 presents an overview of some essential time-variant characteristics of our dataset. 
On average, new ventures were 6.3 years old at the moment of the last data collection round 
(see Figure 2.6 for the distribution of new venture age and years of founding). During the 
overall data collection period, 31 (17%) of the firms in our sample ceased their existence. The 
mean age of failed firms was 6.74, ranging between 3 and 9 years (Figure 2.7). Around 20 
firms (12%) have received venture capital investment at some point of time, with the mean age 
of 7 years at the time of the first receipt of VC funds (Table 2.8). Also, 20 firms (12%) have 
received business angels’ investment (BA) at some point of time, with the mean age of 6.95 
years at the time of the first receipt of the BA funds (Table 2.9). 
 
Table 2.6. New ventures’ time-varying characteristics 
 Measure N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Age Year 169 6.26 1.93 2 9 
Failure age Year 31 6.74 1.67 3 9 
VC age Year 20 7 1.62 4 9 
BA age Year 20 6.95 1.70 3 9 
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2.3.2. Limitations of the dataset 
Despite offering a rich and unique data on founders’ career histories, the dataset used in this 
dissertation also suffers from a number of limitations. These limitations may have several 
implications for the findings presented in this doctoral thesis and therefore need to be 
addressed. Next to the missing data and sample representativeness (discussed in more detail in 
the following sections), the dataset suffers from a limited number of cases. In each of the two 
empirical studies, the complete information was available for only 148 firms. This limits our 
ability to detect interactions, as well as to add a large number of control variables.   
 Second, the dataset comprises a number of different sectors, each of which may have 
different implications with regard to the commercialization activities (e.g., different product 
development cycles, regulation). This may be a source of unobserved heterogeneity that we are 
unable to control for. Furthermore, it makes it difficult to compare performance. Due to the 
differences in cost-intensity and product development cycles, new ventures in some sectors 
may be faster than others to generate returns. Third, our dataset is an unbalanced panel data, 
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which suggest that the new ventures in our sample belong to different cohorts that may face 
different environmental constraints (i.e., subjected to different economic climates, changes in 
regulation etc). Each of these limitations are discussed in more detail at the end of each 
empirical chapter of this dissertation.  
 
Missing data and subsamples  
Although great efforts have been made to collect data from multiple sources, some data of 
interest could not be obtained, leading to the fact that our dataset suffers from missing data. 
This is particularly evident for variables including personal information about entrepreneurs 
and new ventures’ board and investment characteristics. As a result, the two of our empirical 
studies are each performed on a separate subset of firms from our overall sample. The table 
below summarizes the number of observations in each of the subsamples, as well as the overlap 
between the two.  
 
Table 2.7. Overview of the datasets used for the two studies  
 N Overlap study 1 Overlap study 2 
Overall dataset 169 88% 88% 
Dataset study 1 (Chapter 4) 148 100% 127 (86%) 
Dataset study 2 (Chapter 5) 148 127 (86%) 100% 
 
 
2.3.3. Sample representativeness 
We used the population of technology-based new ventures identified by the IWT – Flemish 
governmental agency for Technology and Innovation. It needs to be noted that this is not a 
random sampling technique and new ventures may self-select into the dataset by actively 
applying for the governmental seed funds. Therefore, this sample may be not representative of 
the overall population of technology-based start-ups in Flanders, Europe or the world. 
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However, given that it is difficult and maybe even impossible to identify the full population of 
technology-based start-ups from which one could draw a representative sample, this dataset is 
well suited for the theory-testing we aim at, and offers a number of strengths in this regard. 
First, it includes a relatively large number of technology-based start-ups that consider 
themselves innovative and have certain levels of growth-orientation, as signaled by their 
application for the IWT grants. Second, the dataset spans across different sectors and 
technological domains, allowing us to examine environmental differences within the 
entrepreneurial process. Third, all new ventures are drawn from the same geographical region, 
suggesting that new ventures within the sample are subjected to the same national policies, and 
region-specific barriers to entrepreneurship. Fourth, consistent with prior studies, we find that 
the large share of new ventures in our sample are founded by teams, where group dynamics 
and synergies play a pertinent role in new venture development. In summary, our dataset is 
well suitable for theory testing. However, to test for its representativeness and the 




2.4. Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.4.1. Construction of the initial IWT dataset 
Before merging with the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) in 2016, the Flemish Agency 
for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT) supported innovation in Flanders, both 
within academia and industry. One of its programs provided grants of up to 50,000 Euros to 
technologically-advanced new ventures. Most of entrepreneurs starting this kind of ventures in 
Flanders apply for these grants, as they represent one of the most accessible ways of receiving 
seed capital. IWT actively encouraged entrepreneurs to apply for these funds and supported 
them with the application process.  
Since 2009, IWT collaborated in constructing the database of technology-based start-
ups in Flanders by providing yearly the contact information of all the applicants – including 
successful and not successful candidates. In 2009, the lists provided by the IWT included all 
new firms applying since 2006. IWT actively endorsed the participation in the data collection 
process, increasing the face validity and the likelihood of higher response rate. Based on the 
contact information provided by the IWT, the annual data collection was performed involving 
multiple data sources (secondary databases, web-search, interviews with the founders and 
surveys). Out of the total number of 258 identified and contacted firms, 169 (66%) participated 
by completing a questionnaire at several points of time. The overall information recorded on 
these firms resulted in an unbalanced panel dataset of 1,006 yearly observations.  
  
 32 
Appendix 2.4.2. Measuring founding team composition 
Consistent with prior research, the composition of the founding team is assessed by the means 
of two measures: (1) breadth of functional roles and (2) breadth of functional experience 
(Beckman & Burton, 2008; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Breadth of roles describes the 
number of functional domains in which a team has formalized roles, while breadth of 
experience assesses the number of functional domains in which a team collectively has prior 
experience.  
Founding team’s breadth of functional roles is assessed by the means of a count 
measure assessing whether the firm has defined positions within the team that correspond to 
the following seven functional areas: (1) general management, (2) 
science/R&D/ICT/engineering, (3) sales and marketing, (4) manufacturing and operations, (5) 
finance/accounting, (6) strategic planning/business development, and (7) law and 
administration (including HR). These areas were identified by prior research as important 
functional domains for technology-based firms (e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2008; Boeker & 
Wiltbank, 2005). For each venture, it was recorded how many functional domains are covered 
by the positions within the founding team. For example, if a founding team consists of a CEO, 
Director of Discovery Research, Director of Marketing, and a Director of Business 
Development, this team has four established functions (general management, 
science/R&D/ICT/engineering, sales/ marketing, and strategic planning/business 
development) at the time of founding. Conversely, if the team consists of a CEO, Director of 
Discovery Research, Senior Director of Technology Development, and a Vice President in 
R&D, this team has two established functions (general management and 
science/R&D/ICT/engineering).  
  Founding team’s breadth of functional experience, assesses whether the team has prior 
experience in the aforementioned seven functional areas. We code up to three prior positions 
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for every individual within these domains. For example, if one founder has worked as a CEO 
and as a technology developer, this founder has prior functional experience in two functional 
domains: general management and science/R&D/ICT/engineering. The second founder 
worked as a senior researcher, R&D specialist and technology developer, this person has 
functional experience in one domain: science/R&D/ICT/engineering. Collectively, these 
founders have prior experience in two domains, hence the team’s breadth of functional 
experience is equal two.  
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Appendix 2.4.3. Comparing university spin-offs and independent technology start-ups 
We performed a number of tests to see whether university spin-offs significantly differ from 
the rest of the firms in our sample. Table 2.8 provides some basic descriptive statistics with 
frequencies and corresponding percentages across two groups, university spin-offs and 
independent start-ups. About 41% of the academic spin-offs, compared to 58% of independent 
start-ups were founded to commercialize a product, approximately 29% (compared to 22%) 
commercialized services, and around 29% (compared to 19%) to do both. An equally large 
share of academic spin-offs and independent start-ups developed their products and services to 
market to other businesses, in a business-to-business model (ca 60% in both groups). Around 
24% of spin-offs, compared to 34% independent start-ups targeted an end-consumer, while 
12% of spin-offs (compared to 5% of independent start-ups) targeted both. There are some 
visible differences between the university spin-offs and other technology-based start-ups with 
regard to the industry sector. The largest share of new ventures operated within Business 
services (44% of academic spin-offs and 28% of independent start-ups). Only 12% of spin-offs 
(compared to 23% of independent start-ups) operated in ICT. With 29%, visibly more academic 
spin-offs (compared to 10% of independent start-ups) operated in Biotech and medical sectors. 
Fewer university spin-offs compared to the independent start-ups worked in industries related 
to Energy, electricity and electric devices, Construction and maintenance, and other sectors 









Table 2.9 provides an overview of the two-group mean comparison tests. In line with the 
literature and prior empirical findings (e.g., Colombo & Piva, 2012; Mustar & Wright, 2010), 
university spin-offs within our sample have larger founding teams than their independent 
counterparts. Because larger teams tend to comprise a wider variety of functional roles, it is 
not surprising that university spin-offs within our sample have higher functional role diversity, 
although this difference is rather weak (p < 0.1). Also, consistent with prior research we find 
that the founding teams in university spin-offs tend to be more homogeneous with regard to 
founders’ experience, as they are typically comprised of scientists and engineers with no, or 
little, commercial experience (Colombo & Piva, 2012; Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). 
 





Product 17 (41.4%)  75 (58.5%) 92 54.4 
Service 12 (29.3%) 28 (22%) 40 23.7 
Hybrid  12 (29.3%) 25 (19.5%) 37 21.9 
Total 41 128 169 100 





Business-to-business 26 (63.5%)  77 (60%)  103 61 
Business-to-consumer 10 (24.5%) 44 (34.5%) 54 32 
Business-to-business-and-consumer 5 (12%) 7 (5.5%) 12 7 
Total 41 128 169 100 





Business services 18 (44%) 36 (28%) 54 32 
ICT 5 (12.5%) 29 (23%) 34 20.1 
Biotech/ medical 12 (29.2%) 13 (10%)  25 14.8 
Energy/ electricity/ electric devices 3 (7.3%) 18 (14%) 21 12.4 
Construction/ maintenance 1 (2%) 10 (8%) 11 6.5 
Other* 2 (5%)  14 (11%) 16 9.5 
missing 0 8 (6%) 8 4.8 
Total 41 128 169 100 
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11 The difference between the mean of University spin-offs and the mean of Independent 
start-ups is above 0. [Ha = diff >0, diff= mean (University spin-off) – mean (independent 
start-up)] 






 N mean (SE) N mean (SE) 
FT size 41 2.29 (.16) 128 2.06 (.10) .03 .02 
FT role breadth 40 1.74 (.84) 121 1.60 (.75) .12 .06 
FT experience breadth 40 1.7(.89) 110 .19 (1.00) .81 .60 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF TEAMS IN ACADEMIC SPIN-OFFS 
 
Abstract 
Although teams play a crucial role in academic spin-offs, research on this topic is still in its 
early stage. In order to stimulate discussion and encourage further studies, this paper offers a 
much-needed overview of prior research on teams in the context of academic spin-offs. By 
examining studies from 1980 to 2016, our review shows that extant work has primarily focused 
on the human and social capital endowments of academic entrepreneurs, while much less 
attention has been paid to team formation and evolution, and team functioning. Based on a 
critical assessment of the status quo, we discuss open research questions and suggest that 
scholars need to account for the temporal context of academic spin-offs and for the type of 
technology that is commercialized. Furthermore, we encourage research on founder identities 
and the creation of social good via academic spin-offs, as such research would allow scholars 
to push significantly beyond the traditional view of academic spin-off teams that emphasizes 
personal wealth creation, licensing incomes and financial profit. 
 
Key words: academic spin-offs, entrepreneurial teams, science commercialization, 
technology, review  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Academic spin-offs (ASOs) represent a small but economically important portion of high-tech 
ventures that are typically operated by teams (Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2010; Mustar & 
Wright, 2010). These teams often bring together individuals with technological and business 
competences in order to successfully commercialize novel and (potentially) disruptive 
technologies that emerge from academic research (Rasmussen, Mosey, & Wright, 2011). 
 38 
 In the present paper, we review extant research on the role of teams in the context of 
ASOs as ASOs have unique characteristics that differentiate them from other types of start-
ups. Following prior research, we define an ASO as “a new company that is formed by a 
faculty, staff member, or doctoral student who left the university or research organization to 
found the company or start the company while still affiliated with the university, and/or a core 
technology (or idea) that is transferred from the parent organization” (Clarysse, Wright, & Van 
de Velde, 2011, p. 1421). The newly-founded ASO faces a unique set of challenges as it 
transitions from a scientific environment to a business context. In particular, spin-off teams 
have to cope with conditions of high market and technological uncertainty, as the 
commercialization process involves several phases—from research and opportunity screening 
to the proof of viability and maturity (Vanaelst et al., 2006). During the initial phases of the 
process, spin-off teams are mostly involved in the technical aspects of their ventures (e.g., 
prototype development and product development), while at later stages they need to choose a 
market application for their technology and develop a market (Shane, 2004).  
While both ASOs and other new high-tech ventures experience difficulties in attaining 
a foothold in the marketplace, team formation and functioning may prove particularly 
challenging for ASOs (Colombo & Piva, 2012; Wright, Birley, & Mosey, 2004). Originating 
from a historically non-commercial environment that may be disapproving of those with an 
entrepreneurial orientation (Miozzo & DiVito, 2016; Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004), 
academic entrepreneurs often lack commercial skills and prior professional experience in the 
private sector (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Colombo & Piva, 2012; Mustar et al., 2006; Visintin 
& Pittino, 2014) and need to add external (surrogate) entrepreneurs to their teams in order to 
acquire business- and market-related competences (Lockett, Wright, & Franklin, 2003; Vohora 
et al., 2004). At the same time, academic entrepreneurs have a strong science identity that is 
often incompatible with an entrepreneurial mindset (Jain, George, & Maltarich, 2009). As a 
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result, they may experience conflict of interest as they are torn between their research and 
venture endeavors (Nelson, 2014) and may face tensions between remaining an academic or 
becoming an entrepreneur, or alternatively working part-time at both (Wright et al., 2004). 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of our paper is to provide a systematic review of 
existing work on teams in ASOs and identify opportunities for further research. In effect, we 
reviewed studies at the intersection of teams and ASOs that have been published from the 
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 to 2016. We identified 43 pertinent studies that are 
presented in Table 3.1. In this paper, we analyze, map and discuss this body of work in order 
to make it readily accessible to researchers and outline a number of interesting paths for future 
research. Finally, we discuss in which ways the insights stemming from studies on ASO teams 
can contribute to the broader team literature. 
 
Table 3.1. Summary table 
Study Sample Key questions Key findings 
Bathelt, Kogler 
& Munro (2010) 
 
 
18 spin-offs from 
the University of 
Waterloo, Canada 
 
What are the typologies of 
academic spin-offs? 
 
Most spin-offs with multiple founders were co-
localized, regardless of the type of knowledge 
they utilized. Two thirds of spin-offs drew from 
generic knowledge.  
Berry (1998) New technology-
based firms within 
science parks. 
Survey: 257 firms. 
In-depth interviews: 




Do managers of high-tech new 
ventures employ strategic 
planning? What role does a 
technical entrepreneur play? 
 
Management teams with predominantly 
technical skills did not engage in strategic (long-
range) planning. Management teams in which 
technical skills are balanced with those of other 
functional areas engaged in long-range planning 








What is the relationship 
between TMT characteristics 
and TMT effectiveness?  
 
TMT effectiveness is positively affected by 
TMT diversity and cohesion. The relationship 
between TMT diversity and TMT effectiveness 
is mediated by board service involvement (BSI), 
while the relationship between BSI and TMT 
effectiveness is positively moderated by the 








Which board members do 
academic spin-offs add in the 
start-up stage? How do boards 
complement resources 
available to TMTs? 
Founders’ social capital serves as basis for 
board formation. At later stages (after legal 
incorporation), new board members bring in 








offs out of 499 
high-tech SMEs 
that went public,  
Germany, UK, 
France, Italy 
How is founders’ university 
affiliation valued by external 
investors? 
 
University spin-offs obtain higher initial market 
valuation, particularly when academics are 
present in the team. Yet, in the long run, they 
underperform their independent counterparts in 
terms of aftermarket valuation and operating 
performance. 




based new venture 







incubators), Taiwan  
 
What are the effects of social 




Both internal and external social networks 
positively affect new venture’s innovative 
capability, whereby trust within the team is an 
important moderator.  
  
 
Ciuchta et al. 
(2016) 
 




firms, USA  
 
What experiences imprinted at 
the founding of a university 
spin-off influence subsequent 
spin-off activity?  
 
The acquisition of formal equity at founding 
increases chances of a subsequent spin-off. The 
presence of a faculty founder in the ASO team 
negatively moderates this relationship, while 
prior start-up experience positively moderates 






Spin-off from the 
Universite ́ 
Catholique de 
Louvain la Neuve 
(UCL), Belgium 
How is a team of 
entrepreneurs formed in a 
high-tech start-up? 
 
Managerial and business capabilities of a team 
evolve from the research phase to post-
incorporation. Coaching of the founding team is 
considered as an alternative to hiring outside 








Do the outside board members 
extend the human capital of 
founding teams? Is their 
human capital complementary 
or substitute to the team’s? 
  
University spin-off teams with strong R&D 
experience are more likely to attract outside 
board members that have complementary 
commercial and/or financial experience.  
Colombo & Piva 
(2012) 
 
196 founders of 64 
academic and 181 
founders of 64 twin 
non-academic 
technology-based 
new ventures, Italy  
 
Do academic spin-offs exhibit 
peculiar characteristics, 
different from the non-
academic start-ups?   
Founding teams of academic spin-offs exhibit 
greater education levels and greater 
specialization in technical and scientific fields, 
while the degree of their industry-specific 
human capital, as well as managerial and 
entrepreneurial experience are comparably low. 
 






offs, Italy  
 
What are the strengths and 
weaknesses of academic spin-
offs compared to other new 
technology-based ventures? 
 
The shortage of commercial knowledge is a 
major weakness of academic spin-off teams. 
ASOs exhibit homophily, as founders team up 
with individuals with similar human capital and 
shared working experience.  
 







How do founders’ specific 
human capital characteristics 
affect academic spin-off 
survival?  
 
University human capital and psychic income 
from entrepreneurship are positively related to 
ASO survival, while industry human capital 
negatively affects ASO survival. 
Entrepreneurship human capital is (partially) 











Do university spin-offs 
perform better than their 
industrial counterparts? 
With a performance premium of 3.4%, 
university spin-offs perform better than industry 
start-ups. This performance premium is larger 
for research academic entrepreneurs.  
 








How do founding teams’ and 
TMTs’ experiences and their 
complementarity affect the 
survival of academic spin-
offs? 
Large team size and team heterogeneity of 
TMTs and boards are positively related to spin-
off survival. Prior entrepreneurial experience in 
general and prior entrepreneurial experience in 
starting a high-tech venture are positively 
related to survival, whereas serial 
entrepreneurship seemed to have a negative 
effect. Characteristics of the founding team 
(incl. education, work experience, 
heterogeneity, participation, or prior 








start-ups & 154 
independent high-
technology new 
ventures, USA  
 
What are the differences 
between tech-based 
university-spin-offs and 
independent tech-based new 
ventures in terms of TMT 
composition (education, 
functional expertise, industry 
experience, and skill), 
dynamics (shared strategic 
cognition, potency, cohesion, 
and conflict) and performance 
(net cash flow and revenue 
growth)? 
Compared to independent start-ups, the TMTs 
of university spin-offs are more homogenous 
with less developed dynamics. University-spin-
offs perform significantly worse in terms of net 
cash flow and revenue growth than independent 
new ventures. Team composition and team 
dynamics account for less variation in the 
performance of academic spin-offs than that of 








Do successful universities 
(those with the largest number 
of spin-offs) prefer engaging 
researchers or surrogate 
entrepreneurs as a spin-off 
leader? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages 
of the two approaches?  
 
 
Successful universities hold more positive 
attitudes towards surrogate entrepreneurs. The 
main advantage of an academic entrepreneur is 
her understanding of the technology, while the 
disadvantage is the lack of commercial 
expertise. The main advantages of a surrogate 
entrepreneur include her commercial 
experience, social network and motivation by 
financial gains, while the main disadvantages 
involve unreasonable equity requirements and 
diverging objectives to the academic inventors. 
The best approach may involve a combination 








characteristics of academic 
start-up founding teams 
influence new venture success 
predictors (business idea 
articulation and market 
attractiveness of a business 
idea)?  
 
Market orientation of the academic founders 
and their frequency of interaction with external 
agents positively affect market attractiveness of 
a business idea. The articulation of roles and 
prior joint working experience of the academic 
founders positively affect the depth of business 






What predicts founding teams’ 
intention to set up relations 
with external agents and the 
frequency of those relations? 
 
The degree of founders’ role articulation has a 
positive effect on the intention to set up 
relations with external agents, while the 
completeness of the founding team has a 
negative effect. The frequency of interaction 
with external agents at the time of founding is 
positively affected by their research groups’ 
prior interactions with external agents and by 









USA & Canada 
 
 
What happened to the 
scientist-started start-ups that 
were founded 12 year ago? 
 
The majority of the scientists whose ventures 
survived believed that their success was due to 
the combination of science quality and business 







What are the different starting 
resource configurations among 
the research-based start-ups?  
VC-backed start-ups tend to have larger 
founding teams, which they tend to extend with 
more professional managers during the 1st year.  
Prospectors tend to have large founding teams, 
but do not attract additional managers. Product 
start-ups are usually founded by small teams of 
2. Transitional start- ups are usually founded by 
small teams (1 or 2 persons) of technical 








What are the effects of the role 
of TMT and board chair 
characteristics on board 
service involvement (BSI)?   
 
TMT diversity positively affects BSI, while 
CEO duality has a negative effect.  The industry 
experience of the board chair amplifies the 
relationship between TMT size and BSI, 
whereas CEO duality strengthens the 










How can knowledge be 
transferred and used in 
science-based entrepreneurial 
firms in order to enhance their 
performance?  
 
Tacit knowledge is most effectively transferred 
when a significant part of the original research 
team joins as venture founders. Commercial 
expertise and mind-set are also important, as 
long as the cognitive distance between scientists 
and the person responsible for 









In which areas can universities 
be more successful with 
regard to the development of 
spin-off companies? 
 
The more successful universities have clearer 
strategies about the process of spinning out and 
the use of surrogate entrepreneurs.  
 
Lundqvist (2014) Quantitative: 170 
ventures 





What is the impact of 
surrogate entrepreneurship on 
venture performance? 
 
Academic ventures with surrogates outperform 
their counterparts.  
 





3 biotech firms 
(including 
academic spin-
offs); 30 key 





entrepreneurs likely to 
exercise the principles of 
effectuation and causation as 
their ventures evolve? 
 
Entrepreneurs select their founding partners 
using effectuation, through their personal 














offs), UK and the 
Netherlands  
 
How can science-based firms 
grow fast?  
 
The development of resources that are critical 
for the growth of science-based firms, including 
a functionally-diverse management team, is an 
unfolding and interrelated process. The firms 
access managerial expertise via five paths 
(investor-appointed, founder-appointed, parent-
appointed, founders-diversity, and founders-
limited paths).  
 






What are the factors that cause 
time-lags in the establishment 
of academic spin-offs? 
The time-lag is considerably shorter for spin-
offs created by a team of founders. 
Combinations like natural science with 
engineering or business are more likely to found 






111 inventors, UK 
How do network non-
redundancy and tie strength 
jointly influence academic 
exodus? Are there any 
systematic team-level 
structural differences between 
different spin-out structures?   
The interaction between tie strength and 
network structure is important for resource 
acquisition via network ties. Academic teams of 
technology spin-outs are more likely to have 
less non-redundant ties in the team’s business 
discussion network than orthodox and hybrid 
spinout teams.  
Rasmussen, 













managers), UK and 
Norway 
How do academic 
entrepreneurs form and further 
develop their social networks 
to build the entrepreneurial 
competencies needed for 
creating an independent spin-
off venture? 
 
All three competencies (opportunity refinement, 
resource acquisition, and championing) are 
developed concurrently for a new venture to 
succeed. Different competencies require 
different types of network ties of the founding 
team (weak vs. strong) but as the venture 
evolves other types play a critical role. Ties 
initially developed to access one competency 
could later be used to access another 
competency. 
Rasmussen, 






UK and Norway 
 
Which entrepreneurial 
competencies are needed for 
nascent spin-offs to reach the 
credibility threshold? Who 
provides these competencies? 
How are these competencies 
developed? 
Three competencies (opportunity refinement, 
leveraging, and championing) were crucial for 
the ventures to gain credibility. The specific 
competencies for venture creation had to be 
developed internally through entrepreneurial 











How does the academic 
trajectory of the founding 
team influence the business 
model and performance of 
academic spin-offs? 
 
Spin-offs inherit their initial resources from the 
academic environment—that in turn influences 
the adopted business model.  
The human resources involved in the creation of 
the new ventures were professors and students 
who were previously involved in academic 
research projects, with social capital 
predominantly from the academic environment.  
Roberts (1990) 114 firms founded 
by former 






How do the founding team 
members allocate their time in 
the early years of a high-tech 
new venture?  
Team ventures devote a large proportion of their 




Rosa & Dawson 
(2006) 
 
1st stage: 92 
university spinouts 
 
2nd stage: 8 female 
and 6 male survey 
respondents, UK 
 
What is the participation rate 
of female academics in 
science commercialization? 
How do female academics 
behave as entrepreneurs?  
 
Most of the female academics tend to be part of 








To what extent does human 
capital leverage the effect of 
bridging ties on the early-
stage growth of academic 
spin-offs? 
Bridging ties increase early-stage employment 
growth. This relationship is amplified by prior 
domain-specific and prior start-up experience. 




134 MIT spin-offs, 
USA 
How do initial resource 
endowments affect 
organizational survival and 
IPO? 
 
New ventures with founders, who sustain direct 
and indirect relationships with venture 
investors, are more likely to receive venture 
funding. The industry experience of the team 











How do scientific 
entrepreneurs influence the 
formation of early ties with 
VC investors? How do these 
early investment tie decisions 
influence the formation of 
subsequent ties? 
The formation of early investment ties is path-
dependent, as entrepreneurs tend to approach 
only one or a few prospective investors from 
their institutional context. Differences in 
experience among early investors influence the 
professionalization of entrepreneurial teams. 
This, in turn, influences the extent to which 
subsequent investment tie formation is path 












What are the dynamics of 
entrepreneurial teams across 
the different stages of the 
spin-out process? 
 
Teams evolve and change in composition over 
the different stages of the spin-out process. New 
team members bring in different kinds of 
experience, but they do not alter the perspective 






How do the demographic 
variables of entrepreneurial 
teams create a balance 
between the scientific and 
business orientations? What is 
their impact on performance? 
Founding teams that concurrently promote 
differentiation and integration of academic and 







offs from seven 
universities, UK 
 
What phases do the university 
spin-offs go through in their 
development?  
 
The locus of entrepreneurship moves from the 
initial entrepreneur to the team, as the venture 
evolves.  Along this process, the team needs to 
develop different types of competences, in order 
to overcome the critical junctures it faces.  
 
Walter, Schmidt 
& Walter (2016) 






What is the relative influence 
of founding team 
characteristics (expert 
knowledge and entrepreneurial 
orientation), compared to the 
influence of organizational 
characteristics on academic 
entrepreneur's propensity to 
seek patents?  
 
Founding team characteristics matter in weak, 
but not strong regimes. The opposite holds for 










What is the relative 
effectiveness of university 
spin-offs vs. corporate spin-
offs? 
Corporate spin-offs have more substantial 
human capital endowments. However, some 
endowments (such as industry experience) 










What differentiates the more 
effective from the less 
effective firms?  
 
The four more effective firms have different 
management teams than the less effective one. 
All four were founded by inventor-
entrepreneurs (university professors) who 
sought to commercialize their own inventions. 
They all remained managers in their firms, had 
more complete management teams, and applied 




UK: 124 surveys 
from TTOS, 
interviews with 11 






What are the problems that 
university spin-out companies 
(USOs) experience when 
seeking to access venture 
capital? 
 
In contrast to non-USOs, investors of USOs do 
not put much emphasis on a working prototype 
and the availability of a professional 
management in place before the investment is 
made. However, investors consider that the 
development of a management team in USOs 
involve a greater risk that non-USOs. Compared 
to the venture-backed USOs, USOs involving 
joint ventures with corporations have resource 
benefits from the prior knowledge of their 
industries and are better positioned to develop 
viable opportunities from scientific discoveries.  
 
 
3.2. Literature review: ASO teams 
In order to make existing knowledge available to researchers and to establish a platform from 
which interesting avenues for future research can become visible, the following sections 
present the key research insights from the reviewed set of studies on ASO teams. Following 
categorizations applied in the team literature (Klotz, Hmieleski, Bradley, & Busenitz, 2013; 
Kozlowski & Bell, 2013; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), we have grouped existing 
work into studies that seek to understand the role of ASO teams by examining team attributes, 
team formation, and team functioning. The vast majority of the reviewed studies focus on team 
attributes by looking at the human and social capital endowments of academic and non-
academic team members. Because of their conceptual distinctiveness—with the former 
focusing on the resources internal to the firm and the latter on the resources externally 
acquired—we separate team attributes into two streams, one for the human capital endowments 
and another one for the social capital endowments. A third, smaller stream of research explores 
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team formation and evolution by acknowledging the dynamic nature of ASOs over time. 
Finally, we identify a fourth stream that appears to be in its infancy in the context of ASOs and 
explores team functioning. 
 
3.2.1. The human capital of ASO teams 
There are several human capital team attributes that have garnered most of the attention in ASO 
research. Below, we will discuss team size, the human capital endowments that are unique to 
ASOs, as well as other human capital characteristics that differentiate ASOs from other types 
of ventures. 
 
ASO team size. Science commercialization via the creation of a spin-off company requires a 
variety of capabilities that a single person usually does not possess. Hence, the majority of 
ASO ventures is created and managed by teams rather than by single individuals (Visintin & 
Pittino, 2014). With an average number of 2.3 versus 1.6 members, ASO teams tend to be 
somewhat larger than the teams of independent start-ups (Czarnitzki, Rammer, & Toole, 2014; 
Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). Despite the importance of team size, which is the most general 
characteristic of any team, findings remain inconclusive, as both positive and negative effects 
have been ascribed to larger ASO teams. 
On the one hand, large teams signal quality and are therefore more interesting to 
investors (Clarysse & Moray, 2004). Furthermore, research has found that spin-offs created by 
large teams tend to achieve higher growth (Czarnitzki et al., 2014) as they are more likely to 
possess the capabilities required to successfully bring new technology to the market. On the 
other hand, however, larger teams can experience a number of challenges due to coordination 
problems and overhead costs (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Visintin & Pittino, 2014). Also, larger 
teams may experience lower incentives to monitor one another, resulting in lower reciprocity 
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and a higher likelihood of free-riding behavior (Visintin & Pittino, 2014). Along these lines, 
other studies argue that smaller teams are not necessarily at a disadvantage, as they can 
compensate their own shortcomings by making use of external knowledge resources 
(Knockaert, Bjornali, & Erikson, 2015).  
 
Human capital unique to ASOs. The academic profile of entrepreneurs. An important part of 
the reviewed studies draws attention to the idiosyncratic human capital of ASO teams—i.e., 
the academic profile of the spin-off entrepreneurs (Bonardo, Paleari, & Visamara, 2011; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2014; Knockaert, Ucbasaran, Wright, & Clarysse, 2011; Lundqvist, 2014; 
Müller, 2010; Visintin & Pittino, 2014). The proportion of academics in the founding team 
seems to be an important indicator of the spin-off performance. A high proportion of the 
original research team joining the venture can facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge that 
will, in turn, increase the chances of reaching sufficient post-founding speed to first product 
(Knockaert et al., 2011). Yet, by including non-academics, who bring along business 
knowledge, teams are able to integrate science with the demands posed by customers and the 
broader business world, leading to a positive effect on spin-off performance (Visintin & Pittino, 
2013; Lundqvist, 2014). 
 While the best composition of academics and non-academics in a spin-off venture 
depends on various features, there seem to be several factors that facilitate, or hinder, the 
integration of science and business knowledge. Knowledge integration can better be achieved 
when the cognitive distance of the team’s members is not too large (Knockaert et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, prior common affiliation in the same research group or a common background of 
academics and non-academics in the team can increase trust and facilitate knowledge 
integration. On the contrary, a large team size will hinder knowledge integration, because 
internal communication, monitoring and team members’ motivation to participate in team 
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efforts is more problematic. Diversity in members’ academic status will also mitigate the 
benefits derived from team profile differentiation, as this type of diversity tends to lead to sub-
groups with different norms and status disparity (Visintin & Pittino, 2014). 
 Surrogate entrepreneurs. Along with their technological competencies, ASOs will also 
need to possess market-related capabilities in order to successfully commercialize their 
invention. Yet, originating from the academic environment, founders of these ventures often 
lack the professional networks and the necessary commercial expertise, which in turn makes 
them less attractive to external investors (Clarysse & Moray, 2004). To counteract this 
deficiency and help new ventures transcend the so-called “Valley of Death”, ASOs may add 
surrogate entrepreneurs to their teams—i.e., entrepreneurs from outside the academic 
institution (Lockett et al., 2003; Vohora et al., 2004). Whereas research indicates that ASOs 
engaging with a surrogate entrepreneur perform better than those that do not (Lundqvist, 2014), 
identifying and acquiring a surrogate entrepreneur can prove to be difficult for ASOs due to 
several reasons, such as the limited social capital of academic entrepreneurs and their 
reluctance to give up control. Moreover, academic institutions are not always in the position to 
indicate suitable persons to undertake this role (Franklin, Wright, & Lockett, 2001; Vohora et 
al., 2004).  
 
Entrepreneurial human capital. ASOs are systematically different in their human capital 
endowments when compared to their corporate counterparts or to independent start-ups. For 
example, they score rather low on industry and entrepreneurial experience, while they exhibit 
superior education, technical and scientific specialization (Colombo & Piva, 2012). ASOs also 
tend to be more homogeneous than independent high-tech ventures in terms of education, 
industry experience, and entrepreneurial experience. This is because they often recruit their top 
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management team (TMT) from the university community and imitate the TMT composition of 
other university-based firms (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). 
In addition to these differences in team composition, the performance effects of human 
capital characteristics are different in the context of ASOs compared to non-academic ventures. 
For instance, prior research has shown that entrepreneurial experience is more beneficial for 
corporate spin-offs, while industry experience plays a more important role in ASOs 
(Wennberg, Wiklund, & Wright, 2011). These findings suggest that it is worthwhile 
understanding the different configurations of human capital endowments that arise in the 
unique context of ASOs, as well as performance differences to other types of new ventures. 
Founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience is the human capital characteristic that has attracted 
much of the scholarly attention in the context of ASO teams. Understanding the effects of prior 
entrepreneurial experience is important because such experience endows entrepreneurs with 
valuable insights into the common challenges associated with new firm creation (Gruber, 
MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008). Founders or TMT managers with prior start-up experience 
benefit from their experience in identifying market opportunities for their technologies, in 
building a customer base, in obtaining external advice, in acquiring funding, and in other 
important activities. Yet, findings are inconclusive regarding the role of prior start-up 
experience in ASOs. For instance, Rasmussen, Mosey and Wright (2011) find that the start-up 
experience of the founding team can contribute to the development of firm competences that 
are crucial for establishing credibility in the new firm setting. However, other studies have 
failed to find a positive effect on ASO survival and performance (Shane & Stuart, 2002; 
Scholten, Omta, Kemp, & Elfring, 2015). This discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that 
the type of entrepreneurial experience is not typically accounted for. For instance, De Cleyn 
and colleagues (2015) showed that the entrepreneurial experience of ASO management teams 
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increases the survival odds of the venture, but not in the case of serial entrepreneurs who may 
be susceptible to overconfidence bias and entrepreneurial euphoria. 
Another key human capital endowment that has attracted scholarly attention, albeit 
limited, in the context of ASOs is industry experience. ASOs tend to start without people 
possessing industry experience. As technologies can be commercialized in different settings, 
industry experience has an intriguing role within ASOs as it may draw founders to some 
settings and not others. More generally, research has shown that industry experience is 
important for the survival and success of new ventures, as entrepreneurs with industry-specific 
experience engage in less “trial and error” learning than entrepreneurs without such experience 
(Dencker & Gruber, 2015). While there are studies reporting the expected positive association 
of industry experience with firm performance, such as the hazard of IPO (Shane & Stuart, 
2002), there are also counter-intuitive findings suggesting that industry experience may 
decrease ASO survival rate. This is because industry experience may increase the opportunity 
costs of the entrepreneurial activity vis-à-vis other occupations and in turn, affects the 
entrepreneur’s threshold of performance (Criaco, Minola, Migliorini, & Serarols-Tarrés, 
2014). 
Team diversity. Only few studies in our sample examine diversity in team 
characteristics—beyond the already discussed notion that individuals with an academic 
background will likely have to add additional competences to their spin-off team. This could 
be partly explained by the fact that ASOs tend to be more homogeneous than independent start-
ups (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). Yet, ASO teams can still possess different degrees of diversity 
that would affect their functioning. For example, Knockaert, Bjornali, and Erikson (2015) 
illustrate that team diversity, as a composite of diversity in several elements (i.e., functional 
background, education, industry background, founding experience, executive experience, and 
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international experience), can spur dysfunctional conflict and induce difficulties in decision-
making. 
Furthermore, team diversity has been examined in terms of their members’ cognitive 
distance. In this vein, Knockaert and colleagues (2011) show that having both technological 
and commercial mindsets in a team is important, as long as the cognitive distance between 
scientists and the person responsible for commercialization is not too large. Large cognitive 
dissimilarity between technical and non-technical team members can prove detrimental to team 
functioning, as it hinders communication and impairs effective knowledge sharing that is 
needed to successfully commercialize a technology.  
 
3.2.2. The social capital of ASO teams 
The team’s social capital is considered to play an important role in ASOs (Bathelt, Kogler & 
Munro, 2010; Grandi & Grimaldi, 2005; Grandi & Grimaldi, 2003; Shane & Stuart, 2002; 
Nicolaou & Birley, 2003; Rasmussen et al., 2011; Rasmussen, Mosey, & Wright, 2015; 
Renault et al., 2016; Vanacker, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2014). Like other entrepreneurial 
ventures, ASOs are resource-constrained entities that have to obtain external knowledge and 
other forms of support in order to become viable organizations. However, given the 
specificities of the environment in which these ventures are born—the academic context—
spin-off teams have strong needs to augment their skill set and to attract other kinds of 
resources. Hence, the social ties that the founding teams of ASOs have assembled during their 
careers and that they will create during the launch process are vital to their ventures’ positive 
development. While there is a relatively small number of studies that address this issue, there 
is evidence suggesting that the social capital of ASO teams demonstrates certain particularities.  
For example, research along these lines shows the limitations that the ASO team characteristics 
entail in relation to the external context. Research indicates that ASO teams are formed by 
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members that are co-localized (Bathelt et al., 2010) and that they rely on their interaction with 
actors coming from the academic environment (Renault et al., 2016) or actors that are somehow 
related to research—such as research institutions, institutions for technological transfer of 
research results, and public institutions—in order to develop a product that will be attractive to 
potential customers (Grandi & Grimaldi, 2005). In a similar vein, the search behaviour of 
founders in ASOs appears to constrain the pool of investors. As they tend to look for investors 
within their founding context, they lack information about potential options, and they are 
reluctant to disclose private information (Vanacker et al., 2014). This early choice of investors 
is critical for the newly-founded firms as it influences subsequent tie formation. Specifically, 
initial tie formation with inexperienced investors is path-dependent, as they are not in the 
position to satisfactorily professionalize the entrepreneurial team. That is not to say that the 
initial ties of academic entrepreneurs remain unaltered over time. On the contrary, as the 
venture evolves, the team may iteratively transform the strength and purpose of their 
relationships depending on the type of the competency they seek to develop and the stage of 
business development they go through (Rasmussen et al., 2015).  
Several studies look at features of social networks that are commonly studied in 
network research and they find that direct, indirect, and bridging ties of the spin-off team (or 
the lack of such ties) are determinants of firm failure, VC funding, and employment. Prior 
direct and indirect ties with financial investors have been found to decrease the likelihood of 
failure and increase the likelihood to receive external funding (Shane & Stuart, 2002). 
Accordingly, a large number of bridging ties in the spin-off’s external network can increase 
early employment growth, as they provide access to non-redundant and diverse information 
that will allow them to identify multiple business opportunities and pursue the most promising 
one (Scholten et al., 2015).  
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Finally, Nicolaou and Birley (2003) provide an interesting twist by showing that 
different types of ASOs exhibit systematic differences in their levels of external network non-
redundancy. Specifically, they find that teams in what they call “orthodox” ventures (i.e., spin-
offs that are created when the academic inventors spin out from the academic institution) and 
“hybrid” ventures (i.e., ventures that occur when academics retain their university position, but 
still have a substantive connection with the newly created firm) are more likely to sustain non-
redundant contacts than teams founding “technology” ventures (i.e., ventures that occur when 
the technology spins out from the institution). 
 
3.2.3. Team formation and evolution  
While most of the reviewed studies have pointed to the team attributes that are needed for 
ASOs to succeed, it is important to identify where these competences come from, who provides 
them and how they evolve over time. In this regard, a smaller stream of research has focused 
on team formation and evolution and reveals that ASO teams are far from being static, and 
should therefore not be viewed as immutable entities (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al., 
2006; Rasmussen et al., 2011). As academic ventures progress through the different phases of 
the spinning out process they face a set of critical junctures, the completion of which requires 
the continuous development of competences (Vohora et al., 2004). Consequently, their teams 
need to evolve and change in composition (Vanaelst et al., 2006).  
By adopting a process lens, a small number of studies have examined spin-off 
development in closer detail, delineating how the activities and the capability requirements of 
the team change along the different phases of academic venture development (Clarysse & 
Moray, 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2015; Vanaelst et al., 2006; Vohora et al., 2004). While 
these studies use different labels to identify distinct phases of the ASO process and more studies 
are needed for common themes to emerge, there are some initial insights with regards to the 
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development of the ASO team. For instance, research agrees that spinning-out an academic 
venture is a very long process, with the legal founding usually postponed until all necessary 
elements, including a team’s managerial and commercial capabilities, are in place. 
Consequently, scholars find that the pre-founding stage, including idea generation, opportunity 
framing, and pre-organization, takes long—sometimes as long as 15 years from research idea 
to formal incorporation (Rasmussen et al., 2011)—and usually consists of several phases 
through which the team needs to develop and recombine its capabilities (Clarysse & Moray, 
2004; Vanaelst et al., 2006; Volhora et al., 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2011).   
A number of studies have indicated that the early team tends to be highly homogeneous, 
as it usually originates from the university research group (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Vanaelst 
et al., 2006) and as such, its formation is strongly influenced by founders’ personal network 
ties, as opposed to external recruitments (Maine, Soh, Santos, 2015; Miozzo & DiVito, 2016). 
In the early pre-founding stage, the research team tends to develop a “champion” role – a 
researcher who assumes initial leadership, by driving the idea forward, and whose main tasks 
include writing a business plan and assembling the team based on the required competences at 
this stage (Clarysse & Moray, 2004). While some initial founders drop out at this early phase, 
as they wish to maintain their career in academia (Vanaelst et al., 2006), other members may 
be added to the team using the networks of founders, universities, and potential investors.  
Surrogate entrepreneurs may also have to be added to develop managerial and 
commercial capabilities of the team (Vanaelst et al., 2006; Locket, Wright & Franklin, 2003), 
as well as to signal credibility to potential investors (Vohora et al., 2004). Yet, research is not 
conclusive about the best time to add an external member with complementary expertise. On 
the one hand, a team in the early opportunity identification phase would benefit from a 
surrogate entrepreneur, who would bring along her industry knowledge, entrepreneurial 
experience and social capital, in order to help the ASO in identifying a market gap that is 
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promising for its technological discovery (Rasmussen et al., 2011; Vohora et al., 2004). On the 
other hand, the team may first need to go through a process of learning before it hires externals, 
as academics are often unwilling to give up ownership and managerial power, and thus tend to 
oppose the hiring of outsider-CEOs. Until then, the team can acquire the necessary commercial 
knowledge via external advice (Rasmussen et al., 2011) and coaching (Clarysse & Moray, 
2004). Involving a surrogate entrepreneur would then become critical at a later stage, when the 
spin-off needs to gain credibility and raise seed funds to establish the venture (Vohora et al., 
2004). 
Subsequent hires and restructuring of the team beyond the time of the venture’s legal 
formation are important activities that help the venture in keeping up with changing 
organizational demands (Clarysse & Moray, 2004) and in developing entrepreneurial 
capabilities to overcome deficiencies stemming from decisions made during previous 
development phases (Vohora et al., 2004). As the spin-off grows, it can acquire managerial 
expertise via several paths, such as the networks of their investors or by making appointments 
from the universities they originate from (Miozzo & DiVito, 2016). Next to adding new team 
members, spin-off teams also experience member exits. While entries, as previously discussed, 
are mostly motivated by the need to acquire additional human, technological, or financial 
resources, and the entrepreneurs’ ambition to reach the next step in a firm’s life cycle, team 
exits tend to be related to team conflict (Vanaelst et al., 2006). Hence, the evolution of an ASO 
team is likely to depend both on the changing task requirements, as well as the overall 
functioning of the team. 
 
3.2.4. Team functioning 
Team evolution and the effects of team attributes on ASO performance are not independent 
from team functioning and the underlying team mechanisms. However, less than a handful of 
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the reviewed studies have explicitly looked into these issues, by focusing on prominent 
concepts within the broader team literature such as trust and team cohesion. For example, trust 
has been found to facilitate information exchange within the team, but also to inhibit inflows 
of external information, as teams with high levels of trust tend to value more internally 
generated ideas than ideas coming from outsiders (Chen & Wang, 2008). Accordingly, the 
cohesion of academic entrepreneurial teams seems to be positively related to team effectiveness 
(Bjornali, Knockaert & Erikson, 2016) and the financial performance of ASOs (Ensley & 
Hmieleski, 2005). These initial insights reveal that opening the “black box” of the role of team 
functioning is critical to improve our understanding of teams in ASOs.  
 
3.3. Promising avenues for future research  
To capture the role of teams in ASOs, extant research has heavily focused on the human and 
social capital attributes of the team, mainly adopting a cross-sectional approach, and has only 
touched upon issues of team evolution over time or team functioning. These research streams 
have accumulated a number of interesting findings, yet a vast number of intriguing, open 
research questions wait to be explored. In the following, we propose a number of future 
research avenues to scholars who seek to move the discussion forward.  
 First, we propose that future studies could look more deeply at the composition of team 
attributes, in terms of the team’s human and social capital. While team attributes in ASOs have 
attracted most of the scholarly attention to-date, we still possess an insufficient understanding 
of several aspects of team composition—such as the diversity of attributes in a team and the 
effect that varying degrees of these attributes have on ASO performance. Second, scholars 
could explore the antecedents of the founding team at the start-up phase within the group of 
ASOs. Extant studies have shown which factors differentiate ASOs from non-academic 
ventures, but more needs to be done with regard to drivers of any systematic differences across 
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ASOs. Third, our literature review points out that very few studies have focused on team 
functioning and the mechanisms through which ASO team attributes affect performance. We 
argue that more needs to be done in this regard as well so that the “black-box” (Lawrence, 
1997) connecting team attributes with organizational outcomes can be opened up. Fourth, we 
argue that research could produce richer insights, if it explicitly accounted for the temporal 
context of ASOs (Wright, 2014). Spinning out an academic venture is a dynamic process that 
requires time and a continuous reconfiguration of teams’ competences as the venture moves 
along different phases of development (Vanaelst et al., 2006; Vohora et al., 2004). 
Consequently, the effects of team attributes would not remain unaltered as the spin-off moves 
from product development to market launch. Yet, apart from a few studies focusing on team 
evolution, the temporal context tends to be neglected. Fifth, we expect that the composition, 
evolution and functioning of a team will be contingent on the technology that is 
commercialized. Despite the core role of technology in ASOs, there is a surprising lack of 
research that examines whether and how the effects of team characteristics are contingent upon 
the technology itself. This is astounding, given that ASOs are typically “formed around a 
technology” (Knockaert et al., 2011, p. 778). Finally, we make several methodological 
propositions that would set the ground for future research at the intersection of teams and 




Table 3.2. Research themes and open research questions 
  Contingent Effects 




How could team attributes (e.g., industry, start-
up experience) be best distributed within the 
team? Should a single person or a certain 
proportion of team members possess a particular 
type of experience? 
 
How do certain combinations of experience 
affect performance? When do certain 
combinations of team characteristics result in 
faultlines?  
 
What benefits spin-off success the most: in-
depth industry-specific experience in a single 
industry or industry breadth? 
 
Which type of prior entrepreneurial experience 
in a team is more beneficial for ASO 
performance? Are there any differences if it is 
possessed by (1) an academic with no prior 
strategic-making experience, (2) surrogate 
entrepreneur, or (3) another academic inventor 
who has acted as a CEO in a previous start-up? 
   
What type of team functional diversity is more 
beneficial for ASO performance: teams that are 
composed of specialists or generalists? 
 
How does the composition of the ASO team 
affect the type of its network contacts? 
 
What are the (social and role) identity 
configurations that can occur in ASO teams? 
What are the effects of pure vs. hybrid identities 
on performance? When do ASO teams decide to 
What are the effects of team attributes across the 
different stages of spin-off development?  
 
What are the performance effects of industry-
specific experience across the different stages of 
spin-off development? When is industry breadth 
or depth more beneficial?  
 
At what stage of spin-off development are teams 
composed of specialists more beneficial than 
teams composed of generalists and vice versa?  
 
When do ASO teams create and sustain 
relationships with external actors that possess 
supplementary knowledge and skills, as compared 
to complementary knowledge and skills? 
 
What are the effects of different configurations of 
identity in an ASO team across the different 





Do the benefits of certain team attributes and 
the diversity thereof depend on technology 
characteristics, such as the scope of the 
technology commercialized? 
 
Are academic spin-offs commercializing 
technologies with high levels of technology 
scope better off by forming diverse teams, 
composed by scientists and individuals with 






pursue social goals with their spin-off creation 
activities? How prevalent are founders with 
Communitarian or Missionary identities in 
university settings relative to founders with a 




What are the antecedents of founding team 
characteristics?  
 
How do individual characteristics of the original 
inventor (e.g., human and social capital, 
identity, personality) affect the composition of 
the founding team?  
 
How do originating institutions affect team 
formation?  
 
How does the focal research domain affect team 
formation? 
How do teams evolve over time beyond legal 
founding?  
 
How do member entries and exits create or alter 
faultlines?  
 
When would it be the best timing for acquiring a 
surrogate entrepreneur? 
 
What are the implications of technology scope 
for team evolution?  
 
How does the initial team member profile 
shape the scope of a technology that is to be 
commercialized? 
 
How does the scope of the technology 
commercialized affect the suitability and 
selection of team members? 
 
 
Team functioning What are the mechanisms through which team 
attributes affect performance? 
 
How does knowledge-sharing occur in teams 
whose members represent separate subgroups 
holding distinct pieces of knowledge (e.g., 
academics vs. surrogates)? How do faultlines 
affect communication within such teams? 
 
How do different team configurations (e.g., 
academics holding different academic status, 
members endorsing different identities, or 
academics vs. non-academics) engage in 
discussions to successfully promote task 
conflict, while keeping affective conflict low?  
 
Is there an “average” team configuration that 
would lead to an “ideal” balance of conflict and 
effective contestation of ideas?  
How does team functioning and its effects on 
performance change over time? 
 
How do team member exits and new member 
additions influence knowledge sharing and 
conflict? 
 
What are the challenges in team functioning when 
new entrants are perceived as similar others 
compared to dissimilar others?  
 
Does the “ideal” balance of conflict depend on the 
phase of ASO process? When do teams benefit 
from task conflict and when from cohesion the 
most? 
Are there any systematic differences in the 
level of conflict ASO teams experience for 
different degrees of technology scope? 
 
How does conflict mediate the relationship 
between team composition and firm 
performance, when comparing ASOs that 






3.3.1. Composition of team attributes 
Distribution of team human and social capital attributes. The vast majority of the reviewed 
studies have looked at a number of team attributes. Yet, we still lack understanding of how 
these attributes could best be distributed within the team. The demography approach (Pfeffer, 
1983) offers an influential lens through which scholars can more clearly approach this question, 
because an essential feature of this approach is that it does not limit its attention to the mere 
presence or the “average value” of a team characteristic, but it extends its focus to the 
distribution of endowments within the team (Beckman, Burton, O’Reilly, 2007). For example, 
this lens could be applied to examine how industry experience should best be distributed within 
a team: should a single person or a certain proportion of team members possess this experience 
for a team to succeed? This could have implications for the selection and the role of surrogate 
entrepreneurs in ASOs. Would industry experience of this one person suffice, or would the 
venture need more team members with industry experience? Taking it a step further, under 
what conditions, would the academic venture maximize the benefits? If a second surrogate 
entrepreneur enters the team or else an academic, who possesses industry experience along 
with her technological expertise? Put differently, it would be interesting to understand whether 
the industry experience of team members coming from the business domain is of the same 
value as industry experience that academics may happen to have.  
 Accounting for team diversity can enrich our knowledge of spin-off team composition, 
but it also involves the risk that some forms of team heterogeneity or the presence of subgroups 
go unnoticed. Identifying group faultlines in a team can mitigate this risk, as faultlines can be 
strong at low levels of diversity—that would mistakenly lead to the impression that a team is 
homogeneous (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Departing from demographic diversity constructs 
that typically address one team characteristic at a time, faultlines are “hypothetical dividing 
lines that may split a group into subgroups” based on one or even more importantly on a 
combination of different team member characteristics, such as demographics, personality, and 
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values (Lau & Murnighan, 2005; 1998, p. 328). This would be particularly important in the 
context of ASOs, as the profile of teams in this context is fairly complex. The mix of academics 
with surrogate entrepreneurs, different combinations of prior work experience, as well as the 
different status level of academic members (i.e., senior vs. junior academics) can lead to 
different degrees of faultlines in a team that would subsequently impact its functioning and 
performance.  
 
Deeper understanding of team attributes. The reviewed studies have examined the effect of 
team human and social capital endowments (such as industry experience, entrepreneurial 
experience, functional diversity, and network ties) on performance, but they often yield 
inconclusive findings. We therefore see merit in delving deeper into these key team 
characteristics. 
For instance, given that most extant research has examined industry experience in terms 
of the degree to which the team or a team member possesses experience in the target industry, 
it is not yet clear what benefits science commercialization the most: in-depth industry-specific 
experience in a single industry or industry breadth, i.e., diversity of industry experience. The 
answer to this dilemma would have important implications for team composition, as spin-offs 
could look for the addition of surrogate entrepreneurs, who possess the right mix of industry 
depth and/or breadth. On the one hand, in-depth knowledge of an industry provides teams with 
key insights that allow for adequate assessment of threats and opportunities within this 
particular setting. On the other hand, when ASOs seek to identify a market for their technology 
and tackle market uncertainty (Shane, 2004), industry-specific experience may constrain a 
team’s choice of the market to enter (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2013). As individuals 
generally prefer options that they can rely on based on their prior experience, the market entry 
choice may be based on team’s familiarity with a particular industry rather than on the best 
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alternative. As a result, they may settle for a “local optimum” rather than the most promising 
market.  
Accordingly, a promising line of research could be to disentangle which type of prior 
entrepreneurial experience matters the most. Because not every single member of a new 
venture team is equally committed to the venture or involved in its strategic decisions, only 
entrepreneurial experience that entails strategic-decision making experience may be beneficial 
in science commercialization. For instance, would prior entrepreneurial experience of an 
academic inventor, who did not have an active role in the strategic-making of her previous 
start-up, qualify in the same manner as the prior experience of a surrogate entrepreneur or 
another academic inventor who has acted as a CEO in a previous start-up? 
Similarly, when examining the effects of functional diversity of the ASO team, future 
research could look more closely into the breadth of team members’ prior functional 
experience. This would enable researchers to distinguish between teams that are composed of 
specialists vs. generalists and help to answer the important question of what type of diversity 
benefits ASO teams the most: teams that are composed of specialists in different functions (i.e., 
academic researchers with no other functional experience and business managers with no 
technical background) or teams composed of generalists (i.e., academic entrepreneurs with 
functional experience in other domains). Specialists possess unique in-depth understanding of 
their field, yet they may be unable to fully exploit their knowledge, as cross-functional 
communication and coordination may prove problematic. On the contrary, generalists may not 
possess as much in-depth knowledge, yet they do not face the same communication barriers 
and may therefore be better able to capitalize on their diverse functional experience (Bunderson 
& Sutliffe, 2002).  
Finally, it is also worth examining how the composition of the team influences the type 
of external network contacts they seek to sustain—contacts that possess supplementary, as 
compared to complementary knowledge and skills. For instance, scholars could examine 
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whether a team that is primarily composed by scientists seeks for complementary knowledge 
from business contacts or whether they exhibit similarity bias and network with like-minded 
individuals.  
 
Team characteristics beyond team human and social capital. Scholars can also enhance 
understanding of the role of teams in ASOs, by looking at team characteristics beyond the 
team’s human and social capital endowments. In particular, we propose that future research 
looks at the composition of identities that ASO team members hold. Understanding identity is 
key, as the entrepreneur’s identity has a profound effect on new firm creation (Fauchart & 
Gruber, 2011; Gruber & MacMillan, 2017; Powell & Baker, 2017). This would be especially 
intriguing in the context of ASOs, as academic scientists come from a traditionally non-
commercial environment (Miozzo & DiVito, 2016; Vohora et al., 2004) and experience 
difficulties in balancing the different norms of science and business worlds (Jain et al., 2009; 
Gurdon & Samsom, 2010). At the same time, non-academics with a strong business 
background may be added to the team bringing with them an utterly different mindset. This 
would create a team composed by members holding very distinct role identities from one 
another, which would, in turn, have important implications for team functioning and 
performance.  
Future research could, thus, seek to understand the composition of teams that are 
comprised of members holding different role identities (e.g., teams comprised of a mix of 
individuals with a pure scientist identity and individuals with a pure commercial identity who 
have been brought into the team as surrogate entrepreneurs, or members with hybrid identities). 
It is also interesting to contrast pure team role identities (e.g., science team identity) with hybrid 
team role identities (e.g., mix of science and business) and their effects on performance.  
Turning to a social identity perspective on teams, it would be intriguing to see when teams 
would embark on a social mission with their ventures rather than pursue “conventional” 
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commercialization objectives such as attaining financial benefits and personal wealth. In this 
vein, the studies of Fauchart and Gruber (2011) and Gruber and MacMillan (2017) offer 
interesting insights on how the identity of entrepreneurs affects the way in which they establish 
their ventures and what outcomes they seek to accomplish in new venture creation. We believe 
that research that looks at how ASO teams decide for pursuing a social goal—be it for the 
benefit of their own community or for society-at-large—could push research to the next 
frontier. It is these outcomes that tend to be hardly understood, yet that could resolve some of 
the most pertinent questions that human beings face in today’s world. We also believe that the 
academic audience, in particular, in technology-related domains, is one that is particularly open 
towards creating start-up firms that serve noble causes. In this regard, the scale developed by 
Sieger et al. (2016) can help scholars in capturing the social identities of the members of ASO 
teams. 
 
3.3.2. Formation of the founding team 
Extant studies have underscored the idiosyncratic nature of ASO teams, which tend to be 
characterized by homophily as they team up individuals, who are co-localized and possess 
similar human capital and shared working experience (Bathelt et al., 2010; Colombo & Piva, 
2008). As a result, when they develop their firm competencies, they tend to place more 
emphasis on technical and scientific functions rather than on commercial ones (Colombo & 
Piva, 2012).  
The existing studies provide useful insights on the factors that differentiate ASOs from 
other types of ventures, but do little that would help us understand the antecedents of founding 
team formation within the group of ASOs. Understanding the formation of the initial team at 
the start-up phase would be critical as the “genetic characteristics” of ASOs have an imprinting 
effect on firm development (Colombo & Piva, 2012). For example, it would be interesting to 
study what makes certain ASOs more likely to include members that possess industry or 
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entrepreneurial experience in their initial founding team compared to ASOs that do not. 
Specifically, we propose that future research could examine the potential reasons for systematic 
differences at three levels. First, systematic differences may be observed because of the 
characteristics of the original inventor such as her human and social capital, identity, or 
personality. Second, the role of the originating institutions needs to be explored in greater 
detail, as there is already evidence about their role in coaching ASO teams and attracting 
surrogate entrepreneurs (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Franklin et al., 2001). Finally, researchers 
could examine whether the focal research domain leads to any systematic differences in 
composing the initial founding team. For instance, scholars can examine whether team 
formation in IT appears to be significantly different from team formation in biotechnology. In 
biotechnology, more scientists may initially form the founding team, as spin-offs in this setting 
are more research intensive, while IT spin-offs may have a marketing function represented in 
the team right from the start, as they tend to progress more quickly to commercialization.  
 
3.3.3. The role of team functioning 
While a lot of attention has been paid to the effects of team attributes on the performance of 
ASOs, the mechanisms through which these attributes affect performance remain unclear, as 
only few studies have done work in this direction. Understanding team functioning in this 
context would be critical, given that ASOs face a number of context-specific challenges that 
affect the way their members interact and combine efforts to successfully commercialize their 
technology. For instance, these teams need to combine different “thought worlds” to link a 
technology to a market (Dougherty, 1992; Gruber et al., 2013): the scientific and the business 
worlds that are likely to create disagreement about the team’s vision and strategy, as well as 
day-to-day operations. Balancing these two very distinct but equally important mindsets can 
hinder knowledge sharing, create tensions in the team, or create communication and 
collaboration problems.  
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 A promising line of research is to examine how knowledge is shared within an ASO 
team. The studies that focus on the effects of human capital endowments on spin-off 
performance suggest that combination of individuals with technological and commercial 
expertise would enhance performance. In essence, it is implied that the knowledge held by 
these individuals would be uniformly shared within a team allowing academics to grasp the 
market side of things and managers to understand the technology parameters. However, 
knowledge sharing does not occur automatically and may prove problematic (Srivastava, 
Bartol, & Locke, 2006), resulting in sub-optimal utilization of cognitive resources available to 
the team (Argote, 1999; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). This may be particularly 
challenging, when team members represent separate subgroups holding distinct pieces of 
knowledge. For instance, we expect that the faultlines that occur between academics and 
surrogate entrepreneurs, based on their different backgrounds, mindsets and identities, would 
pose significant obstacles to knowledge sharing.  
 Scholars could also examine when and how conflict arises from the interaction of 
academics of different academic status or identities, or from the interaction of academic and 
non-academic team members. This is especially important in light of the evidence that conflict 
is the primary reason for ASO founders to leave the team (Vanaelst et al., 2006), depriving the 
team from important tacit knowledge about the technology that is often embodied in the human 
and relational capital of its original founders. Conflict is likely to arise in diverse teams, 
especially when they work under high levels of uncertainty. While some task conflict—related 
to disagreements about the task content—is necessary for decision-makers to arrive at the best 
available option, high degrees of affective conflict—that arises because of interpersonal 
incompatibilities—can be detrimental for team communication and information sharing (De 
Dreu & Weingard, 2003; Jehn, 1995).  
In this regard, it would be relevant to understand if there is an “average” team 
configuration that would lead to an “ideal” balance of conflict and effective contestation of 
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ideas. In other words, what levels of diversity can lead to superior team functioning? The 
answer is not evident, as advantages and disadvantages are associated with both homogenous 
and heterogeneous teams. The ideas of homogeneous teams tend to converge, resulting in 
group conformity with little task conflict and sub-optimal decision-making (Janis, 1982; 1995). 
On the contrary, bringing together individuals that come from different backgrounds and that 
hold different identities can produce a richer exchange of ideas, but may impair group cohesion 
and spur collaboration problems.  
 
3.3.4. Temporal context 
Scholars can bring the temporal context of ASOs to the forefront in three ways: a) by examining 
the effects of team composition across the different stages of spin-off development, b) by 
investigating the evolution of the ASO teams and c) by improving our knowledge on how team 
functioning changes over time.  
Extant research has extensively looked at the effects of team attributes on firm 
performance but has not examined whether these effects differ across the different stages of 
spin-off development. We expect that this would be the case, since the skills and competences 
required for the spin-off development would change, as the new venture moves from product 
development to market launch. In line with our propositions for future research on team 
composition, we propose that the team’s human and social capital endowments, as well as 
identity, may play out differently over time. For instance, future research could examine 
whether industry breadth is more beneficial at the initial stages of spin-off development, as this 
would give space to the team to consider alternative product-market applications, whereas 
industry depth is more relevant when the spin-off has a more concrete idea about their target 
market. Accordingly, the type of a team’s network contacts is likely to change over time. For 
example, a team that is primarily composed by scientists may seek for supplementary science 
knowledge during prototype development, whereas it is more likely to look for complementary 
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market knowledge as they progress to the development of the market. Finally, team identities 
may play out differently, as an ASO moves towards market launch. A team possessing founders 
with pure science role identities could work well for the early stages of the commercialization 
process but could prove detrimental at later stages that require a deeper understanding and 
evaluation of the market.  
Besides the performance effects of team composition across the different stages of spin-
off development, future research can further enhance understanding of team evolution. For 
instance, research still needs to disentangle when would be the best timing for acquiring a 
surrogate entrepreneur. We need to understand whether the benefits of involving a surrogate 
entrepreneur at the very beginning of the spin-off process outweigh the negatives. As prior 
research has indicated, the early involvement of surrogates can help the ASO to identify a 
market gap for its technological discovery. Nevertheless, we argue that at this early stage, the 
surrogate could potentially bias the team towards a market she is more familiar with and as a 
result, discourage them from considering the full range of potential market applications.  
Furthermore, it is worth examining the faultlines that occur when an ASO team evolves. 
The exit or the addition of influential members can create new faultlines or alter existing ones 
(Lau & Murnighan, 1998)—that could, in turn, further influence team evolution in the future. 
For example, the strength of the faultlines would differ if an entrepreneur with industry 
experience joins the team of four academics, as compared to entering a team composed of two 
academics and two entrepreneurs. Yet, it would be more complex to delimit the faultlines if 
the new member had had some prior common experience with the academics due to her 
participation in university-industry collaboration projects. The similarities with the sub-group 
of academics might prove stronger, or at least could lessen the attachment of the new member 
with the sub-group of the entrepreneurs.  
In turn, these team member exits and entries will influence team functioning and 
mechanisms, as the interaction between team members will change. For example, future 
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research could examine how new member additions affect knowledge sharing and conflict 
within a team. In particular, it would be intriguing to understand the associated challenges 
when a team is highly homogeneous, compared to a more heterogeneous team, or when the 
new entrant is perceived as a similar other (e.g., an academic in a team composed of academics) 
or a dissimilar other (e.g., a surrogate entrepreneur in a team composed of academics).  
 
3.3.5. The contingent role of technology 
The very characteristics of the technology that is commercialized also will need to be 
considered in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of teams in ASOs. Whereas 
technologies can be characterized in many ways, scholars have mainly examined differences 
in commercialization processes arising from distinctions between major fields (e.g., 
biotechnology, IT, semiconductors). Beyond such broad distinctions, future research could 
adopt a more fine-grained perspective on technologies and examine dimensions that have a 
core influence on the tasks and challenges that teams will be faced with when commercializing 
an invention. For instance, future research could account for the scope of technology. Going 
back to the resource-based view argument developed by Penrose (1959), technology scope can 
be seen as being endogenously shaped by the ASO team. In other words, a technology can be 
wide in its scope as scientists de-link it from the particular application and seek to understand 
its more generic building blocks (Danneels, 2007). ASOs can therefore opt for developing a 
technology that ranges from a very specific, “tailored” single product technology to a more 
generic platform technology with multiple applications (Clarysse et al., 2011). ASOs are more 
likely to develop platform technologies, as compared to single product technologies, as they 
tend to originate from basic research. A platform technology offers them the possibility to 
explore multiple market applications (Gruber et al., 2008) and at the same time incumbents 
have more difficulties in figuring out what to do with this type of technology (Shane, 2004). 
Yet, the degree of technology scope can greatly differ across ASOs and we expect that higher 
 70 
levels of technology scope are likely to pose more significant challenges to a team, as agents 
will need to engage in heavy search and experimentation both on the technology and on the 
market side.  
 For instance, future research could examine whether ASOs that seek to commercialize 
technologies with high levels of technology scope would be better off if they formed highly 
diverse teams, composed of scientists and individuals with industry, entrepreneurial and other 
business-related experience. The answer is not that apparent, as this team composition 
increases the likelihood that they identify a large spectrum of alternative market opportunities, 
but it would also limit the workforce that designs and experiments on alternative product 
prototypes. To disentangle this trade-off, researchers could examine whether a large team size 
counters this drawback or whether the spin-off teams should better opt for moderate levels of 
team diversity, while sourcing complementary skills and knowledge from their network 
partners. 
 It is also worth examining the evolution of an ASO team under different degrees of 
technology scope. As a high degree of technology scope creates the potential for multiple 
product solutions, the competences required for both the technological and market 
development of the different solutions may vary significantly. Take, for example, 3D printing 
that can lead to a variety of products applicable in a multitude of industries, from aerospace, to 
dentistry, and entertainment. This could have important implications for ASO team member 
exits and entries. For instance, the original inventor may no longer be willing to be part of the 
team, if the technology takes a turn that significantly departs from her research interests. At the 
same time, identifying the right type of surrogate entrepreneur can be quite tricky. Surrogates 
from different backgrounds would be more suitable for different market applications (e.g., 
aerospace vs. entertainment), but the spin-off may be unable to identify certain promising 
market applications, before taking the right person(s) on board. In that case, the process of 
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locating the right surrogate entrepreneur(s) would be highly iterative rather than linear in 
nature.  
 Finally, technology scope may affect team functioning, such as conflict. The plethora 
of potential applications can encourage vivid discussions about the most promising product-
market alternative to follow, but can also put additional mental strain on a team. It would thus 
be interesting to examine whether there are any systematic differences in the level of conflict 
ASO teams experience for different degrees of technology scope or how conflict mediates the 
relationship between team composition and firm performance, by comparing ASOs that exploit 
low vs. high scope technologies. 
 
3.3.6. Methodological approaches  
Depending on the research question under study, future research could adopt both qualitative 
and quantitative research designs. For example, in order to study team identities, initially a 
qualitative research design would be more suitable, as it allows scholars to capture the different 
identities (from social identity and role identity perspectives) that emerge, as well as their 
unique characteristics. Once the phenomenon is sufficiently well understood, quantitative 
research projects could compare the performance outcomes of different ASO team-level 
identities or the effects of the same identity across the different phases of the ASO 
development. Longitudinal research designs, both qualitative and quantitative, would be of 
value when seeking to track and analyse changes over time, such as team formation and 
evolution.  
There is also an opportunity to reconsider data collection techniques, as the techniques 
that are frequently employed in extant studies do not allow scholars to capture the complexity 
of team mechanisms and dynamics. The quantitative studies reviewed in our paper typically 
administer surveys or use secondary databases to measure the examined constructs. Although 
this is common practice in the field of management, this type of research design is not always 
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suitable to study team functioning—which would be essential to advancing our knowledge of 
the role of teams. Therefore, future research could benefit from adopting data collection 
techniques from other fields (e.g., human resource management, social psychology, and 
behavioral economics) that can generate richer data such as laboratory and field experiments, 
as well as video-recording. The use of information visualization techniques (Meyer, Hoellerer, 
Jancsary, & van Leewen, 2013) would also add richness to the findings.  
A particularly pertinent methodological advancement relates to the use of experiments. 
Field and laboratory experiments are a powerful tool to uncover and specify complex 
relationships and to determine causal effects (Colquitt, 2008). Accordingly, experiments are 
uniquely suited to shed light on the complex, dynamic, and multi-faceted relationships involved 
in the study of teams in ASOs. For instance, an experimental research design could be 
employed to advance understanding of the effects of team composition on spin-off 
performance. By manipulating the identity, experience, or networking ties of members in a 
team and by providing these teams with one or more performance-related tasks, researchers 
can observe relevant effects of team composition on performance and unravel whether an 
optimal team composition exists in this setting.  
Finally, understanding technology-related boundary conditions of team effects would 
also have important methodological implications, as scholars will have to adopt more complex 
research designs that will encompass data collected from different sources. For instance, such 
studies may need to combine primary data (e.g., on team characteristics) with secondary data 
on technology or to code open-ended information from ASOs’ websites, brochures, business 
plans, patent databases or other documents (e.g., in order to assess technology scope). 
 
3.4. Implications for the broader team literature  
There are at least two key ways in which research on ASO teams can contribute to the broader 
team literature. First, ASOs experience several stages of development over a longer period of 
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time (Vanaelst et al., 2006). ASO teams therefore need to change along with the demands that 
are placed on them at each of developmental stages. In other words, the empirical setting 
offered by ASO teams will allow researchers to arrive at  a better understanding of how teams 
change in response to evolving challenges and, ultimately, to address recent calls for more 
research on the dynamic nature of teams within the broader team literature (Mathieu et al., 
2014).  
Second, another distinct characteristic of ASOs lies in the strong science role identity 
of academic entrepreneurs, along with the need to grow the team with surrogate entrepreneurs 
who bring in experience and knowledge from the business world (Jain et al, 2009; Lockett et 
al., 2003; Vohora et al., 2004). ASOs thus provide an interesting context to study the identity 
make-up of entrepreneurial teams, how it evolves and how it shapes outcomes—a phenomenon 
that cannot be easily investigated in large, established firm settings, where the identity of the 
organization itself tends to be strong and may override the identity of individuals. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Our review on teams in ASOs revealed four research themes that have emerged in the literature. 
Most of the reviewed studies have looked at the attributes of ASO teams, by examining the 
human and social capital endowments of academics and surrogate entrepreneurs forming the 
ASO team. Much less attention has been directed to issues surrounding team formation and 
evolution, while less than a handful of studies focus on team functioning. These studies have 
already provided some useful insights on the role of teams in ASOs, but much work remains 
to be done in each of these themes. For instance, more research is needed to examine the factors 
that drive the heterogeneity in founding teams’ initial structure within ASO and a wider 
population of technology-based new ventures. In similar vein, more research is needed to 
understand the drivers of professionalization within these teams. Questions of why founding 
teams look the way they do and how they can be developed to better meet the business demands 
 74 
of their growing venture are yet to be answered. In addition, more attention needs to be given 
to the temporal context of ASOs, to the contingent role of the technology commercialized, and 
the wider environment of the venture.  
In this review, we proposed several avenues for future research towards this direction. 
We organized the identified gaps and future research propositions along several themes. We 
did not formulate propositions based on the theory mainly because our review has also revealed 
that the literature in this field is predominantly phenomenon-driven and the theory is yet to be 
developed. Although the main focus of this review was on ASO, we are certain that the 
generated insights apply to a wider population of technology-based start-ups. We hope we can 
motivate scholars to embark on some of the open research questions not only for the sake of 
new theory development but also to provide guidance to entrepreneurs when striving to bring 
new technology to the market.  
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CHAPTER 4: MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BLUEPRINTS: 
THE ROLE OF LEAD FOUNDERS’ PERSONALITY 
 
Abstract 
The present study examines the micro-foundations of organizational blueprints with specific 
focus on the effects of the lead founder’s personality in assembling and structuring the founding 
team in growth-oriented technology-based start-ups. Basing our hypotheses on person-
organization fit theory and the “liabilities of newness” hypothesis, we find that personality 
traits affect different aspects of the founding team structure, each of which are known to 
facilitate the long-term success of new ventures. Extraversion, agreeableness and emotional 
stability reflect an individual’s interpersonal disposition and are associated with the starting up 
with a team. Conscientiousness is reflected in an individual’s deliberation and planning and is 
important for the structural elaboration of the founding team. These findings highlight a new 
way of looking at entrepreneurs – rather than being “eccentric risk-takers,” successful 
entrepreneurs appear to be socially adept conscientious planners. 
 
Key words: lead founder personality, the Big Five, founding team structure, elaborate structure 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Understanding founding team structures is critical as they provide a framework for 
entrepreneurs to combine and channel their efforts in order to achieve organizational goals. 
Yet, up to now, little is known about how these structures emerge and what drives the 
heterogeneity with regard to their design among nascent firms. For instance, it is not clear why 
some new ventures are founded by teams with a developed functional roles and experience, 
while others are founded by homogeneous teams with no differentiated functional structure. 
This is particularly intriguing because, research repeatedly finds that new ventures founded by  
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large, broadly experienced and formally structured teams are more likely to succeed over time 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Ferguson, Beckman, & Cohen, 2015; Sine, Mitsuhashi, & 
Kirsch, 2006). It is hence worthwhile to understand why some nascent firms settle for a less 
successful team design. 
 The most prominent attempt to understand formation of founding team structure is the 
seminal study by Ruef and colleagues (2003) that offers a comprehensive account of the 
sociological mechanisms yet does not pay close attention to the individual founder. Although 
the authors highlight the importance of the lead founder in making an implicit choice of 
whether or not to engage others in the founding process, and in the “decision regarding who 
will participate and what they will contribute” (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003; p.195), they do 
not explore how an individual’s characteristics may influence these decisions. The aim of the 
current study is to contribute to this line of research by elucidating the role of lead founder’s 
personality in forming and structuring a founding team12. 
 Extant research shows that personality traits – as captured by the five-factor model 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987; 1992) – affect a leader’s strategic decision making (Nadkarni & 
Herrmann, 2010; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003) and action (Herrmann & 
Nadkarni, 2014), both of which are likely to have implications for new venture success. 
However, existing studies have examined the influence of lead founders on new venture 
performance without considering the intermediary outcomes of the very formation of the 
founding team. The personality (Ciavarella, Buchholtz, Riordan, Gatewood, & Stokes, 2004; 
Zhao, Seibert, & Lumpkin, 2010) and entrepreneurial cognition (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 
2003; Mitchell et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 2007) literatures have suggested psychological 
mechanisms, which may explain how the disposition of lead founders affects their propensity 
                                                 
12 Although some new ventures may be initiated by a group of founders with equal control and decision power, 
research shows that a clear majority of new ventures has one single core founder who takes on the leading role in 
the venture creation process (Ensley, Carland, & Carland, 2000; Wasserman, 2012; 2017). In the methods section, 
we describe how we empirically identified the lead founder. 
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to work in a team context, even at the expense of retaining full control over their venture 
(Wasserman, 2012; 2017). They may further explain the differences with regard to how 
founders choose to organize teams’ collective efforts.  
From an individual perspective, assembling a functionally developed team involves 
both the propensity to work effectively in a team context and the ability to organize team 
members’ activities strategically. We therefore distinguish between personality traits that 
highlight lead founders’ (1) interpersonal disposition and (2) deliberate planning. Extraversion, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability are personality traits that have been associated with 
interpersonal skills (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Mount, Barrick & Stewart, 1998) and are found 
to be particularly critical in the context of teams (Morgeson, Reider, & Campion, 2005). 
Conscientiousness13 refers to the personality trait that is strongly associated with thorough 
organization and long-term planning (DeJong, Song, & Song, 2013; Zhao, Seibert, & Lumpkin, 
2010). These sets of personality traits are likely to affect the two most salient features of a 
founding team’s structure that have been deemed important for a new venture’s development 
and performance over time: (1) founding by team (as opposed to a solo entrepreneur) and (2) 
the team’s structural elaboration – the degree to which the team comprises a broad set of 
formally-defined functional roles, and the broad set of experiences that enables team members 
to fulfil these roles14. Because the degree of structural elaboration in a team is conditional on 
whether the lead founder decides to start up with a team, we employ a two-stage approach. In 
the first stage, we propose that lead founders with high interpersonal disposition are more likely 
to start their business with a team rather than be lone entrepreneurs. In the second stage, we 
                                                 
13 We did not incorporate Openness to experience in our main model, as we did not find sufficient theoretical and 
empirical support that it is related to either interpersonal disposition or strategic planning in teams. We did 
however, include it in our control and supplementary analyses. 
14 It needs to be noted that some new ventures may not aspire to grow and hence starting up with a team and 
developing its structure may not be of interest for these firms. The specific focus of our study is on growth-
oriented technology-based start-ups, at the core of which lies technological innovation. These firms are innovative 
by default but suffer from the liabilities of newness due to the lack of established structures. They therefore benefit 
(unlike large established organizations) from implementing more formalized structures within their team 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Sine et al., 2006).  
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focus on the sub-sample of firms that were founded by teams and examine the role of lead 
founders’ conscientiousness in promoting structural elaboration within their team. In order to 
provide support to our claims based on prior research findings that founding teams’ structure 
facilitates new ventures’ long-term success (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Sine et al., 2006). 
The theoretical basis of this study is person-environment fit (also known as person-
organization fit) theory (Judge & Kristof-Brown, 2004; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & 
Johnson, 2005), which suggests individuals choose their work environments based on their 
personality, values and needs. While this theory was initially used to study the fit of individuals 
with pre-existing structures (Chatman, 1991), it has also been applied recently to broader 
contexts, such as engagement in an entrepreneurial process (Zhao & Seibert, 2006) and person-
team configurations (Ferguson et al., 2015). We build on the main premise of this theory that 
individuals seek to achieve a fit between their dispositional traits and their work environment 
(Zhao et al., 2010) and we suggest that entrepreneurs are likely to actively design 
organizational structures in the way that fits their ideals embedded in their personality traits. In 
sum, we expect that individuals with a high interpersonal disposition are more prone to working 
in a social context and therefore are more likely to start up with a team. Conditional on starting 
up with a team, we expect conscientious lead founders to be more prone to implementing an 
elaborate team structure. Based on prior research, we further expect new ventures that start up 
with a team and elaborate founding team structure to be more likely to complete critical 








4.2. Theoretical development 
Upper echelons (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and CEO research (Hiller & 
Hambrick, 2005) suggest that the individual characteristics of CEOs influence the strategic 
decisions of organizations. Particularly within the context of new ventures, where 
entrepreneur’s managerial discretion and latitude of action are at higher levels than in most 
other teams and organizations (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Klotz, Hmieleski, Bradley, & 
Busenitz, 2014), leaders’ preferences, experience and behavior have significant effects on the 
choice and continuation of the initial structures. Although there is a variety of individual 
attributes that are known to influence organizational choices, a long history of research in the 
field of personality psychology was able to generate a robust and comprehensive taxonomy of 
fundamental personality differences – the “Big Five”15 (John, Naumann & Soto, 2008; Peterson 
                                                 
15 In the present study, we use a five-factors model, as opposed to the six factors, as at the time of our first round 
of data collection the Hexaco models (Ashton & Lee, 2007; 2008) were not yet widely used. 
Elaborate structure 




















































et al., 2003). This framework distinguishes between individuals’ personality types classified 
along five dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
and neuroticism (Barrick & Mount, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1992). Each of these personality 
traits reflects a set of preferences and drives in an individual (Allport, 1937; Zillig, Hemenover, 
& Dienstbier, 2002; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997) that are known to relate to the individual’s 
personal choices (Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001) but also to the 
strategies, structures and performance of the organizations they lead (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). The five-factor model offers a robust and comprehensive 
psychological framework for understanding fundamental personality differences and their 
effects on strategic decision making (Peterson et al., 2003).   
Although by the late 1980s, unable to establish a consistent relationship between 
personality and entrepreneurship, reviewers had prematurely concluded a discontinuation of 
this line of work (e.g., Brockhaus & Horwitz, 1986; Gartner, 1988), recent meta-analyses 
provide strong evidence for the predictive validity of personality traits in entrepreneurship 
research (Collins, Hanges, & Locke, 2004; Stewart & Roth, 2001, 2007; Zhao & Seibert, 2006; 
Zhao et al., 2010) and call for further analysis of the contingencies and intermediary 
mechanisms that impact this relationship. Conceptual and methodological advancements, 
particularly in the use of more complex models, meta-analyses, robust taxonomy of the 
personality traits (the Big Five) and concepts that closer reflect performance in terms of 
causality, have spurred a new wave of scholarly interest in personality and entrepreneurial 
processes (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Ciavarella et al., 2004; DeJong et al., 2013), enabling 
more robust and rigorous research. While the recent meta-analyses confirm the importance of 
personality traits in entrepreneurship success (Zhao et al., 2010),  
empirical work typically focuses on the mechanisms that reflect the propensity of 
individuals to perform entrepreneurial tasks successfully, without paying sufficient attention 
to the intermediary and more proximal outcomes that may facilitate this success. With the 
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strong focus on an entrepreneur’s need for achievement (Rauch & Frese, 2005) and risk-taking 
(Stewart & Roth, 2001), extant research tends to overlook the social aspect of a new venture 
creation and the qualities it takes to assemble an effective and resourceful team. 
In the current study we aim to extend our understanding of the role of personality in the 
entrepreneurial process, by focusing on how lead founders’ personality attributes affect 
founding team formation. Hereby, we first focus on those among the lead founder’s traits that 
reflect interpersonal disposition, as “new organizations are clearly social entities from the 
beginning, as even solo founders implicitly make choices – or face constraints – that lead them 
not to cooperate with others in the founding process” (Ruef et al., 2003, p. 196). Hence, we 
propose that lead founder’s propensity to work effectively in a team context will either 
predispose or constrain the choice of founding with a team. Second, entrepreneurial activity 
requires a high degree of conscientiousness, as designing a viable organization with growth 
prospects involves thorough planning about how to assemble resources, organize human 
capital, establish communication channels, distribute tasks and assign organizational roles. We 
therefore focus on conscientiousness as the personality trait most related to an individual’s 
organization and planning (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Zhao & Seibert, 2006), and as the 
one most likely to affect a lead founder’s propensity to develop an elaborate structure to 
organize the team.  
These qualities have been widely understated by the general entrepreneurship research, 
despite the strong evidence that new ventures founded by teams have higher survival rates 
(Aspelund, Berg-Utby, & Skjevdal, 2005), and that founding teams with higher levels of 
structuring are more likely to grow (Sine et al., 2006), obtain venture capital (Beckman & 
Burton, 2008), and achieve initial public offering (Beckman et al., 2007). Teams, as opposed 
to a lone entrepreneur, enjoy access to more human and social capital resources (Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1992), while having a more developed structure helps new ventures to overcome the 
liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Unlike large established firms, in which structures 
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impede their ability to innovate, growth-oriented technology-based new ventures are 
innovative by default, as innovation is the primary reason for their very existence. Formalized 
structures within these ventures are beneficial as they enable organizational decision making, 
individual focus, learning and efficiency, while reducing complexity and work ambiguity 
(Perrow, 1986; Sine et al., 2006). Furthermore, recent studies show that the professionalization 
process beyond the founding stage may be constrained by the founding condition as a result of 
path-dependency (Gruber, 2010), homophily (Ruef et al., 2003) and inertia (Phillips, 2005).  
For instance, in a longitudinal study of technology-based new ventures in the Silicon 
Valley, Beckman and Burton (2008) found that narrowly structured and narrowly experienced 
founding teams were less likely to develop their role structure or their experience over time 
and that this decreased their likelihood to obtain VC and initial public offering. We build on 
these insights to suggest that the founding team’s structure is an important intermediary 
outcome in the new venture creation process, and that choices of whether others will join the 
team and, more importantly, who will join and what they will contribute can have lasting 
consequences for new venture’s development, survival and success. 
As our theoretical basis we build on the person—environment fit theory (Judge & 
Kristof-Brown, 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005) to suggest that individuals choose their work 
environments in congruence with their personality, values and needs (Zhao et al., 2010). 
Applying this logic to the formation of the entrepreneurial firm, we expect individuals who 
score highly on personality traits related to interpersonal disposition to be more likely to found 
a new venture with a team (as opposed to becoming a solo entrepreneur).  
This is because these individuals are more motivated to engage in the type of behaviors 
that involve social interaction. They do so effortlessly, with more commitment, satisfaction 
and success. In other words, their motivation, ability and opportunity to engage in social 
interactions make the team-based work-setting more attractive. Similarly, we expect 
individuals scoring highly on conscientiousness to be more likely to elaborately structure the 
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team, as they have higher motivation, ability and opportunity to engage in behaviors that 
involve an eye for detail and planning. In sum, we expect personality to affect lead founders’ 
decisions about the founding team due to their motivation, ability, and opportunity to engage 
in certain types of behaviors. 
In the following sections, we formulate our hypotheses. First, we examine the effects 
of personality traits, highlighting the effect of interpersonal disposition on a lead founder’s 
choice to assemble a team. Next, we highlight the role of conscientiousness in setting up an 
elaborate team structure, followed by an examination of the interplay between lead founders’ 
conscientiousness and interpersonal disposition.  
 
4.2.1. Interpersonal disposition and founding by a team 
Founding with a team depends on whether the individual’s perceived benefits of cooperating 
with others outweigh the perceived threats. Benefits include the increased human and social 
capital (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Colombo & Grilli, 2005) necessary 
to achieve important milestones, a larger knowledge pool and specialization in decision making 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonoven, 1990), but also the reduced workload and complexity that comes 
from the division of tasks and responsibilities (Perrow, 1986; Sine et al., 2006). The threats 
arise from the need to give up equity and control over one’s venture (Wasserman, 2012; 2017). 
While the precise benefits and threats of starting a new venture with a team depend on a wide 
range of situational factors that are difficult to predict, depending on their personality traits  
individuals may have stronger preferences and predispositions towards certain behaviors and 
situations.  
An important and distinguishing feature of starting up a venture with a team, as opposed 
to as a solo entrepreneur, is the need for the individuals to have the motivation, ability and 
opportunity to work effectively with others. A variety of interpersonal skills increase in 
importance when a leader decides to set up a team. These skills include the ability to instill 
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trust, to communicate effectively with others and listen to them, as well as to read accurately, 
influence and persuade other people (Baron & Markman, 2000; Mohrman & Cohen, 1995; 
Morgeson et al., 2005). The following paragraphs describe personality traits that prior research 
has associated with these skills: extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability. We 
propose that they enhance lead founders’ propensity to set up a team, as well as to successfully 
manage it throughout the trial period before founding a new venture collectively. 
 
Extraversion. Extraversion describes individuals characterized by assertiveness and sociability 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987). Extravert leaders tend to be active and take initiative (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991), they are socially engaging and charismatic (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 
2002; House & Howell, 1992). This helps them build wide and diverse networks of social 
relationships, from which they can draw while assembling resources and building a team. As 
highly articulated and assertive individuals, they have strong persuasive skills (Judge et al., 
2002) that may help them to convince others to join their team. Because extravert individuals 
have a strong need for sociability, we expect them to prefer working in teams rather than as a 
lone entrepreneur. Due to their charisma and broad social network, they are also likely to be 
able to attract and retain potential partners to join their team. Introvert individuals, on the other 
hand, are quite, more reserved and less sociable (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Lack of 
persuasiveness and expression of introvert founders makes it difficult but also less desirable 
for them to form a team. In sum, we propose that the charisma, broad social network and strong 
need for sociability of extravert founders provides them with the necessary motivation, ability 
and opportunity to work in a team context. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Extraversion is positively related to starting up with a team, as opposed to 
being a solo entrepreneur. 
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Agreeableness. Agreeableness describes individuals characterized by trust, altruism, 
cooperation and modesty (Zhao et al., 2010). Agreeable individuals show sympathy, kindness 
and consideration for the needs of others (Costa & McCrae, 1992). They tend to be 
compromise-seeking, deferring to others and dealing with conflict in a collaborative way 
(Digman, 1990; Zhao et al., 2010). Highly agreeable leaders build highly cohesive teams, in 
which they tend to de-emphasize status and power asymmetries, they encourage discussion and 
information exchange among the individual team members to reach group consensus (Peterson 
et al., 2003). The kind and compromise-seeking nature of agreeable individuals makes it easy 
and more attractive for them to work in teams. Conversely, it also attracts potential partners to 
join the team, as working closely with these individuals is perceived as pleasant and reliable. 
Highly disagreeable individuals, in contrast, tend to be selfish, stubborn, rude and generally 
have little patience with others (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Their conflictful and callous nature 
makes it difficult for them, but also for the others to work together in a team setting. In sum, 
we propose that the collaborative, trustful, and compromise-seeking nature of agreeable 
founders provides them with the necessary motivation, ability and opportunity to work in a 
team-based setting. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Agreeableness is positively related to starting up with a team, as opposed to 
being a solo entrepreneur. 
 
Emotional stability. Emotional stability characterizes individuals who are calm, even-
tempered, and relaxed as opposed to being anxious, compulsive, defensive, and thin-skinned 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987). Individuals high on emotional stability tend to be good at handling 
stress, while maintaining composure and self-confidence across different situations (Morgeson 
et al., 2005). Ability to tolerate stress allows emotionally stable leaders to better manage 
complex and ambiguous situations (Morgeson et al., 2005). They are more likely to engage in 
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helping behaviors (Porter et al., 2003), to “get along” with their counterparts (Hogan & 
Holland, 2003), and to have more developed teamwork skills (Hough, 1992). In contrast, 
emotionally unstable (neurotic) individuals are less cooperative, more likely to express 
negative attitudes and exhibit poor quality interactions with colleagues (LePine & Van Dyne, 
2001). This makes it very unlikely for unstable leaders to be either willing or able to attract and 
retain potential partners. In sum, we propose that the positive, even-tempered, and confident 
nature of emotionally stable founders provides them with the necessary motivation, ability and 
opportunity to work in a team. 
 
Hypothesis 1c. Emotional stability is positively related to starting up with a team, as opposed 
to being a solo entrepreneur. 
 
4.2.2. Conscientiousness and elaborate founding team structure 
“The emergence of a new formal organization invariably entails a decision regarding who will 
participate and what they will contribute” (Ruef et al., 2003, p. 195), both of which may have 
lasting effects on new venture survival and success. We therefore examine the effects of lead 
founders’ personality on their propensity to assemble a founding team that comprises both 
structural aspects of the founding team (the who and the what). Building on the established 
tradition of top management team demography research and the upper echelons perspective, 
we distinguish between two team characteristics: (1) founders’ functional role assignments, 
and (2) founders’ functional experience (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 
2002). Functional role assignments refer to the existence of specific functional positions within 
the team, while founders’ functional experience refers to the human capital of each of the 
individual founders (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2015). Although conceptually 
and empirically different (Beckman & Burton, 2011; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Crossland, 
Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2013; Ferguson et al., 2015), each of the two represents an 
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important element of a founding team structure. We therefore examine them in combination 
and coin the term elaborate structure to describe founding teams that comprise both clear 
distribution of functional tasks and a broad set of experiences that would enable individuals to 
successfully complete these tasks. 
The degree to which the lead founder is likely to adopt an elaborate structure in the 
founding team depends on his or her propensity to engage in thorough structuring and long-
term planning – the qualities that are best reflected by individuals’ conscientiousness 
(Anderson, Spataro, Flynn, 2008; Barrick & Mount, 1991). Lead founders with a high 
motivation, ability and opportunity to engage in thorough detail-driven planning and 
structuring of organizational tasks are more likely to identify all relevant operational domains 
of their venture and strive to staff them with the relevant expertise. We therefore propose that 
highly conscientious founders starting up with a team are more likely to elaborately structure 
their founding team. 
Conscientiousness describes individuals characterized by high sense of organization, 
responsibility, deliberation, and achievement-orientation (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Bono & 
Judge, 2004; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Conscientious individuals tend to be planful, efficient, 
detail-oriented, and thorough in their work (Anderson et al., 2008). They are also known to be 
more persevering and attentive to tasks (McCrae & Costa, 1987; Peterson et al., 2003), and this 
makes conscientiousness the most consistent predictor of job performance across all types of 
work and occupations (Barrick et al., 2001) and particularly those involving managing others 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
Having an eye for detail and planning allows conscientious lead founders to carefully 
identify critical functional domains and individual tasks important for new ventures’ long-term 
development, as well as the experience that is necessary to fulfil these tasks. Furthermore, they 
are more likely to strive to organize the activities of their team in a more structured and efficient 
way. For instance, Zhao and Seibert (2006) suggested that achievement-oriented and well-
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organized conscientious entrepreneurs would develop more detailed plans and strategies in 
order to demonstrate their ability to successfully fulfil entrepreneurial tasks (Zhao & Seibert, 
2006). In another study of lead founders’ personality, DeJong and colleagues (2013) proposed 
that conscientious lead founders would initiate structures and set rules that guide team 
members’ efforts effectively while decreasing potential conflict. Conscientious lead founders 
have a preference for unambiguous, structured work settings (Costa & McCrae, 1988; DeJong 
et al., 2013). In an effort to control the uncertainty associated with establishing a new business, 
conscientious entrepreneurs tend to highly structure their environment (Peterson et al., 2003). 
We therefore expect conscientious leaders to assemble founding teams that are elaborately 
structured – including a broad range of formalized functional tasks to foster coordination and 
experience that would enable team members to effectively fulfil their tasks. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Conscientiousness is positively related to the founding team’s elaborate 
structure 
 
4.2.3. Conscientiousness and Interpersonal disposition 
Conscientiousness may be essential for identifying critical functional domains and individual 
tasks within these domains that need to be covered by the team. However, this trait alone may 
not ensure that the roles identified are filled by the right people, as highly conscientious 
individuals tend to focus on the tasks, rather than on interpersonal relationships (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987), and this may make it difficult to attract the desired human capital to join the 
team. Particularly in the context of new ventures, which are typically resource constrained and 
may not be able to offer salaries competitive to those of the resourceful established firms 
(Ferguson et al., 2015), social skills may be essential to attract highly-skilled human capital. 
We therefore propose that leaders characterized by personality traits that are associated with 
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both a high degree of conscientiousness and high degree of interpersonal disposition would be 
more likely to form elaborate teams.  
First, conscientious individuals do not necessarily possess the appropriate social capital 
to ensure that the gaps identified are filled by individuals with the relevant expertise. However, 
highly conscientious extraverts – who are enterprising, firm, persistent and vigorous (Witt, 
2002) – may benefit from a broad social capital from which they can draw and enables them 
to attract the right people to fill the required roles and provide the experience needed. 
Conscientious leaders who also exhibit high degree of sociability, persuasiveness and charisma 
would also find it easier to convince the right people to join the team. In contrast, highly 
conscientious introverts – who are cautious, conservative and reserved (Witt, 2002) – may not 
be interested in working in teams, as the costs of social interaction perceived by an introvert 
individual may outweigh the benefits of covering all the necessary task domains that the 
conscientious individual perceives. In sum, we propose that the tendency to be sociable and 
charismatic (i.e. extravert) makes conscientious lead founders even more likely to assemble a 
structurally elaborate founding team. 
 
Hypothesis 3a. The positive effects of conscientiousness on the founding team’s elaborate 
structure are stronger for extravert leaders.  
 
Second, conscientious founders who are also agreeable are likely to be more effective. Their 
deliberation and task-focus makes it easier for them to identify the relevant positions and 
expertise to be filled by potential partners, while their kind compromise-seeking nature, 
helpfulness and cooperation makes it easy for them to work with other, but also makes them 
very attractive to work with (Witt et al., 2002). In contrast, conscientious but highly 
disagreeable founders may be perceived by others as not trustworthy and even as unpleasant to 
work with – they may appear as micro-managing, unreasonably demanding, inflexible and rude 
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(Witt, Burke, Barrick, & Mount, 2002). In sum, the tendency to be cooperative, considerate, 
and trusting (i.e., agreeable) makes conscientious leaders even more likely to assemble a 
structurally elaborate team. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. The positive effects of conscientiousness on the founding team’s elaborate 
structure are stronger for agreeable leaders.  
 
Third, conscientious and emotionally stable leaders are more likely to be positive and confident 
in their ability to structure their organization, which in turn signals strong leadership and 
reliability and makes it attractive for others to join the team. In contrast, conscientious yet 
emotionally instable founders may feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the entrepreneurial 
task – and even more so by the responsibilities of managing others – and this could impair the 
climate and the general functioning of the team (Hatfield et al., 1994). The negative affect of 
emotionally instable individuals is likely to be amplified by high pressure to perform – typical 
for conscientious individuals – making individuals with this particular combination of 
personality traits very vulnerable to emotional exhaustion (Witt, Andrews, & Carlson, 2004).  
In sum, the tendency to be confident and even-tempered (i.e., emotionally stable) makes 
conscientious leaders even more likely to assemble a structurally elaborate team. 
 
Hypothesis 3c. The positive effects of conscientiousness on the founding team’s elaborate 
structure are stronger for emotionally stable leaders.  
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4.3. Data and methods 
4.3.1. Sample 
We test our hypotheses in a sample of 148 technology-based new ventures founded in Flanders 
between 2006 and 2011. The population of technology-based start-ups in Flanders was 
identified through the IWT, the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology, 
which aims at supporting innovation in Flanders, both within academia and industry. The 
technology-based entrepreneurship community in Flanders is rather small, with the majority of 
founders applying for IWT funds and making use of the agency’s supportive activities, 
including information sessions and networking events. IWT has endorsed our study and 
provided us with the lists of new ventures and their contact information, including successful 
and non-successful applicants for seed funds. Using these lists, the annual data collection was 
conducted from 2009. We have recorded general information about these ventures (including 
founding year, sector, profitability, legal type) using BELFIRST database. Companies that 
were older than 3 years at the time of the first observation were eliminated from the sample. 
This resulted in a total of 258 companies being identified and contacted over the course of 5 
years. Out of this total number of firms, 169 (66%) participated in the study by completing a 
questionnaire at some point of time. Due to the missing information, the final dataset includes 
148 firms. Our key variable of lead founder personality was assessed via a survey, while most 
remaining information about the start-ups and their founders was obtained via secondary data 
collection sources, and this allowed us to keep track annually of the companies and to record 
important organizational changes. Our key dependent variables (and some independent 
variables) were constructed from founders’ career histories. We constructed a large-scale 
database of each founder’s demographic and career-related information using secondary data 
sources (e.g., LinkedIn, Bloomberg, firms’ websites, and press releases) in combination with 
the primary data-collection (interviews with the founders). We record prior employment 
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information and the initial job title of every founder in each of the sampled firms, resulting in 
a database of 382 founders.  
 
4.3.2. Analysis 
In order to model the effects of the lead founders’ personality on the founding team structure, 
we first need to address a potential selection bias. Sample selection issues arise when the 
population of interest stems from a non-random sub-sample of the wider population and when 
the observations are not independent of the outcome of interest. In our study, the founding team 
structure is conditional on whether there is a founding team. Hence, accounting for the selection 
into team-based founding is critical, as it may affect our results. To control for this potential 
selection bias, we run a Heckman two-step model (Heckman, 1976). This approach involves 
estimation of a first-step probit model for selection, followed by the insertion of a correction 
factor—the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), computed from the first-step probit model—into the 
second-step linear regression model of interest (Heckman, 1976).  
In our study, step one (selection model) involves estimating the propensity to start-up 
with a team (as opposed to being a solo entrepreneur) using a probit model. This analysis is 
performed on the full sample of firms (N=148). Step two (linear regression model) is 
conditional on the first step and involves estimating the elaborate structure of the founding 
team with the coefficients adjusted according to the results of the first step. We use the ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression on the sub-set of firms (N=91) that were founded by teams (as 
opposed to one single entrepreneur). This method allows us to investigate not only the 
determinants of structure in founding teams, but also the determinants of founding with a team 
– which in itself has been considered an important antecedent of new venture success.  
The effectiveness of this approach relies on whether we can identify instrument 
variables (i.e., exclusion restriction variables) in the first-step (team vs. solo) equation that do 
not plausibly influence the second-step outcomes (founding teams’ elaborate structure). Doing 
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so minimizes the confounding regression function misspecification problems. We include two 
exclusion restriction variables: (1) new ventures’ entry mode (university spin-off) and (2) lead 
founders’ prior commercial experience – both of which are likely to affect the size (i.e., starting 
with a team as opposed to being a solo entrepreneur) but not the structure of the team. Table 
4.1 provides an overview of the methods (incl. analyses, variables, sample size) we performed.  
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4.3.3. Dependent variables 
In this study, we examine two types of dependent variables related to founding team structure: 
(1) team-based founding and (2) founding team’s elaborate structure. These are the conditions 
that have been deemed relevant for the long-term success of new ventures by prior research 
(e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2008; Colombo & Grilli, 2005; 2010). In line with De Jong and 
colleagues (2013), we define the founding team as the group of entrepreneurs who jointly 
incorporated the venture.  
Team-based founding. We code whether the new venture was incorporated by a 
founding team, as opposed to a single founder. We use a dummy variable with the value 0 if 
the venture was founded by a single entrepreneur and a value 1 if it was founded by at least 
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two founders. Consistent with the literature, the majority of new ventures within our sample 
were founded by teams, rather than by a lone entrepreneur. Out of the total of 148 new ventures, 
91 (61%) were founded by teams. The founding team size varies from two to seven founders. 
Table 2 depicts the descriptive statistics for the first stage model predicting team-based 
founding. 
Founding team’s elaborate structure. Teams with elaborate structure comprise a wide 
set of functional roles, and broad set of experience that allows individuals to fulfill these roles 
effectively. We therefore define an elaborate team structure as a structure in which breadth of 
roles and breadth of experience are both high. Breadth of roles and breadth of experience are 
two measures that are frequently used in the top management team research to examine the 
team (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Breadth of roles denotes 
whether a team has a broad set of formalized functional roles, while breadth of experience 
assesses the human capital of the team members. Although most prior research uses the two 
team characteristics interchangeably or in isolation from one another, each of the two 
represents an important element of a founding team structure and should therefore be examined 
conjointly (Beckman & Burton, 2008). We therefore examine breadth of roles and breadth of 
experience in combination with one another and coin the term elaborate structure to describe 
founding teams that comprise both clear distribution of functional tasks and a broad set of 
experiences that would enable individuals to successfully complete these tasks. The measure 
is constructed by averaging breadth of roles and breadth of experience after initially 
standardizing the two16. In the following sections, we describe how we operationalized each of 
these measures.  
Founding team’s breadth of functional roles. We use a count measure assessing 
whether the firm has defined positions within the team that correspond to the seven functional 
                                                 
16 We performed a number of robustness analyses with each of these separate measures (See Appendix, Table B 
and Table C). 
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areas: (1) general management, (2) science/R&D/ICT/engineering, (3) sales and marketing, (4) 
manufacturing and operations, (5) finance/accounting, (6) strategic planning/business 
development, and (7) law and administration (including HR). These areas were also identified 
by prior research as important components of technology-based firms’ functional structure 
(e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2008; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), signaling how developed the 
functional structure of a given firm is.  
For each venture, we record how many functional domains are covered by the positions 
within the founding team. For example, if a founding team consists of a CEO, Director of 
Discovery Research, Director of Marketing, and a Director of Business Development, this team 
has four established functions (general management, science/R&D/ICT/engineering, sales/ 
marketing, and strategic planning/business development) at the time of founding. Conversely, 
if the team consists of a CEO, Director of Discovery Research, Senior Director of Technology 
Development, and a Vice President in R&D, this team has two established functions (general 
management and science/R&D/ICT/engineering). Within our sample of team-founded firms, 
the minimum of formal functional roles is one (if all team members are general partners or 
scientific managers) and the maximum is four. The vast majority of firms has two functional 
roles at founding – typically within general management (CEO) and a technical domain (IT, 
R&D) domains. Table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics for the second stage model. 
  Founding team’s breadth of functional experience. We gathered information about 
founders’ prior work experience from career histories. In line with prior research, we assess 
whether each of the founders has had prior functional experience in the aforementioned seven 
functional areas. We code up to three prior positions for every individual within these domains. 
For example, one of the founding teams in our sample includes four members with the 
following prior functional experiences. Before starting the venture of our focus, the first 
member founded three firms that they led as a Chief Executive Officer (general management), 
three firms. The second founder worked as a managing director (general management) in a 
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large consulting firm, founded and led one venture (general management), and worked as 
project manager (general management) in a large global science-based company active in 
health nutrition and materials. The third founder worked as a software designer 
(science/R&D/ICT/engineering) in a medium-sized information technology firm and as 
software designer (science/R&D/ICT/engineering) in a large electronics multinational. The 
fourth founder worked as a managing director (general management) in a medium-sized 
information technology firm and as strategic business developer (business development/ 
strategic planning) in a large multinational. This founding team has functional experience in 
general management, science/R&D/ICT/engineering, and business development/ strategic 
planning. Within our sample, the minimum count of functional experience within the founding 
team is 0 (freshly graduated students or college drop-outs with no prior working experience) 
and the maximum is 4. The vast majority of the founders have two functional experiences – 
typically within the technical and general management domains (See Table 3 for descriptive 
statistics for the second stage model). 
 
4.3.4. Independent variables 
Following De Jong and colleagues (2013), we define the lead founder as “the lead entrepreneur 
who initiated the new venture and assembled the new venture founding team” (p.1835). The 
lead founder takes on the most prominent role in his or her venture and is responsible for most 
of the initial decision making (De Jong et al., 2013). We established the identity of the lead 
founder through consultation with respondents. This information was then confirmed through 
the secondary data sources (e.g., company’s web pages, incorporation files). In all companies 
within our dataset we were able to establish that one of the founders was undertaking the 
leading role in new venture’s activities and its strategic decisions, including the formation of 
the team. We administered the personality questionnaire to this person. 
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Lead founder’s personality. To measure lead founder’s personality, we used the Big 
Five Inventory (BFI) of John, Donahue and Kentle (1991), as modified and tested by Soto and 
John (2009). All items were assessed by the means of the seven-point Likert scale. Extraversion 
was assessed by the means of eight items measuring the degree of the lead founder’s 
expressiveness and sociability. Examples of items include “I am outgoing, sociable”, “I am 
talkative”, “I am reserved (R)”. The reliability of this scale is α= .84. The conscientiousness 
measure comprises nine items assessing whether the lead founder is thorough, well organized, 
efficient, planful, and focused.  Examples of items include “I persevere until the task is 
finished”, “I make plans and follows through with them”, “I can be somewhat careless (R)”. 
The reliability of conscientiousness is α = .72. Agreeableness consists of nine items measuring 
whether the lead founder is trusting, helping and forgiving. Examples of items include “I am 
generally trusting”, “I am sometimes rude to others (R)”, “I tend to find fault with others (R)”. 
The reliability of this scale is α=.73. The emotional stability scale consists of eight items 
assessing whether the lead founder is tense, anxious, or compulsive. Examples of items include 
“I am depressed, blue (R)”, “I worry a lot (R)”, “I can be tense (R)”. The reliability of this scale 
is α= .80. 
Although, we did not include it in our main analysis, we also measured the lead 
founder’s openness to experience, and performed supplementary analyses to eliminate 
potential confounding. Openness to experience consists of 10 items measuring whether the lead 
founder is original, curious, ingenious, imaginative, inventive, and reflective. Examples of 
items include “I am someone who is original, comes up with new ideas”, “I am someone who 
prefers work that is routine (R)”, “I am someone who likes to reflect, play with ideas”. The 
reliability of this scale is α= .82. 
All five scales of the Big Five questionnaire were subjected to a confirmatory factor 
analysis to test the extent to which the five-factor scales adequately represent the covariance 
matrix of the data. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is the most appropriate tool for 
 98 
confirming whether construct measures load on their respective a priori defined factors 
(Browne & Cudek, 1993). The range of loadings for the five personality factors were: 
conscientiousness, .38 to .78; extraversion, .34 to .75; agreeableness, .38 to .63; emotional 
stability, .31 to .75; and openness to experience, .34 to .78 (See Appendix, Table E)17. Overall, 
the CFA along with the high reliability scores indicate the strong validity of our personality 
measure.  
 
4.3.5. Control variables 
We include a number of control variables that have been found by prior research to be 
important for team formation and new venture success. Due to the limited degree of freedom 
(particularly in our second stage model), we were careful in selecting control variables. Our 
first-step model (selection model) has the largest degree of freedom and includes following 
control variables: year of founding, product vs. service, university spin-off, and lead founders’ 
prior commercial experience. Thereby, university spin-off, and lead founders’ prior 
commercial experience are the exclusion restriction variables – instrument variables that affect 
the first-step, but not the second-step, outcomes – and are therefore not included in the second-
step regression model. Our second-step model includes following control variables: year of 
founding, product vs. service, and inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR). Our Cox proportional hazard 
model has a limited number of events, leading to a very careful consideration of control 
variables. The overview of which control variables are used in each of the models is depicted 
in Table 1. 
Year of founding. To control for the general economic and environmental conditions 
at the time of founding, we include a dummy variable with the value 1 for all ventures founded 
                                                 
17 Although most variables loaded high on their respective a priori defined factors, some loadings were moderately 
low (.33 - .39). Given the well-established nature of or measure, we included all items in our analyses. We also 
performed a number of robustness checks using only items with loadings above .40, which did not significantly 
alter our results (results are available upon request). 
 99 
during the financial crisis period (which was most prominently felt in Belgium throughout 2008 
until the middle of 2009) and 0 for all ventures founded before or after the crisis. 
Product or service to be commercialized. Developing and commercializing a product, 
as opposed to delivering services, may require a larger set of capabilities and coordination. We 
therefore expect product-based start-ups to be founded by teams, particularly with an elaborate 
founding team structure. We include a dummy variable with the value 1 if the new venture is 
created around a product (including ventures that capitalize on both product and services) and 
0 for those that do not involve product development. 
University spin-off. Prior research shows that more than other firms, university spin-
offs are more frequently founded by teams as opposed to a single entrepreneur (Colombo & 
Piva, 2012; Mustar & Wright, 2010). While on average these teams tend to be larger than the 
teams of their independent counterparts, research shows that their functional structure is 
usually constrained as their management teams are typically comprised of scientists and 
engineers with no, or little, commercial experience (Colombo & Piva, 2012). Therefore, we 
have a strong reason to suggest that starting up as a university spin-off has an effect on founding 
with a team, but not on the teams’ functional structure. Hence, this variable is the exclusion 
restriction variable, which is included in the first-step selection equation (new ventures’ 
probability to start-up with a team), but not in the second-step model (predicting elaborate 
structure of the team). We use a dummy variable for university spin-offs (1= university spin-
off; 0 = otherwise) in the first stage.  
Lead founder’s prior commercial experience. To control for lead founders’ human 
capital that may affect their propensity to start up with a team, we assess lead founders’ prior 
commercial experience. Individuals with the high human capital relevant to their business may 
rely more heavily on their own capabilities and be less inclined to share responsibility over 
their venture. We therefore propose that, due to their higher self-reliance and the ability to 
mobilize external resources, lead founders’ prior commercial experience is likely to negatively 
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affect starting up with a team (selection model), yet it is unlikely to affect the structural 
elaboration of the team. This variable is the exclusion restriction variable, which is included in 
the first-step selection equation (probability of starting up with a team), but not in the second-
step model (predicting elaborate structure of the team). We define commercial experience in 
terms of how many years of work experience in business-related functions the lead founder 
had in the same sector as the start-up, before the founding of the new firm. This information 
was obtained through secondary data sources, such as web search, the company’s websites, 
and LinkedIn.  
Inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR). The IMR are generated using the residuals (error term) 
from the selection model. In our study, the value of the IMR for each firm represents the 
predicted probability that they started up with a team, as opposed to being a lone entrepreneur. 
It needs to be noted that as a function, the IMR comprises both observed (i.e., measured) and 
unobserved (i.e., unmeasured) variables – that are captured through the error term (residual) in 
the selection equation and included to estimate the IMR through a non-linear function. As a 
result, including the IMR into the second-step outcome equation introduces a term that attempts 
to capture both observed and unobserved variables that affect selection. 
 
4.4. Results 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 contain summary statistics and bivariate correlations for each of the sub-
samples. The correlations between the variables are low to moderate. The overall sample of 
firms used in the first stage has the highest correlation (r = .28) between emotional stability 
and agreeableness. In the sub-sample of firms founded by teams (step two), the highest 
correlation between unrelated variables is between the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) and 
emotional stability (r = - .59). The roles and the breadth of experience of the founding team are 
highly correlated with the elaborate structure variable because they are part of this measure.  
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics: First stage.  
Full sample of firms (N = 148) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1. Team/ solo  .67 .47 0 1 
2. FT size 2.15 1.14 1 7 
3. University spin-off .24 .43 0 1 
4. Product .74 .44 0 1 
5. LF commercial experience 3.60     5.46      0 25 
6. Conscientiousness 5.14 .86 2.78 6.84 
7. Extraversion 4.93 .98 2.75 7 
8. Agreeableness 5.20 .77 2.11 7 
9. Emotional stability 4.84 .88 2.23 6.75 
N= 148 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Team/ solo 1.00        
2. University spin-off .21 1.00       
3. Product .05 -.05 1.00      
4. LF commercial experience -.16 -.01 -.05 1.00     
5. Conscientiousness .12 .18 -.04 .09 1.00    
6. Extravert  .05 -.03 -.01 .20 .09 1.00   
7. Agreeable    .14 -.05 -.01 .05 .20 .12 1.00  
8. Emotional stability .19 .11 -.01 .01 .10 .27* .28* 1.00 





Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics: Second stage.  
Sub-sample of firms founded by teams (N= 91) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1. FT elaborate structure  .36 .83 -1.37 2.77 
2. FT role breadth 1.99 .81 1 4 
3. FT experience breadth 1.99 .99 0 4 
4. FT size (log) .96 .32 .69 1.95 
5. Product .76 .43 0 1 
6. IMR .48 .24 .08 1.17 
7. Conscientiousness 5.21 .89 2.78 6.84 
8. Extraversion 4.96 1.01 2.75 6.75 
9. Agreeableness 5.23 .72 3.67 6.69 
10. Emotional stability 4.98 .91 2.23 6.75 
N= 91 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. FT elaborate structure  1.00         
2. FT role breadth .77* 1.00        
3. FT experience breadth .77* .19 1.00       
4. FT size (log) .35* .33* .21 1.00      
5. Product .09 .09 .05 .08 1.00     
6. IMR .16 .10 .14 -.01 -.07 1.00    
7. Conscientiousness  .16 .06 .19 -.09 -.13 -.26 1.00   
8. Extraversion .04 -.03 .09 .08 .13 -.25 .09 1.00  
9. Agreeableness  .08 .10 .03 .16 -.13 -.39* .15 .07 1.00 
10.Emotional stability .10 .13 .02 -.05 .03 -.59* .12 .21 .34* 
N=91; *p<0.01 
 
Table 4.4 present the results of the probit model used in the first-step model to predict the 
likelihood of founding with a team as opposed to going solo. Model 1 is the baseline model 
that includes the main effects of our control variables. In line with prior research (e.g., Bonardo, 
Paleari, & Vismara, 2011; Mustar & Wright, 2010), university spin-offs are more likely to 
found with teams than with a lone entrepreneur. Commercial experience is negatively related 
to founding by team, suggesting that lead founders who are familiar with the market primarily 
rely on their own experience to fulfil organizational roles.   
 103 
Table 4.4. Effects of personality traits on founding with a team as opposed to going solo 
First stage model: Probit regression model with robust standard errors 
Team vs. solo Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Founding year         
                    crisis -.30 -.33 -.31 -.24 -.32 -.29 -.29 -.30 
 (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.26) (.26) (.26) 
University spinoff .58** .60** .65** .55* .53* .59** .63** .60** 
 (.29) (.29) (.28) (.29) (.29) (.29) (.29) (.29) 
Product .17 .20 .20 .18 .18 .21 .22 .22 
 (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) 
Commercial exp. -.04* -.05** -.04** -.04** -.04** -.05** -.05** -.05*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
         
Extraversion  .19*    .13   
  (.11)    (.12)   
Agreeableness    .24*   .15   
   (.15)   (.16)   
Emotional stability    .27**  .19   
    (.13)  (.14)   
Conscientiousness     .18 .11  .11 
     (.12) (.13)  (.13) 
Interpersonal disposition       .50*** .47** 
       (.19) (.19) 
         
_constant .42 -.48 -.85 -.86 -.42 -2.47** -2.07** -2.48** 
 (.24) (.58) (.81) (.68) (.68) (1.13) (.97) (1.12) 
         
Wald chi^2 8.60* 12.28** 12.79** 14.94*** 12.07** 19.37** 18.42*** 19.27*** 
Pseudo R^2 .06 .07 .08 .08 .07 .10 .10 .10 
Log pseudo-likelihood -88.30 -87.02 -86.91 -86.13 -87.48 -84.49 -84.86 -84.53 




Models 2 to 5 depict the main effects of the personality traits individually, and Model 6 shows 
the effects of these traits when entered simultaneously. Consistent with our expectations, 
extraversion (p < 0.1, two-tailed test), agreeableness (p < 0.1, two-tailed test) and emotional 
stability (p < 0.05, two-tailed test) are positively related to founding by team. To obtain a better 
understanding of how large and important these findings are, we calculated the marginal effects 
of a unit increase of each of these personality traits – using the Marginal Effects at Means 
(MEM) approach. This method allows us to calculate predicted probabilities for each of the 
individual based on their personality score, while setting all other variables equal to their mean. 
We plotted these predicted probabilities to create a visual representation of the marginal effects 
– the Average Adjusted Probabilities plots (See Appendix 4.6.1) – depicting the predicted 
probabilities for each personality type given that all other conditions are average.  With all 
other conditions being average, an increase of one scale unit of extraversion translates into a 
7% increase in probability of founding with a team. The same scale unit increase for 
agreeableness produces a 9% increase, and for emotional stability, a 9% increase. From the 
plots we can also see that a highly extravert lead founder (extraversion=7) is 40% more likely 
to start-up with a team than a highly introvert (extraversion=1) individual, while a highly 
agreeable (agreeableness=7) lead founder is 50% more likely to start-up with a team than a 
highly disagreeable (agreeableness=1) individual, and a highly emotionally stable (emotional 
stability=7) lead founder is almost 60% more likely to start-up with a team than a highly 
instable (emotional stability=1) individual. This provides support for our hypotheses 1(a-c), 
which state that personality traits associated with interpersonal intelligence (extraversion, 
agreeableness and emotional stability) play a role in setting up a business by a team.  
 Model 6 includes all three personality traits in order to test for the independent effects 
of these variables. However, all three are insignificant in this model, and this may be ascribed 
to the fact that they are correlated. This is consistent with our theoretical arguments suggesting 
that extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability reflect personality traits displaying 
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interpersonal disposition – and could therefore be considered as components of one construct. 
We therefore create an index variable representing the interpersonal disposition by using the 
mean of the three standardized variables and examine its effects on founding with a team 
(Model 7 & 8). In line with our expectations, interpersonal disposition is significantly 
positively related to founding with a team (p < 0.01 in Model 7 and p < 0.05 in Model 8, two-
tailed test). We also find that consistent with our expectations, conscientiousness is not 
significantly related to founding with a team. This provides further support to our argument 
that deliberation and planning may play an important role for structuring but not for the 
interpersonal aspect of team formation.  
 Table 4.5 present the results of the OLS model used in the second stage to predict 
founding team structure. The large and significant coefficients of the inverse Mill’s ratio 
indicate that there is a selection effect (elaborate team structure is conditional on founding by 
team), hence the use of a selection model is appropriate. Model 1 is our baseline model that 
shows the effects of our control variables. Founding team size is significantly related to 
founding team elaborate structure, as the more team members there are, the more likely it is to 
cover all the necessary functional roles and experience. Model 2 depicts the effects of our key 
independent variable – conscientiousness. Consistent with our expectation, conscientiousness 
is positively related to the founding team’s elaborate structure (p < 0.05, two-tailed test). Our 
marginal effect analysis suggests that one scale unit increase of conscientiousness translates 
into 17% increase in the elaborateness of the founding team structure. This provides support to 
our hypothesis 2, which states that conscientiousness as a personality trait that relates to 
deliberation, planning and organization has a positive effect on the elaboration of founding 
team structure. Models 3-6 show interaction effects of conscientiousness and other personality 
traits. The interaction effects between conscientiousness and extraversion and between 
conscientiousness and agreeableness are non-significant, thus showing no support for our 
 106 
hypotheses 3a and 3b. Interaction between conscientiousness and emotional stability is positive 
and significant (p < 0.1 (p =0.056), two-tailed test), providing support for our hypothesis 3c.  
 
Table 4.5. Effects of personality traits on elaborate founding team structure 
Second stage model: OLS regression model with robust standard errors & Inverse Mill’s Ratios 
FT elaborate struct. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding year       
                    crisis .08 .00 -.01 -.00 .04 -.00 
 (.20) (.19) (.19) (.20) (.20) (.20) 
Product .23 .28 .27 .31* .36** .38** 
 (.19) (.18) (.19) (.18) (.17) (.18) 
FT size (log) 1.00**** 1.01**** 1.01**** .95**** .91**** .86*** 
 (.23) (.24) (.24) (.26) (.26) (.27) 
IMR .55 .76** .75** .93*** 1.25*** 1.40**** 
 (.35) (.34) (.35) (.35) (.38) (.40) 
Conscientiousness   .17* -.10 .42 -.81 -.18 
  (.09) (.43) (.57) (.55) (.77) 
Extraversion   -.26   -.21 
   (.41)   (.34) 
Consc. X extravers   .05   .04 
   (.08)   (.06) 
Agreeable     .42  .86 
    (.57)  (.58) 
Consc. X agreeable.    .39  -.15 
    (.53)  (.12) 
Emotional stability     -.77 -.71 
     (.48) (.50) 
Consc. X emo stab     .19* .19* 
     (.10) (.10) 
       
_constant -1.05**** -2.10**** -.73 -4.16 1.65 -2.16 
 (.31) (.62) (2.24) (2.84) (2.76) 3.96 
Model F 6.04***** 5.23***** 3.64*** 4.61***** 6.83***** 5.15***** 
R 2 .20 .23 .23 .24 .29 .31 
Root MSE .76 .75 .75 .75 .72 .73 
N= 91; *p<0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01, two-tail test 
 
To illustrate the effect of this interaction, we present a figure (Figure 4.2) showing the marginal 
impact of conscientiousness and emotional stability on the founding team’s elaborate structure, 
based on the estimates from Model 5. Consistently with our hypotheses, highly conscientious, 
emotionally stable lead founders form more elaborately structured teams. From the graph, we 
can see that conscientiousness alone does not drive founding team structure, as highly 
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conscientious but emotionally instable founders are less likely to form structurally elaborate 
teams. Furthermore, it seems that high conscientiousness may even have adverse effects in 
emotionally instable founders – which gives support to the notion that the combination of high 
conscientiousness and emotional instability is detrimental as it reflects individuals’ inability to 
reach the high standards they set for themselves (Witt et al., 2004).   
 
Figure 4.2. Interaction effects of conscientiousness and emotional stability on elaborate 







4.4.1. Robustness analyses 
We performed a number of supplementary analyses with different variations of independent 
and dependent variables to verify the robustness of our results (See Appendix 4.6.2.). The 
results of our first-stage model are robust to operationalizing the dependent variable as team 
size, with extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability significantly positively 
associated with founding team size and conscientiousness remaining insignificant.  
To examine the robustness of the results in the second stage model, we performed sub-
scale analyses, examining the effects of lead founder’s personality on founding team’s breadth 
of roles and on founding team’s breadth of experience. Consistent with prior research, the 
majority of new ventures within our sample were started by teams with (a) limited roles breadth 
and (b) limited breadth of experience – causing the distribution of these two variables to be 
highly right-skewed. The use of the OLS regression is clearly inappropriate. We therefore 
performed a Poisson regression model – after having confirmed that our data does not suffer 
from over-dispersion (i.e., the assumption of equality of variance and mean of the dependent 
variable)18.  
In line with our results, we find conscientiousness significantly positively related to 
founding team’s breadth of experience and the interaction of conscientiousness and emotional 
stability positively relates to founding team’s breadth of roles. Due to the relatively low number 
of cases in our second stage model (N=91), we were trying to keep the number of control 
variables low in order to avoid overfitting the model. In our supplementary analyses, we ran it 
with a number of additional control variables, including various sector dummies (e.g., ICT, 
biotechnology, business & services), university spin-off, lead founder’s prior commercial 
experience and prior start-up experience. The results remain robust throughout the models. In 
                                                 
18 The preference of the Poisson model is confirmed by an unreported likelihood ratio test of the over-dispersion 
parameter alpha, showing the alpha coefficient (the over-dispersion parameter) is not significantly different from 
zero (thus confirming the null hypothesis that Poisson is the preferred model). 
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summary, these supplementary analyses indicate that our findings are generally robust across 
various model specifications and variable operationalizations. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine the micro-foundations of organizational blueprints, by 
focusing on the role of the lead founder’s personality. Our main findings are that the leader’s 
personality matters for the initial decision to form a team, as well as for the way the team is 
organized. Personality traits that reflect interpersonal disposition (extraversion, agreeableness, 
emotional stability) predict team-based founding, as opposed to being a solo-entrepreneur. 
Personality traits associated with diligence and planning (conscientiousness) are positively 
related to elaborate founding team structure. Remarkably, conscientiousness was found to be 
unrelated to founding with a team, while personality traits associated with interpersonal 
disposition were not related to founding team elaborate structure. However, these traits may 
interact to predict elaborate founding team structure.  
 These findings make several contributions to the theories about entrepreneurial firms. 
First, this study aims to contribute to the research on founding conditions – by investigating 
the origins of the founding team structures. A large number of studies have researched the long-
lasting effects of early organizational structures, suggesting that they are difficult to change 
even when all founders have left the organization (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Beckman & Burton, 
2008; Leung et al., 2013). While focusing on the consequences of early organizational 
structures, only a few studies have examined their origins, leaving the important question of 
why a diversity of structural design exists in new ventures. The most comprehensive account 
of the mechanisms governing founding team formation was provided by the seminal paper of 
Ruef and colleagues (2003). This study provides a thorough examination of various 
sociological influences on the team design of new ventures’– including homophily, 
functionality, status expectations, network and ecological constraints (Ruef et al., 2003). While 
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the authors acknowledge the important role of the lead founder and their decision to involve 
others in the entrepreneurial process, to date, the role of this individual has not been well 
understood. We aim to contribute to this line of work by taking a psychological approach to 
team formation and focusing on the individual lead founder. To our knowledge, the present 
study is the first attempt to elucidate the role of the individual lead entrepreneur in the team 
formation process. We provide a set of theoretical and empirical arguments that the early 
organizational choices can be traced to the very dispositional traits of the lead entrepreneur as 
a key decision maker.  
While controlling for a number of environmental, organizational and individual 
characteristics, we found that the lead founders’ personality is reflected in their propensity (1) 
to start-up with a team as opposed to being a solo entrepreneur, and conditionally on this 
decision (2) to start up with a structurally elaborate founding team. The early work suggesting 
that the personality of founders matters in setting an organizational blueprint is the qualitative 
study by Kimberly (1979) that examined the birth and development of a new school of medical 
education. The author showed that the founder’s personality, along with other characteristics, 
had a long-lasting effect on a number of subsequent organizational outcomes. In the present 
study, we examine quantitatively the role of the personality of the lead founders in the creation 
of the early structures of new ventures. Focusing on the micro-foundations of organizational 
blueprint, we also aim to address recent calls for more micro-level theories and explanations 
of imprinting and the origins thereof (Simsek et al., 2015, p.20; Nikiforou et al., 2018).  
Second, this study contributes to the research on personality in entrepreneurship. 
Although personality, as measured by the Big Five, has been frequently linked to new venture 
performance (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Zhao & Seibert, 2006; Zhao et al., 2010), the results 
have remained mixed and inconclusive. This has been partially ascribed to the distal nature of 
entrepreneurial performance outcomes that has led to a new wave of calls for more research on 
intermediate outcomes between personality and new venture performance. As personality 
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reflects disposition and not determination, it is likely to predict only broad behaviours (Epstein 
& O’Brien, 1985), including tendencies to shared responsibility, sociability, compromise, 
organizing, and planning. We therefore focus on the more proximal outcome and examine the 
effects of lead founders’ personality traits on the choice of an important start-up mode – 
founding team structure. We show how the personality of lead founders may reflect a 
preference towards a collective (team-based) start-up mode. We also show how 
conscientiousness may affect lead founders’ choice of a more elaborate founding team. Both 
of these start-up modes have been considered important for new venture success. Hence, 
focusing on the effects of personality on these start-up modes may shed more light onto the 
effects of personality in entrepreneurial process.  
Furthermore, examining the effects of conscientiousness, we build our argumentation 
around diligence and planning as a facet of conscientiousness. We hypothesized and showed 
empirically that, through organization and planning, conscientiousness is positively associated 
with founding with an elaborate team, which in turn is likely to affect new the venture’s long-
term success. This is particularly intriguing because the traditional entrepreneurship research 
examined the effects of conscientiousness by predominantly focusing on the mechanisms 
related to the need for achievement but ignoring the diligence facet altogether. In the present 
study we show that diligence facet of conscientiousness also matters as it is likely to lead to a 
more successful blueprint for an organization. We therefore propose a more modest view of an 
entrepreneur, suggesting that being a thorough organizer and planner is a quality that can lead 
to a successful nascent organization.  
Beyond informing the literature on entrepreneurship, these findings contribute to the 
research on upper echelons, by focusing on the degree to which founding team structure reflects 
both a clear distribution of functional tasks and a broad set of experience that would enable 
individuals to successfully complete these tasks. We proposed the concept of “elaborate 
structure” to describe teams that comprise both of these features. Capturing the two important 
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attributes of a team in one overarching construct allows for a better understanding of the 
antecedents and the simultaneous effects of both. 
 
4.5.1. Limitations 
As with any other study, this work is not without limitations. Like most studies in 
entrepreneurship, the present work was challenged by the difficulty of data collection, as a 
result of which the data for founders and new ventures may be somewhat incomplete. With 
regard to founders, we have recorded a large amount of career history data for each individual 
within the founding team, but not all of the prior experiences could be retrieved. For instance, 
we don’t have a detailed account of the lead founder’s prior working experience with regard to 
organizational design. In light of imprinting arguments, it would be reasonable to examine 
whether lead founders are likely to structure their organizations based on their familiarity with 
certain designs. With regard to new ventures, one of the limitations is that we do not have the 
kind of detailed performance accounts that are available for established public firms. As 
small and medium enterprises are not legally obliged to make their data public, this is a 
difficulty common to the entrepreneurship field in general.  
Although the main strength of this study is the unique longitudinal dataset of 
technology-based new ventures, which we traced throughout a longer period of time after their 
legal founding and thus did not limit our sample to success stories only, one variable was 
assessed retrospectively. To assess lead founders’ personality, we relied on a questionnaire that 
was sent out to new ventures after their legal incorporation. We did so basing our reasoning on 
the notion of stability of personality traits that is widely accepted within the personality 
research field (Costa & McCrae, 1988; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008; Srivastava, John, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2003). While it has been acknowledged that personality traits may change 
as individuals age (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Scollon & Diener, 2006; Soto, John, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2011), these changes tend to be relatively small and invariant across 
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different age groups with the majority of individuals experiencing changes of no more than 
half a point in either direction (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012). Therefore, personality traits 
continue to be seen as stable patterns that distinguish individuals from others (Bleidorn, 
Kandler, Riemann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2009; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008).  
Another limitation of this study is related to the unobserved heterogeneity. Although 
we performed a number of supplementary analyses to rule out the various potential influences 
to the extent possible, future research should try to isolate the effects of a lead founder’s 
personality by focusing on one single industry and type of venture. This may allow for better 
control over the environmental and organization-related influences. 
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4.6. Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.6.1. Marginal effects 
Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of extraversion on founding with a team  
Figure 4.4.  Marginal effects of agreeableness on founding with a team 
Figure 4.5.  Marginal effects of emotional stability on founding with a team 






Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of extraversion on founding with a team  











Figure 4.4. Marginal effects of agreeableness on founding with a team 










Figure 4.5. Marginal effects of emotional stability on founding with a team 
                                                 
19 Patrick Royston’s marginscontplot command was introduced in 2013 to address the limitations of the margins 
and marginsplot commands in STATA 11 and 12, which focus primarily on categorical variables, while 
continuous predictors were rather neglected. Marginscontplot command facilitates visualization of the marginal 
effect of a continuous  
predictor in a meaningful way for a wide range of regression models, including OLS, general linear models, 



















































Figure 4.6. Marginal effects of conscientiousness on elaborate founding team structure 




















































Appendix 4.6.2. Additional analyses 
Table 4.6.  Effects of personality traits on founding team size 
Table 4.7.  Effects of personality traits on founding team roles breadth  






Table 4.6. Effects of personality traits on founding team size 
First stage model: Poisson regression model with robust standard errors 
Team vs. solo Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding year       
                    crisis -.021 -.036 -.017 .002 -.024 -.018 
 (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) 
University spinoff .188** .191** .209** .168* .176* .195** 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Product .081 .086 .096 .087 .085 .098 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Commercial exp. -.008 -.011 -.010 -.009 -.009 -.011 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
       
Extraversion  .091**    .068* 
  (.23)    (.04) 
Agreeableness    .141***   .114** 
   (.05)   (.05) 
Emotional stability    .240*  .043 
    (.28)  (.05) 
Conscientiousness     .036 .002 
     (.05) (.04) 
       
_constant .689**** .249 -.061 .240 .506* -.473 
 (.09) (.23) (.30) (.28) (.27) (.43) 
       
Wald chi^2 5.71 10.188* 11.87** 9.52** 5.97 15.45* 
DF 4 5 5 5 5 8 
Pseudo R^2 .007 .013 .015 .0115 .0079 .0196 
Log pseudo-likelihood -229.389 -228.200 -227.575 -228.402 -229.246 -226.546 
N= 148 





Table 4.7. Effects of personality traits on founding team roles breadth  
Second stage model: Poisson regression model with robust standard errors & Inverse Mill’s 
Ratios  
FT roles breadth Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding year       
                    crisis .019 .015 .028 .015 .024 .028 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.09) 
Product .095 .097 .103 .102 .141 .151 
 (.11) (.11) (.10) (.11) (.10) (.10) 
FT size (log) .443**** .444**** .462**** .434**** .395**** .418**** 
 (.10) (.10) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.12) 
IMR .181 .191 .131 .215 .359** .348* 
 (.17) (.16) (.18) (.18) (.19) (.20) 
Conscientiousness   .009 -.052 .030 -.501* -.220 
  (.05) (.27) (.33) (.28) (.35) 
Extraversion   -.115   -.087 
   (.23)   (.19) 
Consc. X extravers   .013   .005 
   (.05)   (.04) 
Agreeable     .041  .295 
    (.33)  (.24) 
Consc. X agreeable.    -.004  -.058 
    (.06)  (.05) 
Emotional stability     -.421* -.404* 
     (.24) (.23) 
Consc. X emo stab     .099* .100** 
     (.05) (.05) 
       
_constant .087 .033 .598 -.186 2.152 .873 
 (.16) (.29) (1.25) (1.76) (1.35) (1.79) 
       
Wald chi^2 23.75***** 23.67***** 26.37***** 25.51***** 44.38***** 58.19***** 
DF 4 5 7 7 7 11 
Pseudo R^2 .0179 .0179 .0196 .0180 .0240 .0267 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-127.993 -127.988 -127.774 -127.974 -127.196 -126.845 
N= 91 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tail test 
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Table 4.8. Effects of personality traits on founding team breadth of experience 
Second stage model: Poisson regression model with robust standard errors & Inverse Mill’s 
Ratios 
FT exper. breadth Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding year       
                    crisis .048 -.026 -.056 -.037 -.014 -.064 
 (.12) (.11) (.11) (.12) (.11) (.12) 
Product .107 .142 .124 .169 .170 .177 
 (.14) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) 
FT size (log) .331** .356*** .333** .304** .316** .260* 
 (.14) (.14) (.13) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
IMR .270 .444** .500** .575*** .602*** .742**** 
 (.22) (.20) (.20) (.22) (.21) (.51) 
Conscientiousness   .154*** -.027 .486 -.181 -.109 
  (.06) (.25) (.37) (.36) (.51) 
Extraversion   -.111   -.131 
   (.26)   (.24) 
Consc. X extravers   .034   .035 
   (.05)   (.04) 
Agreeable     .444  .552 
    (.37)  (.39) 
Consc. X agreeable.    -.063  -.087 
    (.07)  (.07) 
Emotional stability     -.254 -.248 
     (.34) (.35) 
Consc. X emo stab     .065 .062 
     (.07) (.07) 
       
_constant .140 -.785** -.149 -3.151 .478 -1.777 
 (.22) (.35) (1.35) (2.02) (1.84) (2.71) 
       
Wald chi^2 8.77* 23.13**** 26.27**** 28.61***** 34.17***** 42.94***** 
DF 4 5 7 7 7 11 
Pseudo R^2 .0133 .0235 .0267 .0270 .0273 .033 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-134.416 -133.021 -132.588 -132.540 -132.507 -131.729 
N= 91 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tail test 
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Appendix 4.6.3. Factor analysis of the Big Five Inventory of personality traits 





Table 4.9. Factor analysis of the five-factor model (Big Five) of personality traits 
Factor analysis/correlation (N=169), Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)  
Variable  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness  










extravers3 0.4213 0.3418  
 
 0.6063 
extravers4 0.3996 0.3405  
 
 0.5510 






















 0.5298  0.6543 
agreebl2  
  
 0.4913  0.6447 
agreebl3  
  
 0.5305  0.6388 
agreebl4  
  
 0.4665  0.6810 
agreebl5  
  
 0.3777  0.7221 
agreebl6  0.3598 
 
 0.4929  0.6065 
agreebl7  
  
 0.5355  0.6047 
agreebl8  
  
 0.6298  0.6066 
agreebl9  
  






































































































































† Correlations below .30 are suppressed 
                                                 
20 Emotional stability measure is a reverse scale of the questionnaire’s original neuroticism items  
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CHAPTER 5: EXPANDING THE CIRCLE: ANTECEDENTS OF A NEW 
MANAGERIAL HIRE IN TECHNOLOGY-BASED NEW VENTURES 
 
Abstract 
As new ventures evolve, founders become less adept at managing their firms beyond their 
initial focus, yielding to a need to readjust the team. Building on the life-cycle perspective, we 
examine an important yet understudied milestone in the development of a new venture – its 
first manager-level hire. In a unique sample of 634 yearly organizational observations (2006 – 
2010) of 148 Flemish technology-based start-ups, we find that the strength of the need to hire 
a new manager is determined by multi-level forces – related to the founding teams’ human 
capital, board characteristics and new ventures’ environment. We examine the relative effects 
of each of these characteristics and discuss the role of the environmental fit of team and board 
characteristics. 
 
Key words: board, environment, founding team, life cycle of a firm, new managerial hire 
 
5.1. Introduction 
New ventures are typically founded by a group of friends or colleagues (Klotz, Hmieleski, 
Bradley, & Busenitz, 2014; Ruef, Aldrich & Carter, 2003) whose knowledge, skills and 
charisma are the major source of new firms’ initial human capital (Beckman & Burton, 2008; 
Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). However, over the course of 
time, as the venture develops, a new set of managerial and operational demands evolve, 
outgrowing the capabilities of initial founders. In response to this growing mismatch, new firms 
need to readjust their team by hiring new professionals (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Hellmann 
& Puri, 2002; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). This first manager-level hire is an important milestone 
in a life of a new venture as it sets the course towards transition from a small, typically 
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unstructured venture managed by a rather informal entrepreneurial group to a fully developed 
organization led by a professional management team. New hires are considered to increase the 
managerial capability of a developing firm contributing to its overall development and long-
term growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006; 
Wasserman, 2017). 
Despite the importance of the first managerial hire in the life of a start-up, we know 
surprisingly little about when firms are likely to reach this milestone and what factors influence 
its completion. Prior research has shown that new ventures adjust their teams in response to a 
significantly high or exceptionally low firm growth (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). Yet studies 
also show that even under the extreme levels of either growth or decline, ventures differ with 
respect to their likelihood to augment the team. These differences were typically ascribed to 
teams' human capital (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Ferguson, Cohen, Burton, & Beckman, 
2016; Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, & Westhead, 2003), as well as to organizational 
characteristics related to board oversight (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wasserman, 2003). While 
these studies generated a number of valuable insights on either the team or firm-related 
attributes, they have not examined their conjoint effects and relative importance. The purpose 
of this paper is to integrate existing findings, as well as to extend them by offering new insights 
into what motivates professionalization of founding teams. We do so with a specific focus on 
growth-oriented technology-based start-ups, as these ventures are typically started by teams in 
which capability development proves particularly important (Gruber, MacMillan, & 
Thompson, 2008; Mustar & Wright, 2010). Following the life-cycle perspective (Greiner, 
1972), we suggest that with the passage of time growth-oriented technology-based new 
ventures are faced with the need to update the competencies of their management teams21. 
                                                 
21 In line with prior research (e.g., Beckamn & Bruton, 2008), we use a more inclusive definition of a team, 
which also comprises solo entrepreneurs, due to their capacity to form a team by hiring a new manager.  
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Their likelihood to accommodate this need by hiring a new manager, however may depend on 
the attributes of the team, firm and its environment.  
With regard to the team, we propose that two types of human capital play a pertinent 
role in new managerial hires: (1) one that reflects shortage of skills and (2) one that highlights 
founders’ capacity to implement change. Prior work has predominantly focused on the former 
type, suggesting that new member additions are driven by the aim to fill existing gaps in teams’ 
human capital important to pursue new ventures’ goals and strategies (e.g., Chandler, Honig, 
& Wiklund 2005; Ucbasaran et al., 2003). In addition to reflecting a shortage of requisite skills, 
however, founding teams’ human capital may also reflect teams’ capacity to implement 
change. While it is common to think of a new venture as agile and highly responsive to 
contextual cues, founders’ vision and consequently their decision-making may be constrained 
by their prior experience (Gruber, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2013), but also by 
the aim to maintain full control over their venture (Adizes,1999; Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; 
Wasserman, 2013; 2017). 
With regard to the organizational characteristics, we propose that external stakeholders 
apply pressures on new ventures to update capabilities of their team. We build on prior research 
which has unveiled the importance of board oversight and governance in initiating 
compositional change but did not distinguish between new member entries and founder exits 
(e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005). Because the two events are motivated by different 
mechanisms – whereby new member additions are strategic in their nature and founder exits 
are typically motivated by conflict within the team (Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, & 
Sapienza, 2006; Vanaelst et al., 2006) – they should be studied independently. We examine the 
role of boards in new ventures’ propensity to add a new manager to the team. 
Changes to the team may also be triggered by new venture’s environmental 
characteristics, as industry environments pose distinct technical and managerial requirements 
to the team and determine what competences teams need to develop to successfully manage 
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their firms (Eesley, Hsu & Roberts, 2014). To date, the role of the external environment in the 
evolution of a management team has been largely ignored, with the majority of studies merely 
controlling for the sector. We go beyond this approach and argue that the environmental 
commonalities across different sectors determine to a large extent what capabilities new 
ventures need and how these needs can be met over time. We focus on new ventures’ 
commercialization environment, as the most salient environmental characteristics reflecting 
firms’ commercialization strategies (Eesley et al., 2014). We further propose that the 
importance of team (human capital) and organizational (board oversight) characteristics is 
strengthened by the type of commercialization environment new ventures operate in. To 
examine this environmental fit, we build on the early contingency literature insights 
highlighting the impact of environment on firms’ organizational design and evolution 
(Woodward, 1965). Figure 1 depicts our research model. 
Our study was designed to make several contributions to the extant literature. First, we 
integrate findings generated by prior studies, which focused on different aspects of new 
ventures’ compositional change, into one theoretical framework with a specific focus on the 
first new managerial addition. This approach allows us to evaluate the unique contribution of 
each of these variables. Second, we aim to contribute to the existing work, which has largely 
ignored the role of environment in teams’ turnover, by examining the effects of environmental 
pressures on the development of managerial capabilities in entrepreneurial teams. Focusing on 
new ventures’ commercialization environments, we examine contextual features that extend 
beyond the dimension of environmental stability versus dynamism and provide a more 
elaborate account on how environmental features shape technical and managerial requirements 
of the team. Third, we consider the role of environmental fit of internal (team and 
organizational) characteristics in elevating the need to hire new managers. To date, this is the 
first study to examine the contingent role environment in the process of founding team 
professionalization. Finally, we contribute to the stream of research in entrepreneurship and 
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management that adopts multilevel approach (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum et al., 2001; 
Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007) by examining the antecedents of a new managerial 
hire on team (founding team’s human capital), organization (board oversight) and environment 
(commercialization environment) levels of analysis, as well as the effects of the environmental 
contingency thereof. 
We test our hypotheses in a unique longitudinal data set of 148 technology-based new 
ventures founded between 2006 and 2010 in Flemish region of Belgium. We use event-history 
analysis technique to assess which new ventures are more likely to add new managers to their 
team. To do so, we examine four groups of variables assessing (1) founding teams’ human 
capital, (2) board oversight and (3) environment, as well as the (4) alignment of the founding 
team and board characteristics with the new ventures’ commercialization environment. We 
find that all three levels of analysis are related to new managerial hire and discuss their relative 
importance. 
 
Figure 5.1. Research model 
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5.2. Theoretical development 
The success of a new venture depends on the ability of its leaders to continue meeting new 
challenges as the business evolves. With the passage of time, skills related to managerial 
competences, ability to work under increasing administrative load, and extensive delegation in 
place of control become increasingly important (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Lewis & Churchill, 
1983). As founders may not be able nor willing to adjust their personal management styles in 
order to match the evolving needs of their venture (Gilmore, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), 
new managers are needed to reduce the misfit between founders’ capabilities and changing 
organizational demands. However, not all new ventures face equal organizational demands to 
begin with, yielding to a heterogeneity with respect to the strength of the need to augment the 
team over the course of time. Prior research has examined antecedents of membership change 
from different angles. Thereby, most scholarly attention has been devoted to the human capital 
of the team, including industry experience (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), functional diversity 
(Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, & Westhead, 2003) and discrepancies between teams’ functional 
roles and qualifications (Ferguson et al., 2016). Less attention has been devoted to the firm-
level antecedents, such as board oversight (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005) and acquisition of 
external funds (Wasserman, 2003). To date, only one study has considered the effects of 
external environment, focusing on environmental dynamism (Chandler et al., 2005). Table 1 
provides an overview of the most prominent quantitative studies on new member additions to 
new venture teams, highlighting that the antecedents of team change may be traced to multiple 
levels of analysis. In order to integrate these fragmented insights, we examine antecedents of 
new managerial hire on all three levels of analysis – with the specific focus on founding teams’ 
human capital, board oversight, and commercialization environment.  
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Table 5.1. Overview of most prominent quantitative studies on new member additions 
Study Sample Outcome  Antecedents Contingency Findings Shortcomings 
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5.2.1. Founding teams’ human capital 
Founders’ prior experience constitutes the most critical human capital of a new venture, 
affecting a number of organizational outcomes (e.g., Dencker & Gruber, 2015; Colombo & 
Grilli, 2010; Shane & Stuart, 2002). We propose that two distinct types of human capital are 
associated with new managerial hires in technology-based start-ups: (1) the type that reflects 
shortage of important market-related and managerial competences – as highlighted by 
founders’ technological specialization, and (2) the type that reflects teams’ capacity to 
implement change – as highlighted by team’s prior start-up experience.  
Technological specialists archetype describes teams that have strong experience in the 
technological domain, but lack marketing, sales and management know-how. Typically 
composed of engineers and scientists wishing to commercialize their invention, these teams 
need to develop their managerial capabilities over the course of time. Prior start-up experience 
refers to whether the team members have founded and led a new venture before founding the 
focal firm. Teams with prior start-up experience are more likely to have obtained special insight 
into the entrepreneurial process and knowledge about firm formation and management, which 
in turn may equip them with a higher responsiveness to arising opportunities and threats (Baron 
& Ensley, 2006; Gruber et al., 2008). Because prior start-up experience involves high degree 
of learning-by-doing, it entails valuable tacit knowledge that cannot be easily learned through 
other sources (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Gruber et al., 2008).  
 
Technological specialization. Although the nature of the tasks and leadership requirements 
changes over time as new venture evolves, some entrepreneurial teams may be better than 
others at adapting to the new business demands and adjusting their management styles. For 
instance, founding teams with a wide variety of knowledge, particularly in business and 
management domains, should have greater knowledge pool that would allow them to cope with 
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changing environmental demands (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005). In contrast, teams with low 
variety of experience have a limited knowledge base to draw from, consequently lacking the 
requisite skills necessary to manage the evolution of their organization (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Aldrich, 1999). While broadly experienced founding teams may rely on their own readily 
available skills, teams with limited variety of experience should strive to enhance the 
knowledge base by hiring new managers. In a study of 86 Silicon Valley’s semiconductor start-
ups founded between 1983 and 1995, Boeker and Wiltbank (2005) found a negative 
relationship between top management team diversity and membership change, suggesting that 
homogeneous teams are more likely to augment their team in response to experience shortage.  
 Although, founding team diversity has been linked to a variety of positive 
organizational outcomes (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman, Burton & O’Reilly, 2007; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990) and could generally help adjusting to new organizational 
needs, most new ventures, both in general and within the technology-based sectors in 
particular, are founded by individuals with similar experience (Klotz et al., 2014; Ruef et al., 
2003). A large share of technology-based new firms is started and led by scientists and 
engineers with no or little market-related experience (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Colombo & 
Piva, 2012; Eesley et al., 2014). While these teams benefit from a strong technological focus 
that allows for a thorough understanding of the technology and its potential applications 
(Danneels, 2002; Gruber et al., 2013), we expect these teams to be less adept at long-term 
managing of a firm and expect them to be more likely to hire new managers with the relevant 
business and managerial know-how. 
We choose to take an archetype approach (Greenwood, 1988; 1993) and focus on 
technological specialist teams – teams that are composed solely of individuals with high 
technological expertise and no commercial work experience, nor education in business and 
management domains – because prior literature has suggested that a large proportion of 
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technology-based new venture teams begin with a technical founding team, which they 
subsequently professionalize by adding new more seasoned managers (Audia & Rider, 2005; 
Eesley et al., 2014). Furthermore, this archetype represents a team composition of extreme 
homogeneity in which essential managerial and business-related capabilities are missing. We 
therefore believe that teams of this archetype will experience an exceptionally strong need to 
complement team’s competences through new member addition.   
 
Hypothesis 1. New ventures whose founding team is technologically specialized are more likely 
to hire new managers. 
 
Prior start-up experience. As new venture’s business requirements shift over time, founders 
may not always be aware of, nor be able to address the competence shortages of their team. 
They may develop resistance to change due to their unwillingness to give up equity and control 
over their venture (Adizes,1999; Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Wasserman, 2013), but also due 
to a low perception of added value through a new hire (Brinckmann & Hoegl, 2011) and the 
general inability to respond to changing environmental cues. This resistance however may be 
overcome by founding team’s pre-existing knowledge that allows for effective information-
gathering and processing behaviours (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Prior start-up 
experience may supply new firms with this specific (and to the large extent tacit) knowledge, 
which has been repeatedly found important for environmental scanning with regard to new 
venture’s opportunity and threat recognition (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Gruber et al, 2008; 
McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). 
Expert information-processing theory posits that through repeated experience in a 
particular area individuals develop refined and complex cognitive schemes, which allow them 
to more effectively process new information to arrive at more optimal judgements (Gagné & 
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Glaser, 1987). Teams whose members have had prior start-up experience are more aware of 
the common challenges related to establishing and managing a new venture (Gruber et al, 2008; 
McGrath & MacMillan, 2000) and are therefore susceptible to its changing needs. For instance, 
scholars in the effectuation literature show that prior experience leads to a wider range of 
heuristics which help entrepreneurs to make better decisions in uncertain, even unpredictable 
environments (Sarasvathy, 2001). Having gone through the process of managing a new venture 
throughout different stages of its development founders are more likely to develop a better 
susceptibility to a variety of cues to effectively detect when a compositional change is 
necessary. Therefore, we propose that through increased susceptibility to environmental cues 
founding teams with prior start-up experience are more attentive to the venture’s changing 
business demands.  
 Furthermore, founders with prior start-up experience benefit from the readily available 
knowledge of how to build a customer base, how to acquire funding, and where to look for 
strategic advice (Gruber et al., 2008). During their prior start-up experience, they are likely to 
have developed social ties to other start-up founders, managers, mentors and investors who 
may supply the firm with the contacts of potential candidates. Therefore, we expect founders 
of new ventures with prior start-up experience to be more inclined to hire new managers. 
 
Hypothesis 2. New ventures whose founding team has prior start-up experience are more likely 
to hire new managers. 
 
5.2.2. Board oversight  
Next to the founding team characteristics, boards may increase new venture’s propensity to 
change. The primary role of the board is to provide oversight as well as to support new 
ventures’ strategic decision-making, including functional role assignments, remuneration and 
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team composition (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). From the 
governance point of view, founders-managers are seen as agents of the principals who do not 
always share the residual profits of the enterprise. Consequently, the interests of the founders 
with regards to the firm’s vision, goals and resources may be substantially different from those 
of the external equity owners. For instance, founders may be primarily concerned with pursuing 
their initial vision and maintaining their own position within the firm (Wasserman, 2013; 
2017). To address this agency problem, boards are the primary means of monitoring founder-
owner relationships (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Oviatt, 1988; Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
They carefully scan environment and proactively initiate changes within the new ventures to 
address arising opportunities and changing business demands. We propose that the likelihood 
of a board to initiate new managerial hire will depend on (1) its decision power – as reflected 
by board independence and on (2) its active involvement – as it is typically the case with 
external investors, such as venture capitalists (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Rosenstein et 
al., 1993). 
 
Board independence. Previous work on governance has distinguished between outside and 
inside board members. Boards with higher proportion of outside members are considered to 
have higher board independence. While the outside board members may carefully fulfil their 
monitoring role, inside board members (board members that are also full-time managers) are 
more involved in the firms’ day-to-day operations and may be less independent in their 
decision-making (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Boyd, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Scholars 
argue that inside directors may be less interested in giving up their equity and sharing control 
with new managers, especially those that come from outside the firm. Particularly as founders, 
inside board members are involved in new ventures early gestation and are likely to develop 
personal attachment to their venture, which may result in limited objectivity and divergence of 
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interests from those of the outside directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Founders-directors may 
be more reluctant to welcome changes that may undermine their own role in the venture, 
particularly because of the fear of losing control over new venture’s decision-making or being 
removed from the venture altogether.  
We therefore expect new ventures with less independent boards to be less likely to 
implement compositional change in their team. Boards with greater board independence, in 
contrast, will be less reserved and more proactive at critical monitoring of new venture’s 
performance and capabilities of its management team. Prior research found that ventures with 
higher board independence are more inclined to initiate change within new venture teams 
(Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wasserman, 2003; 13). In line with these insights, we propose that 
new ventures with higher board independence will be more likely to hire new managers. 
 
Hypothesis 3. New ventures with high board independence are more likely to hire new 
managers. 
 
External investment. Entrepreneurship research and governance literature have highlighted the 
importance of external investors in exerting pressures towards team membership change 
(Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Hellman & Puri, 2002; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2001; Wasserman, 
2003). External investors that are actively involved in the operation and development of new 
ventures are venture capitalists, business angels and investors from the industry. Next to 
providing financial backing, these investors tend to be actively involved in new ventures’ 
strategic decision-making, oversee operations and provide legal advice (Gompers & Lerner 
2001). They closely monitor capabilities of the venture, as embodied by the experiences of its 
team, and are ready to implement compositional changes (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Bruton 
& Ahlstrom, 2003; Wasserman, 2003).  
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These changes often occur in spite of the team’s wish to remain unchanged, as founders 
often prefer to keep their positions (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Wasserman, 2003). Yet, 
because new firms usually lack necessary financial resources to invest in product development 
and key facets of their business model, they have to rely on external investors for capital. In 
return for capital external investors receive equity that grants them power to enforce their 
decisions. From the external investor's perspective, investing into a particular new venture is 
fraught with a high level of uncertainty, as early-stage ventures rarely have substantial tangible 
assets that one could assess (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, Stevenson, Roberts, & Bhide, 
1999). To reduce this uncertainty, next to evaluating the business idea and the trajectory of the 
targeted market, investors assess quality of the entrepreneurial team by closely observing its 
skills. Prior research has shown that external investors actively initiate changes in composition 
of new ventures’ management teams by reassigning roles and bringing in new professionals 
(Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Wasserman, 2003). Bringing in new 
managers to the team is often a pre-requisite to complete an investment deal. 
Furthermore, because external investors are not involved in the day-to-day activities of 
a new venture, they are not subjected to inertia that may emerge within teams driving them 
towards resistance to change. They are therefore susceptible to a wider range of cues indicating 
the need to augment the team. While founders identify more strongly with the firm they created 
and may believe that they have all it takes to successfully lead their firm, external investors 
have less personal and relational ties to the initial team and are therefore less reserved about 
changing its composition if it is needed. This way, external investors are able to closely monitor 
the team and enforce new managerial hires due to arising shortage of competence. We therefore 
propose that external investors will apply pressures on teams to hire new managers. 
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Hypothesis 4. New ventures obtaining external investment are more likely to hire new 
managers. 
 
5.2.3. Commercialization environment 
Organization research has long emphasized the importance of the firm’s environment in 
shaping organizational decisions and outcomes (Cockburn, Henderson, & Stern, 2000; Porter, 
1991; Stinchcombe, 1965). A firm’s environment is known to exert pressures on organizations 
to lean towards a particular type of organizational design (Roberts & Greenwood, 1997), 
strategy (Eesley et al., 2014), and practice (Cockburn et al., 2000). Consequently, it affects the 
set of capabilities needed for new ventures to successfully compete in the market and applies 
pressures on the initial team make-up if it does not comply with these needs. Examining 
environmental pressures on organizational choices, prior research predominantly focused on 
environmental stability versus dynamism (Simerly & Li, 2000), and uncertainty (Leifer & 
Huber, 1977) constructs. While useful for explaining a variety of organizational phenomena, 
this distinction does not offer a nuanced account of how new ventures’ technological and 
managerial requirements are shaped by its environment. We choose to focus on the types of 
environment that reflects the core activity of technology-based new ventures - the technology 
commercialization process. Specifically, we distinguish between competitive (stand-alone) and 
cooperative commercialization environments, based on the effectiveness of intellectual 
property protection and the costs of complementary assets (Tripsas, 1997). 
In a cooperative commercialization environment, new ventures tend to partner up with 
incumbent firms by forming alliances as opposed to directly competing with them. This type 
of environment is characterized by high degree of appropriability for inventions –  typically in 
form of intellectual property (IP) protection –  and high costs of assembling the requisite 
complementary assets, such as marketing, sales and distribution (Eesley et al., 2014; Gans & 
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Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). For example, in sectors such as biotechnology, new ventures 
developing a new technology typically partner with established pharmaceutical firms that, in 
return for supplied innovation, take care of the subsequent steps, such as manufacturing and 
sales (Eesley et al., 2014). As creating an alliance typically involves innovation disclosure, 
strong appropriability effectiveness makes cooperation possible. At the same time, high costs 
of assembling requisite complementary assets make cooperation between incumbents and 
newcomers a desirable strategy for new ventures that otherwise would not be able to build their 
own complementary assets. Because new ventures in cooperative environments may make use 
of the assets supplied by the collaborator firm, they experience lower need to develop their own 
internal capabilities of their team. Hence, the pressure to adjust the team is lower.  
Competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment (e.g., software, consumer 
products, law, consulting and other services sectors), in contrast, is characterized by low degree 
of appropriability and low costs of assembling complementary assets. New ventures operating 
in this environment are not in the position to form partnerships with the existing firms within 
the industry, as risky disclosure of their innovation would imply potential loss of their 
competitive advantage. Instead, they compete with the incumbent firms and need to make an 
investment into developing their own complementary assets. Consequently, these firms are 
faced with stronger need to continuously update the capabilities of their management team and 
hence are more likely to proactively change its composition. 
 
Hypothesis 5. New ventures operating in a competitive (stand-alone) commercialization 
environment are more likely to hire new managers. 
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5.2.4. Environmental contingency 
The type of commercialization environment has a direct effect on new member addition, but it 
may also strengthen the effects of new ventures’ team and organizational characteristics – its 
founding team’s human capital and board characteristics. Generally, new ventures operating in 
a competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment are faced with higher pressures to 
continuously develop capabilities necessary to manage evolution of their organization. This 
relationship becomes stronger for teams whose (1) human capital lacks managerial experience 
and is susceptive to the environmental cues signaling need for change, (2) boards provide them 
with external funds and are independent in their decision-making.  
 For instance, technologically specialized teams will experience stronger need to 
augment their team in competitive rather than cooperative commercialization environments.  
To develop internal complementary assets, new ventures operating in competitive 
commercialization environments need to develop a set of capabilities that go beyond 
technological expertise (Eesley et al., 2014). Teams that solely consist of engineers and 
scientists are unlikely to internally develop important capabilities, such as marketing, sales, 
and distribution, to successfully compete with incumbent firms. Hence, these teams will 
experience stronger pressures to develop their team externally by hiring a new manager with 
the complementary expertise. Conversely, within the cooperative environment, rather than 
competing with the established firms, new ventures compete with each other in developing a 
superior technology that they can supply to an incumbent firm (Gans & Stern, 2003; Eesley et 
al., 2014). Technological excellence and focus play an important role, as achieving 
technological milestones, such as completion of design, proof-of-concept, and prototyping, 
defines success of these ventures. Changing the setup of the technological specialist team may 
disrupt important team processes, hampering effectiveness and tacit knowledge transfer, which 
are the source of competitive advantage for these teams.  Hence, change within the 
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technologically specialized teams operating in a cooperative environment may not only be 
superfluous, but also detrimental.  
The positive relationship between team’s prior start-up experience and its likelihood to 
hire new managers will also be stronger in competitive as opposed to more cooperative 
commercialization environments. Founding teams with prior start-up experience are better at 
identifying environmental cues that signal need for change. These cues are more salient in 
competitive commercialization environments, as fierce competition with incumbent firms 
requires them to develop a wide set of internal managerial capabilities (Gans & Stern, 2003; 
Eesley et al., 2014). Conversely, in more cooperative environments, the environmental cues 
for change are less pronounced, making it more likely for them to remain unnoticed. Thus, the 
ability to adapt to changing environmental demands in founding teams with prior start-up 
experience will be stronger depending on the degree of competitiveness of the 
commercialization environments. 
In the similar vein, we expect the positive relationship between board oversight and 
new managerial hire to be stronger in competitive as opposed to more cooperative 
environments. Due to their unwillingness to give up control over their venture, founding teams 
may be resistant to implement change within their team, raising the need of boards to step in 
to initiate compositional change. The more independent the board, the more likely it is to 
address competence shortages within the management team. It is reasonable to expect board 
involvement to be more frequent in environments in which development of managerial 
capabilities is critical for new venture success. Because development of internal managerial 
capabilities is more salient in competitive environments, we expect that the positive 
relationship between board independence and new managerial hire is stronger in these 
competitive environments. 
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Furthermore, we expect the positive relationship between external investment and new 
managerial hire to be stronger in competitive as opposed to more cooperative environments. 
Designing a new position and attracting experienced candidates require substantial financial 
resources, specific managerial know-how, as well as broad social network, which in case of 
new ventures, tend to be scarce. External investors provide financial resources that may be 
used to professionalize firms processes and structures (Ferguson et al., 2016; Wasserman, 
2003). They also supply new ventures with strategic advice and make frequent use of their 
professional network to help recruiting experienced managers (Faber, Castaldi, & Muskens, 
2016; Ferguson et al., 2016). Because in competitive commercialization environment the need 
for new managerial capabilities is higher, we expect external investors to be more actively 
involved in providing necessary support to recruit new managers in companies operating in 
more competitive environments. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The effects of change antecedents (founding team’s prior start-up experience, 
technological specialization, board independence, and VC involvement) are strong in new 
ventures operating in a competitive (stand-alone) but not in a cooperative commercialization 
environment. 
 
5.3. Data and methods 
5.3.1. Sample 
The list of technology-based new ventures in Flanders was obtained through the IWT – the 
Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology. The IWT is a governmental 
agency that aims at supporting innovation in Flanders, both within academia and industry. One 
of its programs provides grants to technologically advanced new ventures. Most of 
entrepreneurs starting this kind of ventures in Flanders apply for these grants, as they represent 
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one of the most accessible ways of receiving seed capital of up to 50,000 Euros. Furthermore, 
IWT actively encourages entrepreneurs to apply for these funds and supports them with 
preparing proposals. IWT provided us with the contact information of all the applicants for 
these grants, regardless of whether their application was successful or not. The IWT endorsed 
this study, increasing the face validity and the likelihood of higher response rate. We recorded 
information about all the firms on the list (including successful and unsuccessful applicant-
firms), making sure that our sample is not subject to self-selection.  
  The lists of new ventures and their contact information were yearly provided by IWT 
starting with 2009. Based on these lists, the annual data collection was conducted. After 
retrieving information about the founding years of these ventures from BELFIRST database, 
companies that were more than 3 years old at the time of the first observation were eliminated 
from the sample. Overall, 258 companies were identified and contacted. Out of this total 
number of firms, 169 (66%) participated in the study by completing a questionnaire at some 
point of time. The mixture of secondary and primary data collection was used to construct a 
database. Due to the missing information, the final dataset resulted in 148 firms. The overall 
collected information on these firms is summarized in an unbalanced panel dataset of 634 
annual observations.  
We use a panel data with an observation (spell) for each year starting with the firm’s 
legal formation, as we are interested in the effects of both constant and yearly time-varying 
explanatory variables. Overall, 44 (30%) firms in our sample have experienced new managerial 
hires at some point of time. Some of these firms have experienced more than one entry to the 
team, resulting in the total of 58 events and 85 individuals being hired. In this study, we are 
specifically interested in the first managerial hire. We believe that after its first compositional 
change, managerial team has to renegotiate its processes and routines, whereby, different 
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mechanism may emerge to motivate subsequent hires. We hence, perform a single-event per 
subject analysis. 
It needs to be noted that certainly not all newly hired managers will enhance new 
ventures’ managerial expertise. As prior research has pointed out, the forces of homophily 
strongly prevail within the executives’ turnover (Boone, van Olfen, van Witteloostuijn, & De 
Brabander, 2004; Ruef et al., 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1995), as managers tend to favour 
newcomers with similar set of skills to their own. Yet the decision to hire a new manager into 
the new venture team is the first and conditional step towards increasing its functional diversity 
to develop a professional top management team.  
 
5.3.2. Variables 
New managerial hire. New managerial hires, defined as new member additions to the 
new ventures’ management teams, are observed on yearly basis. Within the total number of 
148 new ventures in our sample, 44 (30%) have experienced new member additions at some 
point of time. We hence record, 44 events of first team member addition. Event is coded as 
dummy variable with the value 1, if the venture has experienced a new member addition, and 
the value 0, if it did not.  
Commercialization environment. In line with prior research (e.g., Eesley et al., 2014; 
Gans & Stern, 2003), we distinguish between two types of commercialization environment – 
competitive and cooperative – based on the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and 
the asset complementarity surrounding new venture’s technology. We define and assess IPR 
protection by the patent effectiveness measure. When patent effectiveness is high, new ventures 
are more likely to disclose their innovation in order to form an alliance with incumbent firms. 
Complementary assets are defined as firm’s capabilities and assets that assist innovation 
through its commercialization process (Teece, 1986). Such capabilities may include 
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manufacturing expertise, customer knowledge, marketing and sales. Combined, the IPR 
protection and the assets complementarity describe the type of commercialization environment 
based on the hazards associated with both (a) contracting for complementary assets and (b) 
threats of potential imitation – an approach that has been frequently used by prior research 
(Eesley et al., 2014; Gans & Stern, 2003). 
Competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment is defined as a context in 
which IPR protection is weak, while development of complementary assets is essential and 
cost-effective (i.e., new ventures can and must develop their own complementary assets). This 
type of environment depicts industries in which, due to low patent effectiveness, bargaining 
with incumbents is risky, while entry costs are relatively low and new ventures are expected to 
develop their own complementary assets. In contrast, cooperative environment is defined as an 
environment with high IPR protection and high costs of complementary assets. New ventures 
in this environment are more confident in bargaining with incumbent firms, due to the legal 
protection of their innovation. Due to the high costs of developing complementary assets, they 
cannot invest in developing their own complementary assets and are therefore inclined to make 
use of those provided by the incumbent firms. 
Focusing on the IPR and complementary assets allows us to distinguish between two 
environments based on well-defined patterns, as both the technological disclosure (in form of 
IPR) and the costs of complementary assets reinforce the same strategy – either cooperative 
(when the complementary assets are costly and disclosure problem is less pronounced) or 
competitive (when the complementary assets are cost-effective and disclosure is problematic) 
strategy (Gans & Stern, 2003). Consistent with the notion that patent effectiveness and 
complementary assets are part of one construct of commercialization environment, the two are 
highly correlated in our sample (r =.90, see Table2 for descriptive statistics). Grouping 
industries based on the importance of their complementary assets and IPR dimensions is a 
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method grounded in the prior literature and allows for classification of industries based on well-
defined characteristics.  
Following the approach of Eesley and colleagues (2014), we measure industries’ patent 
effectiveness and importance of complementary assets by matching industry sectors in our 
sample with the industry scores from the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Industry R&D 
survey (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000), using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code, which we obtained from BELFIRST database. Sectors scoring high on patent 
effectiveness include medical equipment, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical manufacture. 
Sectors scoring low are printing and publishing, food manufacture, software, data processing 
and ICT. Sectors scoring high on importance of complementary assets include printing and 
publishing, textile manufacture, biotechnology and chemicals. Scoring low are software, 
electrical equipment, services, and plastic (see Appendix 5.6.1, Operationalization of 
commercialization environment, for the detailed description of our methodological approach). 
To describe a commercialization environment that is characterized by both patent effectiveness 
and complementary assets costs, we create a mean value after initially standardizing the two 
measures. We then use the median value as the cut-off point to split the sample into two22: (1) 
comprising industries with weak patent effectiveness and low costs of complementary assets - 
competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment (82 firms), and (2) comprising 
industries with strong patent effectiveness and high importance of complementary assets as 
cooperative environment (66 firms). 
Technological specialist founding teams. In line with prior research, we define 
founding team as a group of entrepreneurs who founded the new venture (De Jong et al., 2013). 
Founding teams were classified as either technological specialists or non-specialists (mixed 
                                                 
22 Additionally, we performed robustness analyses using the continuous measure of commercialization 
environment (see Appendix 5.6.2, Alternative operationalization of commercialization environment). The results 
(Appendix, Table 5.8.), which are discussed in more detail in the Supplementary analyses section, remain similar 
using both types of measure, suggesting appropriateness of our methods and the robustness of our findings. 
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teams) using an archetype-approach, based on the distribution of technology and market-
related expertise among the founding team members. We distinguish between teams that are 
fully composed by individuals with strong technological background and no profound market 
knowledge, and the teams in which both technological and market expertise are represented. 
We refer to the former as technical specialist archetype.  
To arrive at the founding team archetype classification, we reviewed founders’ 
education and career histories. For each founder, we record whether he or she had received 
higher education in (1) technological domains, including science, engineering, ICT, and 
medical degree, (2) business- related domains, including organizational studies, business and 
economics, marketing and management, and (3) other domains, including not business-related 
social sciences, humanities and sport. We then record whether each of the founders had prior 
work experience in each of the aforementioned domains. Founding teams comprised of all 
members with technological education and work experience with no members holding 
business-related education or experience were classified as technological specialists. The rest 
of the teams, in which both technological, business-related and other type of education and 
experience are represented by its members, were classified as non-technological-specialists 
(mixed) teams.  Finally, the founding team archetype was coded as dummy variable, with the 
value 1 for technological specialist (N=50) and value 0 for the mixed teams (N= 95) teams. 
This sample is comprised of 50 founding teams (34%) that were classified as ‘technological 
specialists’, yielding 255 (41%) of total observations. 
In this study, we consider an extreme case of homogeneity within the founding teams, 
as all members of technological specialist teams are highly experienced in technological 
domain and possess no prior commercial, nor managerial experience. Over one third (34%) of 
new technology-based ventures belong to this archetype.  
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Founding team’s prior start-up experience. We record whether at least one member 
of the founding team has established and managed a new firm in the past. We code a dummy 
variable, with value 1 for teams that had prior start-up experience before starting the venture 
of our focus, and value 0 if they did not. This information was obtained through the secondary 
data sources, such as web search, company’s websites, and LinkedIn. 
Board independence. For every year, we record the proportion of external board 
members who are not employed by the firm to measure board independence.  
External investment. We obtain a yearly update about new ventures’ external 
investment – venture capital, business angels, and industry investment – from annual accounts 
and interviews with founders. For each observation year, we code a dummy variable with the 
value 1 if new venture has received external investment and 0 if it did not.  
 
5.3.3. Control variables 
Based on the insights from prior studies, we include four control variables on team, 
organizational and macro levels of analysis that could potentially have an effect on new 
managerial hire. 
Founding team size.  Founding team size is measured as a count of members in the 
founding team. To account for its skewness, we take a natural logarithm. By including this 
variable, we control for any effect on new member addition as the result of the initial team size. 
Team exits. New additions to the team may be result of founders’ replacements. We 
hence, control for the founders’ exits from the team. We use a dummy variable, with value 1 
for teams that have experienced founder exits and value 0 for teams that have not. Because 
finding a suitable replacement candidate may take a longer period of time, we do not code this 
variable as time-variant but as a time-constant variable indicating whether or not the team has 
experienced member exits at any point of time prior the new managerial hire. 
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Starting capital. To control for the initial size of the venture, we include starting capital 
variable, of which we take a natural logarithm to account for its skewness. 
Year of founding. To control for the general economic and environmental conditions 
at the time of founding, we include a dummy variable aggregating following founding years: 
before crisis (2006 - 2007), during crisis (2008 - 2009), and after crisis (after 2009).  
 
5.3.4. Analysis 
We analyse the rate of the first managerial hire in technology-based new ventures. First 
managerial hire can be regarded as an important milestone in the life of a new venture, we 
therefore use event-history analysis (also known as survival analysis) to analyze the occurrence 
of this event. We use Cox proportional hazard model estimated by Stata 13.1 using maximum 
likelihood estimation and report robust standard errors to account for observations clustering 
within firms. The Cox model is expressed by the hazard function denoted by h(t), 
h(t) = h0 (t) exp(b1x1+b2x2+...+bpxp), 
in which t represents the survival time, h(t) is the hazard function determined by a set of 
covariates (x1, x2,...,xp), the coefficients (b1,b2,...,bp) measure the impact (i.e., the effect size) of 
covariates, and the term h0 denotes the baseline hazard, which corresponds to the value of the 
hazard if all the xi are equal to zero. The hazard rate is defined as 
r(t) = exp(bi). 
Cox regression is a non-parametric event-history model that has been frequently used within 
entrepreneurship research to examine the likelihood of a certain event, such as failure or 
completion of an organizational milestone (e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2008; Guenther, Oertel, 
& Walgenbach, 2015). Unlike parametric models, Cox regression neither imposes a specific 
shape on the hazard function nor requires an estimation of the baseline hazard, providing a 
greater flexibility and making it well suitable for our study. Prior the analysis, we examined 
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the appropriateness of this model, by testing for the two key assumptions posed by the Cox 
proportional hazard model. First, we assess whether our study design satisfies the assumption 
of non-informative censoring, which suggests that the time to censorship distribution is not 
related to the time-to-event distribution. New ventures may disappear from our sample due to 
two reasons: (a) they cease their business (fail), or (b) they no longer wish to participate in our 
study (drop-out). Although, new ventures’ failure may be due to inadequate management, prior 
research was not able to establish a straightforward relationship between new member addition 
and new venture success, as the results remain mixed and inconsistent (e.g., Beckman et al., 
2007; Chandler et al., 2005; Chandler & Lyon, 2009; Guenther et al., 2015). New ventures’ 
wish to drop-out of our study is unlikely to relate to their propensity to hire a new manager. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that our study design satisfies the assumption of non-
informative censoring, as the mechanisms behind censoring of the ventures are not 
meaningfully related to the probability of the event. Second, we performed a proportional 
hazard test to assess whether the relative risk of new ventures with different covariate values 
is constant at all times. The test confirmed the proportionality assumption. We further plotted 
the survival distribution functions for different groups to visually assess this assumption (see 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5, in Appendix 5.6.3). Figure 5.4 depicts the survival distribution 
functions for new ventures with technological specialists founding teams versus non-
specialists. Figure 5.5 depicts the survival distribution functions for new ventures that have 
obtained external funds versus those that did not. The distributions across the groups in both 
of these plots are relatively parallel, suggesting that our study also satisfies the assumption of 
proportional hazards. Cox proportional hazard model is therefore, well suitable and appropriate 
for our research.  
In the present study, the event of the interest is the first managerial hire. In our analysis, 
time is the age of the firm (in years) and the event is the year in which a new managerial hire 
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took place. Our theoretical development suggests that the event of a first managerial addition 
in technology-based new venture teams is influenced by both time-constant and time-varying 
factors. Therefore, we use time-constant and time varying predictor variables in our model. 
Variables that are time-constant include the controls for founding team size, new venture’s size 
at founding, and the year of founding. Time-constant predictors include founding team’s 
archetype either as a technical specialist team or not, founding team’s prior start-up experience, 
and the type of the commercialization environment (cooperative versus competitive 
commercialization). Time-varying variables include team exits, board independence, and 
external investment.  
 
5.4. Results 
Table 2 contains summary statistics and bivariate correlations. The correlations between the 
variables of our interest are low to moderately low, with the highest correlation (r = .63) 
between external investment and board independence. As external investors are also outside-
directors, the two variables are interrelated. We hence perform our analyses entering these two 
variables into our models separately. We also performed analyses in which we entered the two 
variables simultaneously into the model, which did not alter substantively our results. We 
further examine the model fit across different models and find our results robust with and 
without various control variables.  
 
Table 5.2. Variable descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FT size 2.18 1.11 1 7 
Team exits .04 .22 0 2 
Starting Capital 51,124.58 140,187.8 0 186,5000 
Technological specialists .35 .48 0 1 
Prior start-up experience .24 .36 0 1 
Board independence .23 .31 0 1 
External investment .40 .49 0 1 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. FT size 1.00         
2. Team exits 0.15 1.00        
3. Starting Capital 0.14 0.05 1.00       
4. Technological specialists -0.06 0.01 0.05 1.00      
5. Prior start-up experience 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.15 1.00     
6. Board independence 0.31 0.13 0.29 0.04 0.06 1.00    
7. External investment 0.16 0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.11 0.63 1.00   
8. Competitive environment 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.13 -0.17 1.00  
9. Patent effectiveness -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.22 0.22 -0.82 1.00 
10. Complementary assets 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.15 -0.82 0.90 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts a density plot of a first managerial hire against new ventures’ age (in years).  
It shows that the most additions to the team occur between the years 3 and 6 after new ventures’ 
legal founding. This is in line with the life cycle argument that as new ventures develop they 
need to augment the composition of their team. Figure 3 represents percentage of new ventures 
that do not hire new managers over time, clustered by the type of (cooperative versus 
competitive) commercialization environments. In line with our argumentation, the graph 
clearly shows differences between the two lines indicating that the percentage of new ventures 













We present the results (coefficients and robust standard errors) of our Cox regression models 
in Table 3. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes main effects of our control variables. 
Team size is positive and significant suggesting that larger teams are better at adding new team 
members. In line with prior research and our expectations, team exits are positive and 
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significant indicating that new hires often occur as a result of founder replacements. As 
expected, these variables are significant across the models. 
Models 2 to 6 depict the main effects of our independent variables individually and 
Model 7 and 8 show effects of these variables when entered simultaneously. Hypothesis 1 
stated that technological specialist teams are more likely to hire new managers. We test this 
hypothesis in our Model 2. The coefficients for technological specialist teams are positive yet 
insignificant (although close to the p < 0.1 levels). The coefficient becomes significant (p < 
0.05, two-tailed tests) when all predictors are entered into the model (Model 8).  The hazard 
rate of technological specialist founding teams is 1.80 (r(t) = exp(.59)), indicating that these 
teams are 80% more likely to hire new managers. We thus, find support for our hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that teams with prior start-up experience are more likely to add new 
managers. Model 3 provides evidence to support this hypothesis. The coefficient for prior start-
up experience of the founding team is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
The hazard rate is 2.71 (r(t) = exp(1.00)), indicating that a unit increase in prior start-up 
experience is associated with a substantial increase in new ventures’ propensity to hire a new 
manager. Hypothesis 3 stated that teams with independent boards are more likely to hire new 
managers. In line with prior research and our expectations, the coefficient for board 
independence is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed), indicating that outside 
board members play an important role in initiating new hires to the team. The hazard rate is 
3.99 (r(t) = exp(1.38)), indicating that a unit increase in boards’ independence translates into a 
substantial increase in new ventures’ propensity to hire a new manager. We hence, confirm 
hypothesis 3 (Model 4). Hypothesis 4 stated that teams that obtain external investment are more 
likely to hire new managers. Model 5 provides support for this hypothesis. The coefficient for 
board independence is positive and significant (p < 0.05, two-tailed tests), indicating that 
external investment is an important antecedent of new managerial hires. The hazard rate is 2.08 
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(r(t) = exp(.73)), indicating that new ventures that have obtained external funding are 
significantly more likely to hire new managers. Hypothesis 5 states that teams operating in a 
competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment are more likely to hire new 
managers. In line with our expectations, the coefficient is positive and significant (p < 0.05, 
two-tailed). The hazard rate is 2.09 (r(t) = exp(.74)), indicating that new ventures operating in 
competitive environments are more likely to hire new managers. We hence confirm this 
hypothesis (Model 6). 
In Models 7-9 we examine the independent and relative effects of each of our predictors 
by entering all of these variables into one function. Because of high correlation between board 
independence and external investment, we first enter these variables separately (Models 7-8) 
and then simultaneously (Model 9). In the Model 7, the largest effect size is of board 
independence (r(t)=5.50), followed by founding teams’ prior start-up experience (r(t)=3.38), 
competitive commercialization environment ((r(t)=2.27), and technological specialists teams 
((r(t)=1.78). In the Model 8, the largest effect size is of founding teams’ prior start-up 
experience (r(t)=4.01), followed by external investment (r(t)=2.66), competitive 
commercialization environment ((r(t)=2.20), and technological specialists teams ((r(t)=1.82).  
In the Model 9, the significance levels of board independence and external investment drop 
due to the high correlation between the two variables. The larges effect size in this model is of 
teams’ prior start-up experience ((r(t)=3.99), followed by board independence (((r(t)=3.29), 
competitive environment ((r(t)=2.27), technological specialists teams (((r(t)=1.80), and 
external investment ((r(t)=1.77). Based on these and the independent analyses of each of the 
predictors, we conclude that prior start-up experience and board independence have the 
strongest effects on new member additions in technology-based new venture teams, followed 
by competitive environment and external investment. Having a technological specialist 
founding team has the weakest effect on new managerial hire.  
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Table 5.3. Effects of multi-level antecedents on the likelihood of a new managerial hire  
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors a 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
FT size (log) .64** .64** .65** .36 .55* .54* .33 .52* .36 
 (.29) (.30) (.26) (.31) (.29) (.28) (.28) (.27) (.28) 
Team exits .81** .86** .78** .86** .81** .92*** .91*** .83*** .84** 
 (.34) (.34) (.34) (.34) (.33) (.33) (.35) (.31) (.34) 
Starting capital (log) .07 .06 .06 -.05 -.01 .08 -.11 -.03 -.11 
 (.11) (.12) (.10) (.10) (.11) (.11) (.09) (.10) (.09) 
Founding year:            
                        crisis -.03 -.04 .05 .03 .01 -.01 .18 .27 .27 
 (.31) (.31) (.31) (.31) (.30) (.31) (.30) (.30) (.29) 
Tech. specialists   .43     .58* .60** .59** 
  (.30)     (.30) (.29) (.30) 
Start-up experience   1.00***    1.22*** 1.39**** 1.38**** 
   (.38)    (41) (.39) (.43) 
Board independence    1.39***   1.70***  1.20* 
    (.52)   (.54)  (.67) 
External investment     .73**   .98*** .57 
     (.33)   (.34) (.42) 
Competitive envir.      .74** .82*** .79*** .83*** 
      (.32) (.32) (.31) (.31) 
          
Wald chi-square 



















a Number of ventures is 148; number of new hires is 44; number of observations is 634 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001, two-tailed test 
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Next, we examine the effects of new ventures’ environmental fit. Hypothesis 6 stated that the 
effects of change antecedents (founding team’s prior start-up experience, technological 
specialization, board independence, and VC involvement) are strong in new ventures operating 
in a competitive (stand-alone) but not in a cooperative commercialization environment. To test 
this hypothesis, we first examine the interaction effects of each of our independent variables 
with commercialization environment (Table 4). In contrast to our expectations, none of the 
interactions is significant. For a more in-depth analysis, we split the sample into two: one 
representing ventures that operate in cooperative commercialization environment (N=66), and 
the second representing ventures operating in competitive (stand-alone) commercialization 
environment (N=82) and investigate the effects of our predictors in each of these subsets 
(Tables 5 and 6). In contrast to our expectations, there is no significant difference between the 




Table 5.4. Environmental fit and the likelihood of a new managerial hire  





 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
FT size (log) .55* .54** .23 .45 .40 
 (.30) (.27) (.30) (.29) (.29) 
Team exits .97*** .90*** .95*** .97*** .92** 
 (.35) (.33) (.35) (.34) (.37) 
Starting capital (log) .07 .06 -.06 -.01 -.10 
 (.12) (.11) (.10) (.12) (.10) 
Founding year:        
                        crisis -.02 .06 .10 .03 .26 
 (.30) (.31) (.30) (.29) (.30) 
Competitive Comm. 
Envir. 
.84* .70* .95* 1.36** 1.52 
 (.45) (.42) (.54) (.67) (1.07) 
Tech. specialists  .59    .64 
 (.57)    (.55) 





   -.03 
(.67) 
Start-up experience  .97   1.55** 
  (.61)   (.76) 





  -.20 
(.89) 
Board independence   1.76**  1.24 
   (.90)  (1.06) 
Board independence X 
Competitive Comm. 
Envir. 




External investment    1.43** 1.24 
    (.71) (.88) 
External investment X 
Competitive Comm. 
Envir. 
















a Number of ventures is 148; number of new hires is 44; number of observations is 634 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001, two-tailed test  
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Table 5.5. Effects of the multi-level antecedents in competitive environments  




 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
FT size (log) .40 .43 .37 .18 .37 .26 .39 .27 
 (.33) (.35) (.31) (.35) (.33) (.34) (.32) (.34) 
Team exits 1.54**** 1.45***** 1.639***** 1.27**** 1.30**** 1.23*** 1.24*** 1.19*** 
 (.35) (.37) (.36) (.38) (.37) (.41) (.39) (.43) 
Starting capital (log) .03 .05 .00 -.10 -.03 -.11 -.05 -.11 
 (.15) (.17) (.13) (.13) (.15) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
Founding year:           
                        crisis .07 .55 .16 .24 .13 .35* .32 .37 
 (.36) (.36) (.36) (.35) (.34) (.35) (.36) (.35) 
Tech. specialists   .29    .56 .57 .56 
  (.34)    (.36) (.36) (.37) 
Start-up experience   .94**   1.27*** 1.44*** 1.33** 
   (.47)   (.49) (.51) (.53) 
Board independence    1.70***  1.64**  1.42* 
    (.69)  (.67)  (.86) 
External investment     .60  .78* .22 
     (.41)  (.41) (.51) 
         
Wald chi-square 

















b Number of ventures is 82; number of new hires is 31; number of observations is 332 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001, two-tailed test 
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Table 5.6. Effects of the multi-level antecedents in cooperative environments  
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors c 
 
   Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
FT size (log) .78 .73 .96 .38 .60 .54 .96* .76 
 (.60) (.61) (.62) (.67) (.62) (.64) (.57) (.59) 
Team exits .24 .36 .06 .37 .34 .37 .18 .27 
 (.68) (.70) (.64) (.76) (.73) (.75) (.66) (.72) 
Starting capital (log) .11 .07 .13 -.03 .00 -.10 .01 -.08 
 (.15) (.16) (.14) (.15) (.19) (.16) (.15) (.16) 
Founding year:           
                        crisis -.20 -.22 -.09 -.25 -.25 -.22 .05 .00 
 (.57) (.57) (.55) (.57) (.56) (.57) (.55) (.56) 
Tech. specialists   .47    .59 .56 .63 
  (.60)    (.59) (.59) (.59) 
Start-up experience   1.15*   1.23* 1.47** 1.61** 
   (.60)   (.73) (.66) (.80) 
Board independence    1.53  1.77  1.08 
    (.99)  (1.01)  (1.14) 
External investment     1.25  1.39* 1.15 
     (.77)  (.79) (.88) 
         
Wald chi-square 

















c Number of ventures is 66; number of new hires is 13; number of observations is 302 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001, two-tailed test 
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5.4.1. Supplementary analyses 
We ran supplementary analyses with different variations of independent variables to examine 
the robustness of our results (see Appendix 5.6.1, Table 5.8). The results are robust to using to 
alternative operationalization methods of our key variables, such as a continuous measure for 
the commercialization environment (Table 5.8, Models 1-2). Our commercialization 
environment measure relies on the scores from the CMU survey that was administered in 1994. 
Despite the use of this method by more recent work (e.g., Eesley et al., 2014) this may raise 
questions of whether the scores have remained unchanged until the timeframe of our study, 
particularly because industries and patent effectiveness thereof are likely to change over time 
(Cohen et al., 2000). We therefore performed additional analyses to address this issue by 
looking at the particular sectors. Competitive commercialization environment within our 
sample is largely comprised of software, business services, data processing and other type of 
services. Because Software industry is known to have low patent effectiveness and low costs 
for complementary assets, we perform analyses using this sector as a proxy for competitive 
commercialization environment. Our results remain unchanged (Table 5.8, Model 3). 
However, business and services sector is not significant (Table 5.8, Model 4). Cooperative 
commercialization environment in our sample is to the largest extent comprised of biotech and 
pharma industries. These industries are known for long product development cycles, which are 
typically based on patented research. Patenting in these sectors is the common method for 
young firms to secure their competitive advantage, while costs of developing complementary 
assets are high. Measuring cooperative environment in terms of these sectors did not alter our 
results (Table 5.8, Model 5).   
Overall, a number of supplementary analyses indicates that our results are robust across 
various model specifications and variable operationalization. Although, to avoid overfitting the 
model we had to keep the number of our predictors low, we tried to control for all relevant 
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influences that could affect propensity of a new managerial hire in a young start-up. The small 
number of cases in the sub-sample analyses could limit our ability to detect interactions, as the 
number of observations and especially the number of events in each of the subsamples 
(particularly in cooperative commercialization environment, N firms =66; N events =13) are low.  
 
5.5. Discussion 
Prior work within entrepreneurship literature has illustrated critical difference between starting 
and successfully managing a new venture. Building on the life-cycle perspective of a firm, 
present study examines effects of new venture characteristics, related to its founding team, 
board and commercialization environment. Our main findings are that the professionalization 
process of the new venture team depends on forces operating at different levels of analysis. On 
team level, the need to hire a new manager is high when the founding team has no managerial 
experience, while the opportunity to change is high if the founding team has had prior start-up 
experience. On organizational level, the ability to implement change is amplified by board 
independence and external investment. On environmental level, new ventures that operate in 
competitive (stand-alone) commercialization environment experience stronger need to 
continuously update capabilities of their team and are therefore more likely to hire new 
managers. The main advantage of our approach is that it allows us to evaluate the unique 
contribution of each of these antecedents contributing to the ongoing debate about what 
characteristics matter the most in new ventures development and growth. We find that teams’ 
prior entrepreneurial experience and board independence are the strongest predictors of a new 
managerial hire, followed by external investment and competitive commercialization 
environment. Surprisingly, lack of relevant commercial and managerial experience is the 
weakest predictor of a new managerial hire. 
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 These findings offer several new insights. On the team-level, previous studies have 
predominantly focused on the human capital characteristics, such as team diversity, industry 
experience, relational capabilities, and under-qualification, suggesting that teams with less 
capabilities will be more likely to hire new managers to enhance these capabilities (Boeker & 
Wiltbank, 2005; Brinckman & Hoedl, 2011; Chandler et al., 2005; Ferguson et al., 2016; 
Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Building on these insights, we examined the role of teams’ 
technological specialization as the most salient indicator of human capital within technology-
based new ventures. On the one hand, it reflects shortage of commercial and managerial 
capability necessary to manage new ventures’ growth. On the other hand, scholarly literature 
and popular press have suggested that technology-based new ventures typically start-up with 
technical founding team, which they subsequently professionalize by hiring more seasoned 
managers (Eesley et al., 2014; Beckman & Burton, 2008). Consistent with prior research, we 
found that teams without important commercial and managerial experience are more likely to 
hire new managers. Additionally, we examined the role of teams’ prior start-up experience - as 
the attribute that signals teams’ capacity to implement change. This type of team characteristic 
was not addressed by prior research. As new managerial hire is not only a function of capability 
shortage, it also requires a skill to detect and to realise this need. We argued that experienced 
entrepreneurs will be more susceptive to environmental cues and hence more responsive to the 
need to augment their team. We found support for our hypothesis. Moreover, we found that 
prior start-up experience is a stronger team-level predictor of a new managerial hire than teams’ 
technological specialization. 
 New ventures’ organizational characteristics have gained less attention by prior 
research. Despite the importance of boards in new ventures’ strategic decision-making and 
staffing, only few studies examined their role in new ventures’ evolution of management teams, 
whereby the most comprehensive studies focused on founders’ dismissal (Boeker & Karichalil, 
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2002) and team turnover (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), but not on new managerial hires. 
Building on and extending the insights generated by these studies, we examined the role of 
boards in new managerial hires in technology-based start-ups. Although, prior research did not 
establish a relationship between board independence and the general membership change 
(Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), we found that it mattered for new member addition. This finding 
highlights the importance of boards in development of a new ventures’ managerial capabilities. 
In line with our predictions and prior research, which found external investment to be related 
to general change (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), we found it important for new member addition. 
Both board independence and external investment are amongst the variables with the strongest 
association to the new managerial hire. 
In addition to the team and organization’s characteristics, we examined the role of 
environment as a driving force to update team’s human capital. To date only one study 
examined the role of environment in new member additions (Chandler et al., 2005), which is 
surprising given that new ventures’ environment has direct implications for the team (Eesley 
et al., 2014). Focusing on the environmental dynamism versus stability, Chandler and 
colleagues (2005) found that dynamism was positively related to new member additions. We 
complement this line of research by focusing on the attributes of the environment that reflect 
the most salient features of the technology-based start-ups – namely their strategy to 
commercialize technology or service. This framework allows us to examine the more fine-
grained features of the environment based on how technologies and innovations are introduced 
across different sectors. We distinguished between two types of commercialization 
environment – competitive and cooperative – based on the degrees of intellectual property 
rights effectiveness and the asset complementarity surrounding new venture’s technology. 
Focusing on the two clearly defined types of environments enables a deeper insight into what 
specific opportunities and requirements arise from these environments in order to maximize 
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returns, as well as into how they translate into the professionalization strategies of the team. 
We found competitive commercialization environment strongly associated with a new 
managerial hire. 
Given the strong implications that the environment has on the capabilities development 
of the team, we have also aimed to examine the effects of environmental contingency in 
aligning team and organizational characteristics with new venture’s commercialization 
strategy. To our This is the first paper to take an interaction approach to examine the role of 
environmental “fit”.  However, due to the small sample and a low number of events (N=13 in 
cooperative environment), we were not able to produce meaningful results with regard to this 
hypothesis and encourage future research to consider environmental contingency when 
studying evolution of managerial capabilities in technology-based new ventures. 
Finally, our unique longitudinal dataset that comprises detailed information on founders 
and their firms allows us to advance existing knowledge empirically. Most prior studies have 
relied on self-reports and worked with cross-sectional datasets. We have constructed an 
extensive dataset comprising detailed information on innovative technology-based new 
ventures, their founders, investors, boards and industries. This large-scale data collection effort 
resulted in detailed information about 148 Flemish new ventures founded between 2006 and 
2015, which was updated annually starting with 2006. The longitudinal nature of this dataset 
allows us to obtain real-time insights on the development of the firm, including its management 
team. By employing this detailed data on European start-ups, we also contribute to the existing 
research, which has predominantly examined MIT and Silicon Valley start-ups (e.g., Beckman 
& Burton, 2008; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Fergusson et al., 2015), which constitute a very 
peculiar context and do not represent the larger proportion of technology-based start-ups across 
the globe.   
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5.5.1. Limitations and future directions 
This study offers a broad, multi-level view of some of the core antecedents of new managerial 
hires in technology-based start-ups. While it makes several important contributions, it is not 
free of limitations. First, while we predict new managerial additions to the entrepreneurial 
firms, we do not know whether these additions have positive or negative effects on team’s and 
new venture’s performance. Following the insights from the life-cycle literature, we adopt an 
implication that all entrepreneurial firms need new professional managers to add skills and 
capabilities to the initial founding team. Additional capabilities may facilitate superior 
decision-making and signal quality to potential stakeholders, thus increasing new venture 
chances of success. At the same time, they may disrupt important team processes and pose 
additional turbulence to already-turbulent entrepreneurial firms (Guenther et al., 2015). Future 
studies should incorporate measures of new venture performance to better understand whether 
new managerial hires are beneficial or detrimental for new ventures development.  
Next, we examined the likelihood of a new managerial hire without distinguish between 
the different types of capabilities that a new member brings to the team. It would be reasonable 
to expect that individuals bringing in new skills complementary to the incumbent team are 
more beneficial for new ventures’ development and success than those that bring expertise 
which is already available to the team. Future research could examine in more detail whether 
the capability enhancement or homophily are the strongest driving forces of new managerial 
hires.  Furthermore, a deeper understanding of the types of managerial profiles that are more 
suitable for evolving firms would offer practical insights to new venture teams, investors, 
governments and other stakeholders. We examined the antecedents of a new managerial hire 
on team, organizational and environmental levels of analysis. Future research could examine 
individual-level factors related to the lead founder and the CEO. Finally, we aimed at 
examining the environmental contingencies of both team and firm-level characteristics. 
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However, due to the small sample size and a small number of events our dataset proved to be 
not suitable for testing fit hypotheses. We therefore would like to encourage future research to 
consider environmental fit of team and firm-level characteristics in studying new ventures’ 
managerial evolution.  
 
5.5.2. Practical implications 
This paper highlights the importance of team, board and environmental characteristics as 
predictors of hiring in nascent entrepreneurial firms. Lacking important knowledge resources 
increases the need for a new hire, while prior start-up experience (and to some extent external 
investment) help to identify and realize this need. We have analysed the effects of 
characteristics inherent to the team and those that may vary over time. Inherent characteristics 
include those related to the founding team and new venture’s environment. They are ingrained 
in the new firm and cannot be readily changed, making it particularly important to consider 
their effect for new ventures’ long-term development. We find that technological specialisation 
facilitates new managerial hires, as firms seek to fill existing capability gaps. We also find that 
new ventures’ whose founding teams do not have prior start-up experience have more difficulty 
to hire a new manager, possibly due to the lack of the relevant social capital needed to recruit 
a suitable candidate. Competitive commercialization environments favour compositional 
changes within entrepreneurial teams, as they exert higher pressures for teams to continuously 
update their capabilities. With regard to organizational characteristics that change over time, 
we find that independent boards and external investment facilitate new managerial hires. The 
aim of this paper is to highlight the need for new ventures to update their team capabilities over 
time to meet changing firm needs. We outline antecedents and moderators of these needs. 
Entrepreneurs and investors may benefit from proactively addressing these issues.   
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5.6. Appendix to Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.6.1. Operationalization of commercialization environment 
Following the approach of Eesley and colleagues (2014), we use the Carnegie Mellon 
University (CMU) Industry R&D survey (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000) as the basis for 
deriving our measures. Spanning 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing segment, Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU) survey is a large-scale questionnaire aimed at assessing the 
effectiveness of a range of mechanisms typically used by firms across sectors to secure profits 
tied to their innovation.  These mechanisms include patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and 
the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing assets (Cohen et al., 2000). The survey 
derived a score for the effectiveness of each of these mechanisms, by asking the respondents 
to report the percentage of their product and process innovations for which the mechanism has 
been effective during the prior three years (See Cohen et al., 2000 for the detailed description 
of the methods). With regard to the IPR protection and complementary assets, the original 
survey reported scores for the following six categories: product patent effectiveness, process 
patent effectiveness, product complementary assets for sales and services, process 
complementary assets for sales and services, product complementary assets for manufacturing 
and process complementary assets for manufacturing. 
We match the sectors within our sample with the sectors within the CMU survey using 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, which we obtained from BELFIRST 
database. We then create a measure of industry-level patent effectiveness by averaging product 
and process patent effectiveness scores. Sectors scoring high on this measure include medical 
equipment, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical manufacture. Sectors scoring low are printing 
and publishing, food manufacture, software, data processing and ICT. Similarly, we create an 
industry-level importance of complementary assets by averaging product and process 
complementary assets for sales, services and manufacturing. Sectors scoring high on this 
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measure include printing and publishing, textile manufacture, biotechnology and chemicals. 
Scoring low are software, electrical equipment, services, and plastic. 
For sectors that could not be fit into the industries within the CMU data, we followed 
approach suggested by Easley and colleagues (2014). Service firms (e.g. consulting, health 
advice, and other business services) were grouped into “other services” category. As patents 
are likely to be ineffective and complementary assets unimportant for service firms, both of 
these measures are likely to be low (Eesley et al., 2014). Hence, we assigned the lowest values 
from the CMU survey to this group. The results of our analysis are robust to excluding these 
firms. Other sectors, such as electricity generation, civil engineering, wholesale of food and 
beverages and so on, remained unclassified.  
We then use the median values of each of these measures as the cut-off point to split 
the sample into the firms that are in the environment in which patent effectiveness is strong 
and the importance of complementary assets is high (66 firms) and an environment in which 
patent protection is weak and the complementary assets less important (82 firms). Grouping 
industries based on the importance of their complementary assets and IPR dimensions is a 
method grounded in the prior literature and allows for classification of new industries based on 




Appendix 5.6.2. Alternative operationalization of commercialization environment 
Methods Continuous measure of commercialization environment 




Continuous measure of commercialization environment 
To derive a continuous measure of commercialization environment, we first standardize and 
then average the measures of patent effectiveness and importance of complementary assets. 
The resulting measure indicates the cooperativeness of the commercialization environment –
how likely it is for new ventures to pursue a cooperative commercialization strategy in a 
particular sector. Low scores represent sectors in which both, patent effectiveness and 
complementary assets importance are low, hence the likelihood of partnership and alliances 
between new ventures and incumbent firms is rather low. High scores represent sectors in 
which patent effectiveness and complementary assets importance are high, hence cooperation 




Table 5.7. Commercialization environment – Sectors 










R&D in biotech 7310 18 12.24 Software 7290 34 23.13 
Pharmaceutical 
manufacture 
2423 8 5.44 Business services & 
consulting 
7414 23 15.65 
Wholesale and retail trade 5122 5 3.40 Data processing/ 
computer consultancy 
7230 13 8.84 
General purpose 
machinery manufacture 
2910 4 2.72 Architectural & 
engineering activities 
7421 8 5.44 
Food & beverages 
manufacture 
1500 4 2.72 Other business 
activities 
7499 2 1.36 
Search navigation 
equipment manufacture 
3314 3 2.04 Health services advice 8519 1 0.68 
Miscellaneous chemicals 
manufacture 
2429 3 2.04 Retail of textiles 5232 1 0.68 
Textile manufacture 1700 3 2.04     
Semiconductors and 
related equipment  
3211 2 1.36     
Motor/ generator 
manufacture 
3110 2 1.36     
Plastic & rubber 
manufacture 
2500 2 1.36     
Computer manufacture 3010 2 1.36     
Steel manufacture 2710 2 1.36     
Furniture manufacture 3600 1 0.68     
Aerospace manufacture 3530 1 0.68     
Medical equipment 
manufacture 
3311 1 0.68     
Electrical equipment 
manufacture 
3100 1 0.68     
Machine tools manufacture 2922 1 0.68     
Special purpose machinery 
manufacture 
2920 1 0.68     
Metal products 
manufacture 
2800 1 0.68     
Research in natural science 2429 1 0.68     





Appendix 5.6.3: Additional analyses 
Figure 5.4.  Proportionality assumption test 
Table 5.8.  Effects of alternative measures of commercialization environment, founding 














Table 5.8. Effects of alternative measures of commercialization environment 
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors a 
Models 1-2: Continuous measure of cooperative commercialization environment (the higher 
the more cooperative) 
Models 3-6: Sector proxies for commercialization environment (Software, Biotech)  
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FT size (log) .41 .45 .37 .51* .45 .40 
 (.27) (.28) (.28) (.29) (.27) (.27) 
Team exits .80** .82** .98*** .88*** .80** .99*** 
 (.33) (.34) (.33) (.34) (.34) (.34) 
Starting capital (log) -.12 -.11 -.13 -.11 -.12 -.14 
 (.09) (.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) 
Founding year:         
                        crisis .31 .32 .27 .20 .28 .33 
 (.30) (.30) (.31) (.31) (.30) (.31) 
       
Tech. specialists  .61** .65** .70** .63** .50* .67** 
 (.30) (.32) (.31) (.32) (.29) (.31) 
Start-up experience 1.51**** 1.58**** 1.28*** 1.36**** 1.51**** 1.37**** 
 (.46) (.45) (.42) (.41) (.40) (.40) 
Board independence 1.27* 1.35** 1.13* 1.03 1.31* 1.30** 
 (.68) (.64) (.61) (.64) (.68) (.64) 
External investment .56 .58 .60* .50 .54 .55 
 (.44) (.46) (.41) (.40) (.43) (.42) 
       
Commercialization 
envir. 
-.38** -.53     
 (.17) (.55)     
Software   .74**   .44 
   (.32)   (.37) 
Business Services    -.25  -.30 
    (.34)  (.38) 
Biomedical     -.75* -.67 
     (.43) (.47) 
Commercial 
environment  
X Tech. specialist 
 -.01 
(.45) 
    
Commercial 
environment  
X Start-up experience 
 -.01 
(.45) 
    
Commercial 
environment  
X Board independence 
 .01 
(.62) 
    
Commercial 
environment  
X External investment 
 .34 
(.55) 
    
       
Wald chi-square 













a Number of ventures is 148; number of new hires is 44; number of observations is 634 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001, two-tailed test 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this PhD dissertation was to provide a deeper understanding of the role of the 
entrepreneurial team in technology-based new ventures. This is important because investors 
and entrepreneurs themselves perceive the quality of the team as one of the most critical 
determinants of entrepreneurial success. The importance of entrepreneurial teams is well-
recognized within the academic community, yet only few studies have examined how these 
teams form and develop over time. The shortage of longitudinal studies on new venture teams 
may be due to the difficulty of collecting data on the demographics of all team members, 
including founders and managers joining the team at a later point of time. In this PhD 
dissertation, we collected an extensive amount of data about team members’ career histories 
and demographics. Combined with the existing dataset of 169 Flemish technology-based start-
ups, this effort resulted in a unique longitudinal database of 1,006 yearly observations (2006-
2015) containing fine-grained information on individuals, teams, organizational characteristics 
and the external environment of nascent firms. This dataset enabled us to examine interesting 
hypotheses related to formation and evolution of entrepreneurial teams in technology-based 
sectors. 
We first conducted a large systematic review of extant research (Chapter 3) in order to 
identify prominent gaps, which we later address in our two empirical studies (Chapter 4 – 
Chapter 5). The overall framework is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In particular, Chapter 3 
summarizes and critically reviews existing literature on entrepreneurial teams in academic 
spin-offs. Chapter 4 aims to address the gap in research on team formation. It examines the 
origins of the founding team structure by investigating how a lead founder’s personality traits 
may affect initial choices to form a team. Chapter 5 aims to contribute to the research on team 
evolution. It takes a multi-level approach to examine the antecedents of a first managerial hire 
and comparing their relative effects. 
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In the concluding chapter, we first present a summary of our key empirical findings. 
We then outline the main contributions of this doctoral thesis to the growing body of literature 
and discuss how our insights create a better understanding of the role of entrepreneurial teams 
in technology-based new ventures. Finally, we conclude by presenting the limitations of our 
work and discussing several directions for future research.  
 
Figure 6.1. Overall framework of this dissertation 
 
 
6.1. Summary of the main findings  
Table 6.1 provides a short summary of the main outcomes of our systematic review presented 
in Chapter 3. After carefully reviewing and documenting the final dataset of 43 empirical 
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studies on entrepreneurial teams in academic start-ups, we mapped existing research according 
to the emerging common themes and identified prominent research gaps. Specifically, Chapter 
3 shows that the extant research on teams in academic spin-offs tends to be (a) static in nature, 
(b) over-emphasizing the role of team members’ human and social capital endowments, with 
(c) little focus on team functioning, (d) team formation and (e) environmental and technological 
fit. We formulated a number of open questions and called for more research on topics including 
founding team formation, compositional changes that occur within these teams over time, the 
role of technology and environment in team development and performance of the team, but 
also on the relations among the team members and the imprinting role of founders’ personality, 
identity and ideology, which have been emphasized by related fields. 
Table 6.2 summarizes the most important findings from the two empirical papers 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) presented in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, we examined the role of 
lead founders’ personality in initial choices with regard to the founding team structure. We 
found that personality traits that reflect individuals’ interpersonal disposition – extraversion, 
agreeableness and emotional stability – are related to starting up with a team, as opposed to 
becoming a lone entrepreneur. Conscientiousness is reflected in an individual’s deliberation 
and planning and is associated with the structural elaboration of the founding team. 
Interestingly, we found that these two types of personality traits predict different aspects of a 
founding team structure. 
In Chapter 5, we examined the antecedents of a first manager-level hire in technology-
based new ventures. We found that new ventures’ likelihood to hire new managers is 
determined by multi-level forces – related to the founding teams’ human capital, board 
characteristics and new ventures’ environment. After carefully examining their relative 
importance, we found that external pressures applied by the board are the strongest predictors 
of a new managerial hire, followed by a founding team’s prior start-up experience. 
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Surprisingly, the shortage of relevant commercial and managerial skills is the weakest predictor 
of a new hire in teams. 
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Table 6.1. Overview of the outcomes of the systematic review  
 Chapter 3 
Title  The role of teams in academic spin-offs 
 




Summarize and map existing research; identify the gaps and formulate future research propositions 
 
Themes for future research advancement • Attributes beyond human and social capital endowments 
• Team formation  
• Team evolution 
• Team functioning 




Table 6.2. Overview of the two empirical papers 
 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
 
Title  Micro-foundations of organizational blueprints: The role of lead founders’ 
personality 
 
Expanding the circle: antecedents of a new managerial hire in technology-
based new ventures 
 
Research focus Founding team structure: Effects of lead founder’s Big Five personality 
traits  
 
Antecedents of the 1st new member addition 
 
Theory Person-organization fit theory; liabilities of newness hypothesis Life-cycle theory; human capital; governance; contingency theory 
 
Dependent variable Founding by team; elaborate founding team structure; completion of 
organizational milestones 
 
New member addition 
Results • Lead founders that score high on social disposition (extraversion, 
agreeableness, emotional stability) are more likely to start-up with a 
team, as opposed to being solo entrepreneurs 
• Lead founders that score high on conscientiousness are more likely to 
assemble structurally elaborated founding teams 
• Lead founders that score high on both interpersonal disposition and 
conscientiousness are more likely to assemble structurally elaborated 
founding teams 
 
• NVs with technological specialist founding teams are more likely to 
hire new managers 
• NVs with prior start-up experience are more likely to hire new 
managers 
• NVs with board independence are more likely to hire new managers 
• NVs that generated external investment are more likely to hire new 
managers 
• NVs that operate in competitive commercialization environment are 






6.1.1. Synthesis of the findings 
To gain a deeper understanding of the role of entrepreneurial teams, we first performed a 
literature review of empirical work on teams in science commercialization (Chapter 3), which 
enabled us to map existing work and to identify gaps and avenues for future research. We then 
used a unique longitudinal dataset of Flemish technology-based new ventures and their 
founding teams’ career histories to address these research gaps in two empirical studies 
(Chapters 4 and 5). In this section, we aim to explicate the links between our findings in each 
of the papers of this doctoral dissertation. 
Chapter 3, revealed a number of  interesting research gaps. The most prominent gaps 
included the current lack of understanding of important topics such as (1) team formation, (2) 
team evolution, (3) team members’ characteristics beyond human and social capital 
endowments and their role in shaping organizational goals, (4) team functioning, and (5) the 
role of technology and environment in the commercialization process. For the follow-up 
studies, we decided to focus our attention primarily on the gaps related to team formation and 
team evolution. We did so for several reasons. First, while our literature review focused 
specifically on teams within academic spin-offs, scholars within the broader research on 
entrepreneurial teams have pointed out the critical shortage of empirical work on team 
dynamics, which inevitably leads to an incomplete and even obscured picture of the role of 
entrepreneurial teams (e.g., DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne et al., 2012; Guenther et al., 2015). 
Second, the insight that team formation and membership changes are vital to fully understand 
team performance and its relation to organizational outcomes  has been prevalent in the broader 
team literature, which calls for more dynamic approach towards team research (Mathieu et al., 
2014). We therefore chose to focus on topic related to team dynamics – namely team formation 
and team evolution – the research gap prevalent in the literatures on teams in academic spin-
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offs, but also general new venture teams and the broader team literature – in order to contribute 
to the overall understanding of the role of teams in organizational setting. 
In Chapter 4, we address research questions related to team formation by examining 
how lead founders’ personality traits may influence their preferences towards a certain 
founding team structure. Beyond the main findings of this chapter, which are presented in the 
preceding section, we also inspected our sample for the overlaps between the insights stemming 
from our literature review (Chapter 3) and the follow-up chapter on team evolution (Chapter 
5). The dataset used in this chapter comprised both, university spin-offs and independent firms. 
In line with prior research summarized in the literature review on academic spin-offs, academic 
spin-offs in our sample were more likely to form larger founding teams. Also, consistent with 
previous findings, being a spin-off had no effect on founding team structure –  neither in terms 
of experience nor formalized roles (Colombo & Piva, 2012). Unfortunately, the number of 
university spin-offs was too small to perform sub-analyzes of our predictors on this group. 
Hence, we were not able to tell whether the academic entrepreneurs are likely to differ from 
other entrepreneurs with regard to their personality characteristics.  
The finding that lead founders’ personality may predispose ventures to a certain 
founding mode is very intriguing, as due to the path-dependency forces it may constrain 
ventures’ future development. In this chapter, we briefly discuss path-dependency as a 
mechanism through which founding team structure may affect new ventures’ subsequent 
development and success over time. Yet, we did not empirically test it. In the subsequent 
chapter, when examining the evolution of founding teams, we had an opportunity to examine 
some of the indicators of potential constraints by founding team structure. 
In Chapter 5, we aimed to contribute to the research on team evolution by examining 
the antecedents of a first managerial hire to founding teams. Beyond the main findings of this 
chapter, presented in the earlier sections, we have examined the links between this study and 
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the other two papers. The most intriguing link between the first and the second empirical paper, 
would be to see whether the founding team mode may constrain teams’ subsequent 
professionalization. Although, our data did not allow us to fully explore the imprinting effects 
of founding team structure, we did examine the effects of each of each of its elements on new 
ventures’ likelihood to hire a new manager. For instance, we examined whether a team-based 
founding mode has an effect on the subsequent managerial hire. We found that new ventures 
started by a solo entrepreneur are less likely to add new managers at a later point of time. This 
is an intriguing finding, as one would expect new ventures with limited team size to be more 
prone to enlarge its human capital pool by hiring an additional member. This finding is 
inconsistent with the human capital enlargement hypothesis, which was otherwise confirmed 
when looking at the overall experience of the team – whereby teams with only technological 
experience were more likely to hire new managers. As we found that founders who score lower 
on interpersonal disposition traits (extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability) are 
more likely to become solo-entrepreneurs, this finding could be attributed to the personality of 
these individuals. It could be, for instance, that  this type of people are less comfortable with 
sharing responsibility and giving up control over their venture. As the insight is limited in its 
statistical validity, this is something that could be examined in more depth by future research.  
We also looked at the effects of elaborate founding team structure on the likelihood of 
a new managerial hire, but found no effect.  We also examined the effects of lead founders’ 
personality on new ventures’ likelihood to hire new manager. However, due to the distal nature 
of outcome (of new hire), we found neither theoretical nor empirical support for this 
proposition. We also examined whether academic spin-offs are more likely than their 
independent counterparts to hire new managers. We found some significant relation between a 
spin-off and a new hire if we did not control for external investment and external board. 
However, since majority of academic spin-offs receive external investment and have large 
 184 
external boards, this effect disappeared as soon as external investment and external funding 
were introduced in the model. In sum, we have looked into the potential constraints of founding 
team structure and we find some – although limited –  evidence that such constraints may take 
place.  
 
6.1.2. Performance effects 
Due to data limitation, we could not provide a detailed account of the performance effects of 
founding team structures, nor of their professionalization. Although, this is the main limitation 
of this doctoral dissertation, in this section we aim to provide some indications about the effects 
founding team structure has on new venture success. We do so only for the effects of founding 
teams structure, as our data does not allow us to examine performance effects of new 
managerial hires.   
 The main challenge within the entrepreneurship research is to find a good performance 
measure that would allow to compare start-ups across different sectors. In this section, we 
define new venture performance as completion of an important organizational milestones: 
acquisition of venture capital. This performance measure represents one of new ventures’ most 
critical junctions (Shane & Stuart, 2002), particularly during the time of the focus of our study, 
namely within the first years after new venture’s incorporation. Our focus is on time to the first 
VC fund, rather than the total generated amount, because subsequent rounds of funding are 
more associated with investors’ direct knowledge about the firm, while the amount is 
predominantly firm and sector-specific (Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  Focusing on the first round 
of VC allows us to examine what founding team structures enable firms to obtain VC funds 
and if they do, which structures allow them to obtain funds more quickly than others. Another 
advantage of using this type of measure is that it allows us to compare the performance of 
entrepreneurial firms across multiple sectors. This task is otherwise difficult when using 
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accounting-based measures of profitability, as the product development cycle and time to first 
sales differs enormously by sector. 
Methods. We collected data about VC funds from the interviews with the ventures. This 
information was verified using web search, including firms’ websites, venture capital 
platforms, and press releases. We were able to obtain and verify this information from 132 
firms out of our sample (of 169 firms). We make use of the panel data structure and record 
whether a firm has raised venture capital on the yearly basis. Our final sample with which we 
test the effects of founding team structure on VC acquisition includes 132 firms, with 665 
observations (spells). We code a dummy variable with values 1 if the firm has obtained VC, 
and value 0 for otherwise and conduct event-history analysis to examine this outcome. Of our 
132 firms at risk of VC funds, 15 (11%) have obtained venture capital. This number seems 
low, yet it is consistent with the fact that VC funding in continental Europe is rather rare. Table 
6.3 provides an overview of the methods, including the summary of the key variables and the 
sample size. 
 
Table 6.3. Methods overview: Variables, analysis, sample size 
 Dependent 
variable 







FT vs. solo (1/0) 
FT size 














Results. Table 6.4 presents descriptive statistics. Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 present the 
results (coefficients and robust standard errors) of our Cox proportionate hazard models 
examining the effects of founding team structure on new venture success – namely VC 
acquisition. Due to the low number of predicted events of VC acquisition, we were very careful 
when adding the control variables, so as not to overfit the model.  
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Table 6.5 shows the effects of founding by team on venture capital acquisition. Model 
1 is the baseline model showing the effects of our control variables. The year of founding and 
founding as a university spin-off are positively related to VC acquisition. Models 2 to 7 show 
the effects of founding by team while individually adding each of the control variables. Models 
8 to 18 show the effects of our predictor with several combinations of control variables. The 
coefficients of founding by team are weakly significant across all the models (p < 0.1, two-
tailed test). Hence, we find weak support for the positive effects of team-based founding on 
new ventures’ success. 
Table 6.6 shows the effects of the founding team’s elaborate structure on the propensity 
of new ventures to obtain VC funds. The tests were performed on a subset of firms founded by 
teams, as elaborate team structure is conditional on starting up with a team. Model 1 is the 
baseline model showing the effects of our control variables. Models 2 to 7 show the effects of 
founding by team while individually adding each of the control variables. The coefficients of 
founding team elaborate structure are positive and significant across all models (p < 0.01, two-
tailed test). Models 8 to 18 show the effects of our predictor with several combinations of 
control variables. The coefficients are positive and significant throughout most of these models. 
We thus, find support that a founding team’s elaborate structure has a positive effect on new 
venture’s completion of critical milestones.   
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Table 6.4. Variable descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1. VC .11 .32 0 1 
2. FT elaborate structure .06 .88 -1.35 2.68 
3. FT size (log) .68 50 0 1.95 
4. FT 01     
5 Team entry     
6. Product .76 .43 0 1 
7. University spin-off .28 .45 0 1 
8. LF commercial experience 3.26  5.54   0 25 
N firms =132; N spells 665 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. VC 1.00      
2. FT elaborate structure .24* 1.00     
3. FT size .23* .64* 1.00    
4. FT 01       
5 Team entry       
4. Product .07 .13* .09 1.00   
5. University spin-off .27* .07 .23* -.04 1.00  




Table 6.5. Effects of team-based founding on the likelihood of VC acquisition  
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 a Model 7 
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.23*** 1.37***      
 (.47) (.49)      
University spin-off 1.44***  1.27**     
 (.49)  (.55)     
Product    .13    
    (.63)    
LF prior commercial exper.     .04   
     (.06)   
FT prior commercial exper.      .08  
      (.06)  
Team entry       -.77 
       (1.02) 
 




 (1.05) (1.07) (1.03) (1.08) (1.12) (1.03) 
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -65.63 -66.46 -66.89 -69.78 -69.48 -67.14 -69.30 
Wald chi-square 18.08*** 8.69** 14.33**** 3.39 3.11 3.51 3.98 
(degrees of freedom) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
 Model 8  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 a Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.26*** 1.37*** 1.45*** 1.33*** 1.35*** 1.45*** 1.41*** 
 (.48) (.49) (.52) (.51) (.50) (.52) (.54) 
University spin-off 1.17**      1.27** 
 (.54)      (.57) 
Product  .17    .13 .26 
  (.62)    (.64) (.67) 
LF prior commercial exper.   .06   .06 .07 
   (.05)   (.05) (.06) 
FT prior commercial exper.    .08    
    (.05)    
Team entry     -.76   
 
 
    (.97)   




(1.13) (1.05) (1.25) (1.27) (1.06) (1.25) (1.32) 
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -64.02 -66.42 -65.84 -63.99 -66.02 -65.82 -63.05 
Wald chi-square 22.56***
* 
8.65** 7.97** 8.22** 9.93** 8.01* 18.65*** 





 Model 15 Model 16 a Model 17 a Model 18 a    
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.42*** 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.34***    
 (.52) (.51) (.52) (.52)    
University spin-off   1.24**     
   (.56)     
Product .21 .33 .34 .41    
 (.64) (.64) (.64) (.65)    
LF prior commercial exper. .06       
 (.06)       
FT prior commercial exper.  .08 .10* .08    
  (.05) (.05) (.05)    
Team entry -.86   -.88    
 
 
(.99)   (.98)    
Founding by team (0/1) 2.21* 2.27* 1.88 2.33*    
 (1.25) (1.28) (1.38) (1.28)    
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -65.30 -63.86 -61.22 -63.41    
Wald chi-square 9.62* 8.44* 15.92*** 10.10*    
(degrees of freedom) 5 4 5 5    
  N firms= 132; N events=14; N spells= 537 
 *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tail test 





Table 6.6. Effects of elaborate team structure on the likelihood of VC acquisition  
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 b Model 7 
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.46*** 1.38**      
 (.50) (.57)      
University spin-off .94*  1.14**     
 (.50)  (.50)     
Product    -.19    
    (.64)    
LF prior commercial exper.     .03   
     (.06)   
FT prior commercial exper.      .07  
      (.06)  
Team entry       -.85 
       (1.12) 
FT size (log)        
        




 (.23) (.20) (.25) (.24) (.25) (.27) 
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -56.96 -57.16 -57.93 -60.12 -.59.94 -58.21 -59.62 
Wald chi-square 14.72**** 22.20**** 23.47**** 7.61** 7.30** 7.90** 6.68** 




 Model 8  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 b Model 14 
Founding year:          
                         crisis  1.41***      
  (.54)      
University spin-off   1.14**     
   (.50)     
Product    .81    
    (.66)    
LF prior commercial exper.     .03   
     (.06)   
FT prior commercial exper.      .07  
      (.06)  
Team entry       -.86 
       (1.12) 
FT size (log) -.49 -.63 -.41 -.37 -.34 -.07 -.41 
 (.89) (.97) (.89) (.92) (.92) (.92) (.87) 




(.32) (.32) (.26) (.32) (.33) (.36) (.35) 
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -60.06 -56.95 -.57.83 -60.03 -59.87 -58.20 -59.51 




7.52* 7.21* 7.89** 6.56* 




 Model 15 Model 16  Model 17 b Model 18 b    
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.49** 1.58*** 1.46** 1.48**    
 (.62) (.60) (.62) (.60)    
University spin-off 1.11** 1.16** 1.06** 1.07**    
 (.55) (.55) (.51) (.50)    
Product .01 .13 .15 .18    
 (.69) (.77) (.69) (.74)    
LF prior commercial exper. .08 .08      
 (.05) (.05)      
FT prior commercial exper.   .11** .10*    
   (.05) (.06)    
Team entry        
        
FT size (log)  -.80  -.28    
  (1.05)  (1.07)    
FT elaborate structure .41* .52* .25 .29    
 (.21) (.29) (.25) (.35)    
Log pseudolikelihood-ratio -54.44 -54.15 -53.13 -53.10    
Wald chi-square 37.63**** 41.04**** 35.22****
* 
41.37****    
(degrees of freedom) 5 6 5 6    
Subsample of ventures founded by teams: N firms= 91; N events=14; N spells= 458 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tail test 
 
bN firms= 86; N events=14; N spells= 369 
 
 
Robustness analyses. We also performed supplementary analyses in which we added a 
number of additional control variables, including the exact founding years, sector, starting 
capital, and lead founder’s prior experience. The results remained unchanged. Additionally, we 
performed analyses using the sub-scales of the elaborate founding team structure construct, 
namely the founding team’s breadth of roles and the founding team’s breadth of experience. 
The results are presented in Table 6.7. While a number of our analyses shows significant effects 
of both breadth of roles and experience, they clearly show that the effects of role breadth are 
stronger than those of the experience. These indicate that the structure is particularly important 
for new the long-term development and success of new ventures. We also performed additional 
analyses of the effects of elaborate founding team structure, as well as the subscales thereof, 
on new ventures’ completion of organizational milestones, in a sub-sample of team-based new 
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ventures. Our results remained unchanged.  We also examined whether the lead founder’s 
personality directly affects the new venture’s completion of organizational milestones and 
found no significant direct effect. In summary, these supplementary analyses indicate that our 




Table 6.7. Effects of founding team breadth of roles and experience on VC acquisition 
Cox proportional hazard model – Coefficients and robust standard errors  
  Panel 1: VC c Panel 2: VC d  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Founding year:          
                         crisis 1.275*** 1.176** 1.218** 1.704*** 1.495** 1.556*** 1.688*** 
 (.48) (.50) (.50) (.56) (.62) (.57) (.62) 
Product .170 -.192 .206 .180 .012 -.214 .182 
 (.67) (.67) (.69) (.68) (.69) (.67) (.69) 
University spin-off 1.579*** 1.300** 1.578*** 1.056** 1.114** 1.006* 1.06** 
 (.56) (.55) (.55) (.54) (.55) (.53) (.52) 
Prior commercial exper. .048 .047 .049 .095* .079 .084* .093 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) 
FT elaborate structure     .414*   
     (.22)   
FT roles breadth  .768****    .667***  
  (.24)    (.24)  
FT experience breadth   .242    .031 
   (.22)    (.26) 
        
Likelihood-ratio -65.073 -64.496 -65.237 -55.424 -54.437 -53.069 -55.418 









(degrees of freedom) 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 
 c N subjects= 132; N events=15; N spells= 665 
d N subjects= 91; N events=14; N spells= 458 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tail test 
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6.2. Contributions to existing literature  
The three chapters of this PhD dissertation aimed to extend our understanding of the evolution 
of entrepreneurial teams and have contributed to the corresponding literatures in a number of 
ways. In this section, we elaborate on the key contributions to the existing research (note that 
the specific contributions are listed in each of the separate chapters). 
After performing a careful review of the existing work, we identified a major gap within 
the research on entrepreneurial teams, namely – existing research tends to be predominantly 
static with the vast majority of studies focusing on the performance effects of team 
characteristics but disregarding compositional and relational changes occurring in these teams. 
Topics of team formation and team evolution within the large stream of team research are 
scarce (for exceptions, see Silicon Valley studies of Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman et al., 
2007; Ferguson et al., 2015), despite the evidence that entrepreneurial teams continuously 
change in their composition as founders exit (DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne et al., 2012; Guenther 
et al., 2015) and new members enter the team (Brinckmann & Högl, 2011; Chandler & Lyon, 
2009; Ferguson et al., 2016). The lack of longitudinal approach to teams is not only limited to 
the entrepreneurship research, but to the broader team literature, which has called for more 
studies taking into an account the dynamic nature of team composition (Mathieu et al., 2014). 
The main contribution of this PhD dissertation to team research in general and to new venture 
research in particular, is that it is specifically dedicated to issues relevant for team formation 
and evolution. With the main focus on the founding team development, this dissertation 
explored several important and interrelated questions addressing why management teams look 
the way they do and how they change over time. Specifically, the two empirical chapters 
addressed following questions: (a) why some new ventures start up with more while others 
with less developed founding teams (Chapter 4) and (b) when do founding teams 
professionalize (Chapter 5)? 
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To examine these questions, the present PhD thesis took an interdisciplinary approach, 
combining insights from social and organizational psychology, personality research, 
management, entrepreneurship, and governance. Combining insights from different yet 
interrelated disciplines, allowed us to study the phenomenon of entrepreneurial team evolution 
from a number of angles, providing a more wide-ranging view on the topic. Addressing the 
issue form an environmental, organizational, team-based and individual angles requires very 
extensive data that captures adequately team and firm-level developments over time. One of 
the main reasons why longitudinal research on entrepreneurial teams is scarce, is because this 
type of data is not readily available and is difficult to collect. As a result, the majority of studies 
on entrepreneurial teams rely on cross-sectional datasets (Klotz et al., 2014; Nikiforou et al., 
2018). We developed a unique dataset that enables us to have a deeper insight into the 
organizational, team and individual attributes of technology-based new ventures – with the 
longitudinal design allowing us to follow changes within these attributes over time. The 
development of this dataset is the second main contribution of this PhD dissertation. 
For instance, the detailed accounts of individuals and teams enabled us to examine the 
antecedents of founding team design. Chapter 4 examined whether the variation of founding 
team structure could be traced to the lead founders’ individual differences. Prior studies have 
suggested that individuals’ values and norms explain diversity within new ventures’ initial 
organizational structures (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Leung et al., 2014). Yet research on 
founding team structures has acknowledged the role of the individual founder but did not 
empirically test it. Prior studies have largely focused on the institutional (Colombo & Piva, 
2012; Ensley et al., 2005) and sociological (Aldrich & Kim, 2007; Forbes et al., 2006; Ruef et 
al., 2003) mechanisms guiding founding team formation. Chapter 4 is the first quantitative 
study to examine the role of lead founders’ disposition in setting up a founding team. We found 
that an individual’ personality reflects the preference of whether to and how to assemble a 
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founding team. By doing so, we show that individuals’ personality is important in early 
decisions of the founders and contribute to the ongoing research on founding conditions. To 
further extend this stream of research, it would be interesting to examine whether the effects 
of lead founders’ personality have long-lasting effects on new venture development and 
success. In other words, it would be interesting to examine whether lead founders’ personality 
may imprint their venture.  
Having access to the longitudinal organizational information and the yearly updates 
about the team enabled us to investigate compositional changes within teams. For instance, 
Chapter 5 integrated and extended existing insights on new member addition. Prior studies 
have predominantly examined the issue form a single perspective focusing either on the team, 
organization or environment and often relied on a cross-sectional dataset, comprising various 
industries, not restricted to the technological domains (e.g., Brinckman & Hoegl, 2011; 
Chandler et al., 2005; Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Our rich longitudinal dataset allowed for a more 
fine-grained examination of the new venture attributes that affect team evolution on different 
levels of analysis. It also allowed us to examine the relative importance of these attributes. 
Another important contribution of this PhD dissertation lies in its multi-level approach. 
The present work has demonstrated that examining issues relevant for teams from various 
angles using different levels of analysis helps to generate more nuanced insights. For instance, 
our Chapter 5 shows that team development is affected by forces operating on different levels 
of analysis – including teams’ initial competences, but also organizational and environmental 
characteristics. Prior studies have also addressed the importance of multi-level factors in 
compositional change by examining the effects of team attributes and either the organizational 
or the environmental characteristics (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Chandler et al., 2005). 
However, these studies were not able to produce detailed insights into the antecedents of a new 
member addition at all three levels of analysis, nor into the relative effects of these antecedents. 
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While Chapter 5 showed that macro-level factors may be strong predictors of micro-level 
outcomes, Chapter 4 shows that micro-level forces affect higher-level outcomes. This study 
has demonstrated that lead entrepreneurs’ disposition is an important predictor of founding 
team structure. Having highlighted the multi-faceted nature of founding team development, we 
contribute to the stream of research in entrepreneurship and management that adopts multilevel 
approach (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2007). 
 
6.3. Limitations and future research  
Despite the various contributions, this PhD dissertation also has several limitations that provide 
opportunities for future research. These limitations refer predominantly to the boundaries of 
the scope of this dissertation. With the goal to extend the current understanding of the evolution 
of entrepreneurial teams, we focused on the antecedents of founding team formation and 
professionalization. By doing so, we address important gaps within the existing research on 
entrepreneurial teams, which include (1) an insufficient understanding of the origins of and the 
heterogeneity among the founding teams, and (2) a lack of research on compositional changes 
within entrepreneurial teams. However, other relevant topics, including research gaps 
identified in our systematic review were not addressed within the scope of this work. 
First, the most apparent limitation of this PhD dissertation is that it did not examine 
new venture performance. While we have presented some indications that the founding mode 
with a more elaborately structured founding team positively affects completion of critical 
organizational milestones (VC acquisition), we did not sufficiently investigate this effect. 
Therefore, this finding should be treated only as an indication in support of findings of previous 
studies. We also have not investigated whether the professionalization of the founding team 
necessarily leads to a better performance (Chapter 5). Although the question of performance is 
certainly one of the key questions in entrepreneurship research, it also poses the key challenge 
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with regard to its operationalization. For instance, it is not clear how to define performance in 
firms that do not generate revenues and where financial information is either not available or 
non-existing. Another issue related to performance of entrepreneurial firms relates to the 
comparability of start-ups – as even within the same sector, new ventures may differ with 
regard to their cost-intensity and their product-to-market cycle. Addressing these challenges 
deserves a PhD on its own. 
Second, responding to the calls for more dynamic research (Klotz et al., 2014; Mathieu 
et al., 2014), we have examined antecedents of team formation and compositional change. With 
the primary focus on the origins of team composition at different points of time, we did not 
examine the changing effects of team characteristics across different stages of new venture 
development. There is evidence that some team attributes may be more prominent in the early 
stages of firm development but lose their importance over time (Brixy, Sternberg, & Stüber, 
2012; Klotz et al., 2014). For instance, prior start-up experience may help to build a customer 
base and reach external investors in the early stages of new venture creation, yet become less 
important over the course of time, as it becomes less and less applicable to the new firm (Gruber 
et al., 2008). This is a common limitation across extant entrepreneurship research and beyond, 
as we have highlighted in our systematic review (Chapter 3). 
Third, while we highlighted the role of individuals and the compositional characteristics 
of the teams they form, we did not look into the relational attributes of the team. Organizational 
outcomes may be traced back to the degree to which the team makes use of its available 
knowledge – therefore mechanisms relating to the team functioning, such as knowledge-
sharing (Austin, 2003; Rulke & Rau, 2000), behavioral integration (Hambrick, 1994; Lubatkin, 
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006), and conflict (Bradley, Klotz, Postlethwaite, & Brown, 2013; 
De Wit, Greer & Jehn, 2012) may play a vital role. Examining the role of team functioning 
however requires subjective team-based information, which we were not able to collect within 
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the scope of this dissertation. Future research could examine in how far the inter-relational 
mechanisms within teams play role in strategic decision-making.   
Another limitation of this PhD dissertation relates to what we define as the new venture 
age throughout our empirical studies. We followed new ventures after their legal founding, 
whereby we defined new venture age as zero at the time of its legal incorporation. However, it 
needs to be noted that some ventures may take up to several years before their official launch. 
This is typically the case with the new firms originating from research institutes, which may 
provide a longer incubation period in which they supply new ventures with all relevant 
resources until all important elements are at place (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al., 
2006; Volhora et al., 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2011). In some cases, this pre-founding stage, 
including idea generation, opportunity framing, and pre-organization, may take up to 15 years 
(Rasmussen et al., 2011). While we have controlled for university spin-offs in our analyses and 
robustness checks, we do not have the information about how much support and what kind of 
support each of these ventures received during their incubation phase. Future research should 
look into these issues in more detail. Furthermore, research into the team formation indicates 
that the compositional change within teams during the pre-founding stage are not uncommon 
(Clarysse & Morray, 2004; Vanaelst et al., 2006). This stream of research is mainly qualitative 
(e.g., Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al., 2006; Rasmussen et al., 2011; Vohora et al., 
2004) and therefore based on a limited number of cases. Future research may benefit from 
examining quantitatively issues related to team evolution during the pre- and post-founding 
stages. More specifically, future research could examine how teams come together to frame an 
opportunity and what composition with regard to team members’ knowledge and experience 
influences opportunity identification as well as new venture’s ability to pivot over time.   
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6.4. Practical implications 
In this dissertation we discussed topics related to management structures in nascent 
entrepreneurial firms. Next to contributing to theoretical and empirical insights, our findings 
may also inform practitioners – including investors, policy-makers and entrepreneurs.  
 First, the present work shows that entrepreneurial teams – and more specifically 
founding teams – clearly matter. Our systematic review (Chapter 3) has highlighted the role of 
these teams in several ways. For instance, based on the insights generated by prior research we 
proposed that human and social capital of founders enables firms to achieve organizational 
goals and is a strong predictor of new venture performance. At the same time, founders’ 
personality, identities and ideology have a profound effect on new firm creation. They 
determine what values entrepreneurs pursue and whether they aspire growth. Finally, relational 
characteristics within teams – including the degree of trust, cohesion, and team satisfaction – 
may enhance the way team members combine their efforts to achieve organizational goals. 
Cohesive teams with a broad set of industry-relevant knowledge, that they actively share 
among all members of the group, are known to have higher team effectiveness, which is likely 
to translate into higher organizational performance. Policy makers and investors may use these 
insights to identify high potential new ventures based on the quality of the team and the 
relations between the individual team members. Investors may consider coaching teams 
towards cooperative and effective groupwork. Also, entrepreneurs should consider carefully 
these insights when making decisions about whether and how to form a team. 
 Second, our Chapter 4 highlighted the important role of the lead entrepreneur in setting 
the first and foremost important structure of the nascent new venture – the structure of its 
founding team. Acknowledging that an individual’s personality may lead to biases towards a 
certain type of team design is important to be able to overcome them. For instance, external 
stakeholders that take an active part in shaping and enabling new ventures could instruct 
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founders about the benefits of formally differentiated structures. They could further provide 
mentorship and coaching to recognize biases caused by personality and create heuristics to help 
work around them. It needs to be noted that one’s personality cannot be changed, but one can 
train certain aspects of managerial competences to enable handling of managerial tasks in a 
more effective way. These biases caused by personality types may fall under the common 
pitfalls of the founder’s dilemmas – early decisions made about the founding team that can 
either enable or damage a start-up and its team, whereby the easy short-term decisions are often 
the most dangerous in the long term (Wasserman, 2012). Entrepreneurs should develop an 
increased awareness of these biases in order to be able to navigate around them and to be 
prepared to avoid the common pitfalls. 
 Another contribution that the Chapter 4 offers to founders and investors is that it 
highlights and provides some support to the growing body of evidence suggesting that new 
ventures with more developed founding teams tend to be more successful in the entrepreneurial 
process. Based on this evidence, founders should bear in mind that their initial choice of the 
founding team structure may affect their venture performance in a long run. We have proposed 
a construct of an elaborate team structure – to describe a founding team that comprises both 
the broad set of formally-defined functional roles, and the broad set of experiences that enables 
individuals to fulfil these roles. This construct may serve as a lens through which investors can 
evaluate the quality of the team, as it suggests an approach to identify formally-developed team 
structures that promote successful blueprint of a nascent firm. 
 Fourth, our Chapter 5 highlighted a number of factors that influence the 
professionalization of the management team. We found that significant factors include 
characteristics inherent to the organization (such as founding team and new venture’s external 
environment) that cannot be readily changed. Therefore, it is particularly important to consider 
their long-term effects before formally launching a venture. For instance, experiences of the 
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founding team seem to have a long-lasting effect, whereby the professionalization process may 
be hindered due to the lack of the relevant social capital needed to recruit a suitable candidate. 
When forming a team, founders should bear in mind that they will have to recruit a new team 
member at some point of time. They should therefore critically assess the human and the social 
capital of their initial team to ensure that they have the relevant network from which they could 
potentially select a new member.  
 Similarly, the findings of the Chapter 5 suggest that when forming a team, founders 
should consider carefully the type of environment they wish to commercialize their products 
or services in, as the environment has a direct implication for the requirements to the 
management team. If a firm wishes to enter an environment that favors a highly competitive 
commercialization strategy, the founding team should anticipate the strong need to hire new 
managers to maintain competitive advantage on the market. Hence, founders should be 
prepared that the new hires might be required soon after the new venture launched.  
 To conclude, the findings of this dissertation highlight the importance of founding 
conditions for the formation and the development of a new venture in technology-based sectors. 
As these initial choices may have long-lasting effects, they have to be treated with caution by 
entrepreneurs and investors.  
 
6.5. Epilogue 
To conclude, we hope that the systematic review and the two empirical studies that form the 
basis of this PhD dissertation make a valuable contribution to the understanding of 
entrepreneurial teams – their formation and evolution. We also hope that this dissertation was 
able to set the stage for future research on topics related to entrepreneurial teams that could 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING  
Deze doctoraatsthesis bestaat uit drie empirische studies (Hoofdstukken 3-5) in het domein van 
ondernemingsteams in hoogtechnologische start-ups.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3: De rol van teams in academische spin-offs 
Academische spin-offs (ASO's) vertegenwoordigen een klein maar economisch significant 
aandeel van hightech nieuwe ondernemingen. Afkomstig uit een historisch niet-commerciële 
omgeving, worden deze nieuwe ondernemingen geconfronteerd met uitdagingen, waarvan de 
kern de noodzaak is om synergie te creëren tussen technologische en zakelijke competenties 
om nieuwe en potentieel disruptieve technologieën succesvol te commercialiseren 
(Rasmussen, Mosey, & Wright, 2011). Deze uitdagingen kunnen een mogelijk gebrek aan 
relevante commerciële vaardigheden en ervaring in de sector inhouden, evenals de noodzaak 
om nieuwe managers in te huren in een poging om deze tekortkoming te verhelpen. Nieuwe 
professionals kunnen relevante managementkennis toevoegen, maar deze toevoegingen 
kunnen ook nadelig zijn, omdat verschillen tussen managers en ingenieurs met betrekking tot 
hun denkwijze en identiteiten mogelijk groot zijn. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift is om de bestaande literatuur over teams 
in ASO's op systematische wijze te herzien om een overzicht van pertinente 
gemeenschappelijke thema's mogelijk zouden maken, en om lacunes in onderzoek te 
identificeren. We zien dat het merendeel van de studies zich richtte op human capital (HC) en 
sociaal kapitaal (SC) van academici en surrogaatondernemers die het ASO-team vormden, 
terwijl er veel minder aandacht was voor kwesties rond teamvorming en -evolutie. Slechts een 
handvol onderzoeken richtte zich op kwesties ten aanzien van het functioneren van teams, zoals 
kennisuitwisseling en conflicten. Op basis van deze kritische beoordeling van de status-quo 
hebben we verschillende lacunes in het onderzoek geïdentificeerd en veelbelovende 
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mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek uitgewerkt. We willen een aantal van deze hiaten 
adresseren in de volgende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4: Microfundamenten van organisatorische blauwdrukken: de rol van de 
persoonlijkheid van de oprichter 
Founding team-structuren zijn van cruciaal belang gebleken voor de ontwikkeling en het succes 
van nieuwe ondernemingen, omdat ze een raamwerk bieden voor ondernemers om hun 
inspanningen te combineren en te kanaliseren om organisatiedoelstellingen te bereiken, maar 
ook omdat ze na hun oprichting vaak langdurig en moeilijk te veranderen zijn (Beckman & 
Burton, 2008; Leung et al., 2013). Wetenschappers meldden bijvoorbeeld dat nieuwe 
ondernemingen die door teams zijn opgericht, in tegenstelling tot alleenstaande ondernemers, 
hogere overlevingspercentages hebben (Aspelund, Berg-Utby en Skjevdal, 2005), en dat het 
oprichten van teams met hogere niveaus van structurering meer kans geeft om te groeien ( Sine 
et al., 2006), risicokapitaal verkrijgen (Beckman & Burton, 2008), en een beursintroductie te 
bewerkstelligen (Beckman et al., 2007). Teams, in tegenstelling tot een enkele ondernemer, 
hebben toegang tot meer menselijke en sociale kapitaalbronnen (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) 
en de ontwikkelde structuren helpen nieuwe bedrijven om de liability of newness te overwinnen 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Ondanks deze bevindingen is er een grote variabiliteit tussen nieuwe 
ondernemingen met betrekking tot de manier waarop zij hun founding team structureren. Dit 
leidt tot een interessante, maar onderbelichte  vraag - wat beïnvloedt de voorkeuren van 
oprichters ten aanzien van een of ander (mogelijk succesvoller) ontwerp? 
Hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan deze onderzoekslijn 
door de rol van de persoonlijkheid van de leidende oprichter in de vorming van een 
ondernemersteam te verhelderen. Gebruikmakend van onze rijke, gedetailleerde gegevens over 
de functionele rollen en loopbaangeschiedenissen van oprichters, zien we dat de 
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persoonlijkheidskenmerken van de leidende oprichters verschillende aspecten van de structuur 
van het oprichtende team beïnvloeden, waarvan bekend is dat ze het succes van nieuwe 
ondernemingen op lange termijn mogelijk maken. Extraversie, servicegerichtheid en 
emotionele stabiliteit weerspiegelen de interpersoonlijke aard van het individu en worden 
geassocieerd met het stichten van een team. Zorgvuldigheid weerspiegelt de afweging en 
planning van individuen en is belangrijk voor de structurele uitwerking van het oprichtende 
team. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5: Antecedenten van de rekrutering van managers in hoogtechnologische 
start-up teams 
Nieuwe ondernemingen worden meestal opgericht door een groep vrienden of collega's (Klotz 
et al., 2014; Ruef et al., 2003), wiens kennis, vaardigheden en charisma de belangrijkste bron 
van nieuw menselijk kapitaal voor nieuwe bedrijven worden (Beckman & Burton, 2008 ; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). In de loop van de tijd moeten nieuwe ondernemingen hun 
founding team professionaliseren door nieuwe managers aan te trekken naarmate de 
onderneming evolueert en de uitdagingen de capaciteiten van de oorspronkelijke oprichters te 
boven gaan (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Chang & Shim, 2015; Wasserman, 2003). Omdat de 
oorspronkelijke oprichters mogelijk niet over de vereiste vaardigheden beschikken om een 
bedrijf te leiden dat verder groeit dan het moment waarop het is opgericht, zijn nieuwe 
managers nodig om de mismatch tussen de capaciteiten van de oprichters en de veranderende 
vereisten van de organisatie te verminderen. Deze eerste rekrutering op managementniveau is 
een belangrijke mijlpaal in de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe onderneming, omdat hiermee de 
koers wordt gezet naar de overgang van een kleine, doorgaans ongestructureerde onderneming 
die wordt beheerd door een tamelijk informele ondernemergroep naar een volledig ontwikkelde 
organisatie onder leiding van een professioneel managementteam. Ondanks een aantal studies 
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die hun aandacht hebben gericht op de evolutie van de oprichtingsteams, weten we nog steeds 
verrassend weinig over wanneer bedrijven deze mijlpaal bereiken en welke factoren van 
invloed zijn op de voltooiing ervan. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift is om bestaande bevindingen over 
antecedenten van de rekrutering van nieuwe managers te integreren, hun relatieve belang te 
onderzoeken en aanvullende inzichten te verschaffen. We doen dit met een specifieke focus op 
hoogtechnologische start-ups met groeiambitie, aangezien deze ondernemingen meestal 
worden gestart door teams waarin ontwikkeling van capaciteiten bijzonder belangrijk is 
(Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008; Mustar & Wright, 2010). Gebruik makend van onze 
unieke longitudinale gegevens over 148 Vlaamse, hoogtechnologische nieuwe ondernemingen, 
vinden we dat de kans dat nieuwe ondernemingen nieuwe managers aannemen afhankelijk is 
van multi-level krachten die verband houden met het menselijk kapitaal van de oprichtende 
teams, raad van bestuur en commercialiseringsomgeving. 
 
 
